THE NAYAKS OF SRI LANKA, 1739-1815

POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH IN SOUTH INDIA

. Gopalakrishnan

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THE BOOK

The succession of a Nayak Prince from Madurai in South India to the throne of Kandy in Sri Lanka in 1739 led to a chain of events leading ultimately to the conquest of the entire island by the British in 1815. The Napoleonic wars in Europe in the eighteenth century increased the strategic importance of Sri Lanka, particularly its natural harbour, Trincomallee. The Dutch and the British were also after the control of trade in cinnamon, the "Helen or bride in the contest" of the island of Sri Lanka.

The Nayak Kings, unlike their Sinhalese predecessors, tried to use their South Indian connections to expel the Dutch and find an opening for their external trade. For nearly a century they showed themselves quite able diplomats. If they fell in 1815, it was only to the rapacious imperialism of the British who incited the anti-Nayak faction among the Sinhalese nobles to achieve their objective.

The capture of Sri Lanka was a British enterprise from South India. It is in this light this study has been carried out. This important episode in the history of South India does not find even a passing reference in any of the history books published in India. Based primarily on the archival materials, this enthralling subject is presented in a flowing and lucid style for the benefit of both the scholar and the general reader.

COVER ILLUSTRATION: The last Nayak King of Kandy, Sri Vikrama Raja Sinha alias Kannusami (1798-1815). Just as the last Mughal, Bahadur Shah and the last Burmese King, Thibaw, were deported to Burma and India respectively by the British, Sri Vikrama Rajasinha was also deported to Vellore in Tamil Nadu in 1816 where his relations live even today. "His reputation like that of Richard III of England, is sadly in need of rehabilitation".

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S. GOPALAKRISHNAN

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TO THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER

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PREFACE

This book fulfils the limited objective of analysing the political relations between the Nayak kings of Kandy in Sri Lanka and the English East India Company in Madras. This study based partly on my doctoral dissertation, "South India—Sri Lanka Relations, 1762–1802", does not claim to exhaust the subject completely. There are still many avenues to explore. The social and economic relations have been excluded in this book. The capture of Sri Lanka was a British enterprise from Madras. It is in this light that this study has been carried out. The main reason which impelled me to undertake this study is the total absence of reference to the Nayak dynasty of Sri Lanka in any of the history books published in India.

This book traces the sequence of events which led to the fall of the Nayak dynasty of Sri Lanka and the incorporation of the island as a British Crown Colony. The beginning was tentative and ineffective. In 1762, George Pigot, the Governor of Madras, deputed John Pybus, a member of his Council to Kandy, the capital of the independent Sinhalese Kingdom in the central mountains of Sri Lanka, in response to a request by the King. That monarch, Kirti Sri Vijaya Rajasinha of the Nayak dynasty, was on the eve of a war with the Dutch, who were at that time occupying what was then known as the Maritime Provinces, the littoral along the coast of Sri Lanka. The British asked the Nayak King whether he would "Grant the English liberty to settle upon" the island. The king insisted on military assistance in his struggle

with the Dutch for any concessions to the British. The British could not offer this help without violating the Anglo-Dutc treaties. The Dutch in Sri Lanka resolved to frustrate the activities of the British with the help of the pro-Dutch elements at the Kandyan court. The Pybus embassy failed.

This was a period of wars in Europe involving the British, the Dutch and the French In South India itself, the British had still to contend with the French schemes to recover their power and influence. Due to the exigencies of war in Europe, Lord Macartney, the Go vernor of Madras from 1781 to 1785, had instructions from London to seize the Dutch settlements in India and Sri Lanka. In 1782, he sent Hugh Boyd, a private citizen in Madras, to Kandy to negotiate with the King. Again the attempt failed.

Finally, in 1795, when the imperious Lord Hobert was the Governor (1794-98), a Madras official, Andrews, was despatched to Kandy. At that time the British military campaign was in progress in the Maritime Provinces, culminating in the capture of Colombo, the capital of the Dutch territories in Sri Lanka, on February 15, 1796. Andrews' diplomacy proved superfluous. Nevertheless, it was an event in the history of the diplomatic moves of the period.

Madras set up a military administration in the captured Provinces of Sri Lanka and they made many mistakes. Consequently, the Sinhalese rose in revolt in December, 1796. It smouldered on till 1798. Thereupon, the British Government in London imposed a "dual control". It appointed a Governor from England, but also permitted the East India Company in Madras a share in the administration on the ground that since it had brought the Maritime Provinces under the British flag, it shonld be given an opportunity to recoup them. The Governor was Frederick North.

The "dual control" was a failure. In 1801, the British Government decided to set up a Crown Colony under the Colonial Office On the first day of 1802, the Maritime Provinces became a British Colony. In 1803 the British sent a military expedition, this time against Kandy, but it failed. However, in 1815, the Nayak King, Vikrama Rajasinha, was captured by the British and exiled to Vellore in South India. The Nayak dynasty in Sri Lanka came to an end and the British became the masters of the whole island.

It may be possible to learn from the British that the Dutch and the French policy towards Sri Lanka was guided not only by local considerations but also by global ones. When involved in the

Napoleonic wars in Europe, the strategic importance of Sri Lanka, particularly its natural harbour Trincomalle, grew. When the British captured the Maritime Provinces in 1796, there was no certainty that they would continue to hold the territory. Under a European peace treaty, they might have to return it to the Dutch. This book indicates how after prolonged negotiations the territory was formally ceded to them under the Peace of Amiens, concluded on March 27, 1802.

An important, but little known aspect in the history of South India is the South Indian origin of the last four rulers of the Kandyan kingdom. The last Sinhalese king of the Kandyan Kingdom was Sri Vira Parakrama Narendrasinha (1707–1739). When he died, after having ruled for thirty two years, he was succeeded by his wife's brother Sri Vijaya Rajasinha (1739–1747), a Nayak youth from Madurai. The latter's three successors, who ruled till 1815, when the British exiled the last of them, make up the Nayak dynasty which had mainly to bear the brunt of the foreign presence, the Dutch and the British, in the island. The available sources for the study of this dynasty are limited. This study traces the origin, genealogy and history of this dynasty.

The Indians who went to Sri Lanka in the wake of the first British conquest were the employees of a foreign conqueror, and they inevitably attracted the dislike of the Sinhalese of Sri Lanka. An attempt is made in this book to study the causes which led to the revolt of the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka in 1796. Similarly the main events responsible for the fall of the Nayak dynasty in 1815 are also discussed in detail.

The sources of information are ample, but uneven. The Indian view goes virtually by default. We have to rely mainly on the British and Sri Lankan sources. They are acknowledged at the appropriate places in the references and notes. All entries in the bibliography were consulted although not all are cited in the references and notes.

There is considerable variation in the spellings of words, names and places mentioned in the text of the documents referred to in the book. In this regard, an attempt has been made to be faithful to the spellings as found in the original documents.

This work could not have been undertaken much less completed but for the library and archival facilities made available to me abroad. I had collected most of the material when I was on

Sabbatical leave from the National University of Somalia where I was working as Professor of History on a Government of India deputation in the late 1970s. Later, at the Tamil Nadu Archives, Madras, I consulted valuable material untapped by any other Indian historian so far.

The intellectual debts I have incurred in completing this work are many. I must acknowledge here at least a few. Dr. B.R. Gopal, Professor and Head, Department of History, Sri Krishnadevaraya University, Anantapur, was most helpful throughout the enterprise. He not only supervised my work when I wrote the dissertation but also went through the manuscript of this book carefully and offered valuable suggestions for its improvement. I have no words to express my thanks to him adequately. My thanks are also due to the late lamented Sri N. S. Ramaswami, Assistant Editor, *The Indian Express*, Madras, for giving me some valuable and rare books; and to the late Dr. K. Nambi Arooran, formerly my student and Professor of Foreign Studies, Tamil University, Thanjavur, for sharing with me his bibliographic knowledge and reflections on the subject. I also thank Dr. S. Srinivasan of New Era Publications for editing and publishing the book in its present form.

The twin pillars of support and strength for me in all my academic endeavours have always been my wife, Radhamani, my colleague in the Department of English, and my daughter, Meera, now an Executive with the Tatas in Bangalore. It is perhaps superfluous for me to thank them.

I dedicate this book to the fond memory of my mother.

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SOUTH INDIA AND SRI LANKA



MAP I

1

EARLY SETTLERS

From the dawn of its history, Sri Lanka has been profoundly influenced by India particularly South India. Its principal religion, Buddhism, is of Indian origin. The traditional first king of Sri Lanka is Vijaya. [1] The Vijaya story or legend has strong South Indian associations. Vijaya married a Pandya princess, and his followers also took wives from the Pandyan land.[2] Hostile relations developed after Mahinda, a son of Emperor Asoka Maurya, introduced Buddhism into the island in the third century B.C. [3] Nearly every aspect of Sinhalese life bears the impress of Indian culture. The interaction between India and Sri Lanka in social life in general is studied by K. K. Pillay.[4]

The first attempt of Dravidian adventures from South India, specifically from what is now Tamil Nadu, to seize power may be to take control of trade in pearls, gems and ivory as one of their objectives.[5] In the year 177 B. C. two Tamil traders, Sena and Guttaka, made themselves kings of Sri Lnnka.[6] This is the first recorded event of a succession of invasions down to the late middle ages.

The next invader and conqueror was Elara, or Elala, an adventurer from South India. He ruled from Anuradhapura. His kingdom was confined to the northern part of the island. The south, called Rohana or Rohuna, served for a long time as a place of refuge for kings and others driven out from the north. Finally, Elara was killed by Dutthagamani (c. 161–137 B.C.), the Sinhalese king of Rohana kingdom, in a duel. [7]

More Tamil adventurers from South India followed before the Pallavas, established in Tondaimandalam, began to interest themselves in the island. Their capital, Kanchipuram, was a

Buddhist centre, and that was a bond. The best known incident in Pallava history relating to Sri Lanka was an invasion by Manavamma (684–718), [8] a dispossessed prince of the island, with the help of Narasimhavarman I (630–668), the Pallava king.[9] This occurred shortly after 642.

The early Pandyas of Madurai too had links with Sri Lanka. The earliest invasion occurred in the reign of Srimara Srivallabha (815–862).[10] A Sinhalese work, the *Nikaya Samgrahaya*, states that a Sinhalese king became Saiva and his daughter was cured of dumbness, both by the intercession of an "ascetic clad in the robes of a priest". This king is surmised to be Sena I (c. 833–853) and the ascetic Manikkavachagar.[11]

The Sinhalese retaliated with an invasion in the reign of Sena II (842–877). [12] The rise of the Cholas in the ninth century caused the Sinhalese to align themselves with the Pandyas, both feeling themselves threatened by the new power. When Parantaka I Chola (907–955) attacked Rajasimha II the Pandya (900–920), and defeated him, the latter appealed to Kassappa V (913–923), the Sinhalese monarch, for help. A Sinhalese army arrived, but Parantaka defeated the combined Pandya and Sri Lanka forces. Eventually Rajasimha fled to Sri Lanka. But finding no help there he retired to Kerala, the homeland of his mather.[13]

Parantaka, wishing to celebrate his coronation in Madurai, needed the Pandya crown and necklace. Rajasimha had taken these to Sri Lanka and had left them there. Parantaka asked the Sri Lanka king, Udaya IV (945–953) for them. On his refusal, Parantaka sent an army, but it did not achieve its purpose. This was the first invasion by the imperial Cholas.[14]

By 1017 the Cholas had conquered and annexed most of Sri Lanka. Rajaraja I (985–1014) had little difficulty in seizing the northern part. This was before 993.[15] The Chola removed the capital to Polonnoruva, [16] which he renamed Jananatha-mangalam, after an honorific of his. He assigned some villages in the country to his great Brahadisvara temple in Tanjavur which he had constructed. In Sri Lanka itself the Cholas built many temples, some of which still survive.[17] Rajaraja I's son, Rajendra I (1012–1044), completed the conquest of Sri Lanka in 1017. The Sri Lanka king, Mahinda V (982–1029), was taken to South India, where, after twelve years, he died.[18] His son, Kassapa, escaped

to Rohana and in time, was able to recover it from the Cholas. He ruled that territory as Vikramabahu I for twelve years, from 1029. [19] An interesting interlude was the conquest of portions of the island by one Jagatipala from Kanauj.[20]

The Sinhalese were determined to expel the Cholas and found some able leaders. Vijayabahu I (1055–1110) whose first seat of power was Kataragama, made headway gradually. He captured Polonnuruwa. [21] But this was a short lived triumph. For, Virarajendra, the Chola king (1063–1069), recovered much of what had been lost. Finally Vijayabahu succeeded in expelling the Cholas from the island. He captured Anuradhapura in 1070 and crowned himself there in 1073–74. [22]

The next important event in Sri Lanka's relations with South India was a Pandyan civil war in the latter part of the twelfth century. The Cholas and the Sinhalese fought again, this time in South India and as adherents of two rival claimants to the Madurai throne. Ultimately, this war weakened the Chola power and facilitated the revival of the Pandya power.[23]

The rise of the Pandyas resulted in a change of attitude to Sri Lanka. Hitherto the Pandyas, and the Cheras too, had supported the Sinhalese as against the Cholas. But now the Pandyas became hostile to the Sinhalese. They occasionally invaded the island. An indirect result of the Pandyan invasions was the emergence of the Arya Chakravarthi rulers of Jaffna.[24]

This kingdom of the Tamil districts in the north of Sri Lanka arose following the conquest of the major part of the island by Magha, of Kalinga, in 1215. The Pandyan incursions strengthened the Arya Chakravarthis. [25]

When Vijayanagar became the supreme power in South India from about the middle of the fourteenth century, it frequently invaded Sri Lanka and exacted tribute. The first invasion occurred in the reign of Harihara II (1377–1404). Another followed about 1435 in the reign of Devaraya II (1422–1446). [26] Neither Krishnadeva Raya (1509–1529) nor his successor, Achyutadeva Raya (1529–1542) seems to have invaded the island. But they appear to have continued to exact tribute. [27]

It is interesting to find that Krishnappa Nayak of Madurai, the son and successor of Visvanatha Nayak (1529–1564) of the Madurai Nayak principality towards the end of Krishnadeva Raya's

reign, claims to have invaded kandy. Probably this invasion occurred in 1564–65. According to a Telugu work, *Simhaladyipa Katha*, Krishnappa set up his brother–in–law, Vijayagopala, as hi Viceroy in Sri Lanka. This may not be true, for the available accounts of the Kandy kingdom do not mention this Viceroyalty. In all probability, the king of Kandy had to pay tribute to the Madurai Nayak. [28]

With the arrival of the Portuguese in Sri Lanka in 1505 its history was completely changed. Hitherto its invaders had been mainly from South India though the Chinese and Malaysians had also invaded the island. But the arrival of the Portuguese led to the arrival of Western influences. They were necessarily involved in relations with the Kandy kingdom. Since they were also masters of some territories in India, Goa being their principal seat in the East, they were also involved in the Indian affairs which had their repercussions on Sri Lanka.

Seven years after Vasco da Gama had, after doubling the Cape of Good Hope, arrived in Kozhikode (Calicut) in 1498 to found the Portuguese empire in the East, a Portuguese fleet was driven by storms to the Sri Lanka coast. Lourenco de Almedia, son of the first Portuguese Viceroy of India, was compelled to take refuge in Galle, on the south coast. [29] From there he sailed to Colombo on learning that it was the nearest port to the capital of the Kotte kingdom, the largest in the island.

At this time, early in the sixteenth century, Sri Lanka was divided into three kingdoms, Kotte, [30] Kandy [31] and Jaffna. [32] Kotte occupied the south–west part. Its king was nominally the ruler of the entire island. Kandy stretched from the central mountains to the east coast. Jaffna, the Tamil area, was in the north.

Kotte was the richest and the largest in size of the three kingdoms. The capital was Kotte, a few miles from Colombo. The country's economy was fundamentally one of subsistence agriculture, and the principal source of royal income was land revenue. [33] There was some little trade in cinnamon, arecanut, elephants and precious stones.

The Kandy kingdom was less populous and poorer than Kotte. It was a secluded country, insulated from the other regions by its forests and mountains. Its scanty foreign trade was mainly in

elephants and arecanuts. These were exported through Trincomallee, Kottiyar and Batticaloa, all on the east coast, Kotte, on the west coast, and Jaffna, in the north. Jaffna, a Tamil Hindu kingdom, had special ties with the kingdoms of South India, but they also attacked it on occasions. Its soil was infertile. But crafts such as production of cloth florished.

There were lesser principalities extending from the western coast, south of Mannar, across north centre and then south along the east coast upto the Kotte border. Some of these principalities were very small in size, only a few dozen square miles. Their rulers were called Vanniyars.[34] In the sixteenth century most of the Vanniyars along the east coast acknowledged Kandy's supremacy, while those in the north-centre were under Kandy, Kotte, or Jaffna, according to circumstances.

Thus, the island was badly divided politically. The rulers never made any attempt to present a united front against the foreigners. This fact helped the latter considerably.[35]

The Portuguese policy in the East was to aim at the control of commerce and not so much to seize territory. "One striking feature of Portuguese activities in Asia and Africa was that they did not aim at territorial conquest so much as the control of commerce by subduing and dominating, by means of naval power, the strategic points through which it passed. At no stage did they establish a dominance over the politics of South Asia. What they did was to use their sea power and superior technology at points of weakness or where there were sharp divisions, and thus they attained an influence out of all proportion to their real strength"[36],

Nevertheless, trade did lead to political annexation. Kotte was the first kingdom with which the Portuguese came into contact. When it was partitioned into three parts, their intervention became marked. In 1597 the kingdom passed into their hands.

Kotte was sub-divided in 1521. The king, Vijayabahu VII (1509–1521) tried to make an adopted son his heir. His three sons, Bhuvanekabahu VII (1521–1551), Madduma Banda (later called Raiygam Bandara) and Mayadunne, combined to revolt against him. They had him assassinated. But, unable to decide which of them should succeed, they divided the kingdom among themselves. Kotte, strictly so called, went to Bhuvanekabahu, Raiyagama to Raiyagam Bandara and Sitawake or Sitawaka to Mayadunne.[37]

SRI LANKA DURING PORTUGUESE PERIOD



MAP. II

What followed took a tortuous course. Mayadunne, (1521–81) the most ambitious and ablest of the brothers, wished to rule over the entire Kotte kingdom as it had existed before the partition. But he had to reckon with the Portuguese. In 1527, when he attacked Bhuvanekabahu, he sought the help of the Zamorin of Kozhikode (Calicut) who had a fleet. The war lasted till 1539. The Portuguese, who had taken Bhuvanekabahu under their protection, prevailed. Mayadunne sued for peace. He basely surrendered the Zamorin's chiefs to the wrath of the Portuguese.[38]

Meanwhile, Raiygam Bandara had died in 1538 and his brother Mayadunne had seized his kingdom.[39] Bhuvanekabahu wished his grandson, Dharamapala, to succeed him in Kotte proper. In 1542 he sent a golden image of Dharmapala to the king of Portugal to be "crowned", and to please the king, asked for Christian missionaries to be sent to Sri Lanka. Portugal's policy was to search for "spices and Christians". King John III eagerly seized the opportunity.[40]

King John "crowned" Dharmapala's image and sent it to Sri Lanka[41] along with Christian missionaries. Bhuvanekabahu was murdered by a Portuguese soldier in 1551. According to the Sinhalese law of succession, Mayadunne, his brother, should have succeeded him. But the Portuguese set up Dharmapala. Another civil war broke out.

Dharmapala (1551–97) being too young to rule, his father, Vidiye Bandara, became Regent of Kotte. He turned hostile towards the Portuguese. When they attacked him, Mayadunne joined them. They made short work of Vidiye Bandara. The Portuguese placed Dharmapala on the throne.

But Mayadunne, who had joined the Portuguese only because of his opposition to Vidiye Bandara, broke with them when they ignored his claims to the throne in favour of Dharmapala. He and his son, Rajasimha I (1581–93) attacked Kotte. The Portuguese, who had numerous commitments in India, could not defend Kotte. In 1565 they abandoned Kotte and withdrew to Colombo, taking with them Dharmapala, who had become a Catholic in 1557. Mayadunne annexed all of Kotte except Colombo and the coastal strip.

Sitawake[42] or Sitawaka, his kingdom, had now expanded to include Raiygama and most of Kotte. A further addition followed

in 1582. Rajasinha could make no impression on the Portuguese entrenched in Colombo, but he conquered the Kandy kingdom. Sitawake was now the largest kingdom in Sri Lanka and Rajasinha its most powerful king.

But the decline followed its zenith soon after. The Kandy king, Karaliadde Bandara (1552–82) had, when defeated by Rajasinha, fled to the Portuguese taking with him his nephew, Yamasinha, and his daughter. When he died, these children were converted to Christianity under the names of Don Philip and Dona Catherina respectively.

In Kandy there were many revolts against Rajasinha. The rebels invited Don Philip to be their ruler and asked the Portuguese to help. The latter were only too willing, but at the moment they had no troops. At this time a Kandyan noble, Konnappu Bandara, who had become Christian under the name of Don Juan of Austria, offered them his help. Rajasinha was defeated with his assistance. Kandy was again made independent and placed under Don Philip. Sitawake now consisted of Raiygama, the most part of Kotte, and Sitawake itself.

Rajasinha died in 1592 without leaving any direct heir to the Sitawake throne. A civil war followed. This was an opportunity for the Portuguese. They defeated the rival claimants. They placed Sitawake, Raiygama, and the rest of Kotte under Don Juan (Dharmapala). The Sitawake kingdom ceased to exist. The Kotte kingdom was restored to its former extent and placed under the compliant Don Juan. Kandy was under Don Philip.

The last act in the subversion of Kottee came when Don Juan Dharmapala, the purely nominal king of Kotte, died in 1597. He left no children. Under his will he left his kingdom to the king of Portugal, the so called "Donation of Dharmapala". At his death, the Portuguese seized Kotte. They had profited mostly from the dissensions of the native princes.

In subverting the Jaffna kingdom in the north the Portuguese were helped by the same kind of dissensions. The king of Jaffna at the time the Portuguese went to Sri Lanka was Pararajasekaran (1478–1519). A man named Sankili (1519–1561) assassinated him and seized the throne. The lawful heir appealed to the Portuguese. At their terms, payment of tribute to them and permission to spread Catholicism in his country, they sent an army to Jaffna.

But Sankili offered them the same terms. The Portuguese abandoned the lawful heir and permitted Sankili to hold the throne. But when the conversions to Christianity increased, Sankili became alarmed. He realised that, in any conflict between the two, the converts would prefer the Portuguese to him. He then took some action against the Portuguese.

They sent an army against him. But it turned its attention to plundering a treasure ship wrecked on the Jaffna coast. Sankili had a respite till 1560. That year the Portuguese sent another expedition. Sankili fled to India and was pursued by the Portuguese. He sued for peace and was permitted to retain the throne on the condition that he accepted the king of Portugal as his overlord, paid tribute faithfully, and promised not to interfere with Portuguese missionary activities. At the same time, the Portuguese left a garrison in Jaffna. These soldiers acted barbarously, destroying Hindu temples and robbing them and committing all sorts of crimes against the people. Roused to fury, the people attacked the garrison and compelled the soldiers to flee to Mannar.

Sankili became tyrannical and was deposed by the people. They placed Kasi Nayanar on the throne. He also was tyrannical, and the people appealed to the Portuguese against him. They had him murdered and placed Periya Pillai (1565–1582) on the throne. In 1591, the Portuguese General, Furtado, summoned the chief men of Jaffna to a meeting in Nallur. He proposed that the chiefs accept the king of Portugal as their king, and he promised to maintain the laws and customs of the people. These terms were accepted. Under this convention of Nallur, the king of Portugal, was proclaimed king of Jaffna. Hendaramana Sinha, a son of Periya Pillai, was made the local ruler.

But troubles persisted. On Periya Pillai's death, a civil war broke out among rival claimants to the post of Regent. Thereupon the Portuguese placed another Sankili (1616–1620) on the throne. But Sankili, like his predecessor of the same name, acted against the Portuguese. They sent to Jaffna an army under Philip de Oliveyra. He deposed Sankili. The Portuguese directly annexed Jaffna. In 1621 Jaffna became a Portuguese province under de Oliveyra as the first Captain Major.

We may now turn our attention to Kandy though events had taken place in Kotte and Jaffna at about the same time, the

separate territorial discussions here being only one of convenience. Don Philip was the king of Kandy at this time. But Don Juan of Austria had not given up hopes of the throne. When Don Philip died, suspected by many of having been poisoned by Don Juan of Austria, his son succeeded. But Don Juan seized the throne. He succeeded in expelling the Portuguese from Kandy. He returned to Buddhism under the name of Vimala Dharma Suriya and reigned in Kandy from 1591 to 1604. [43]

The Portuguese replied with an armed expedition. Vimala Dharma Suriya was defeated and he escaped. Dona Catherina was proclaimed queen. But when the Kandyans learnt that the Portuguese intended to have her married to one of their noblemen, they were angry. The Portuguese put to death Jayavira Bandara whom the Kandyans favoured as her husband. This embittered the people further. Vimala Dharma Suriya came out of hiding and with popular support, expelled the Portuguese. He then married Dona Catherina, and thus made himself the lawful king of Kandy.

But the Portuguese were determind to extirpate him. They sent many expeditions against Kandy. In 1602 Jeronimo de Azevedo led an army, but failed to make any impression. What was more disturbing to the Portuguese was that, in the same year, the king of Kandy received two Dutch envoys. The Dutch were now waxing strong in South Asia. It was only a question of time before they challenged the Portuguese for supremacy. Azevedo made another attempt. When on the verge of success, he had to retreat because his Sinhalese troops went over to the king of Kandy. Meanwhile, the king had been attempting hard to get Dutch help to expel the Portuguese, but did not seem likely to succeed. He then offered terms to the Portuguese. But they rejected them. In 1604 he died and was succeeded by his brother, Senarat (1604–1635).

Though Senarat, the new Kandyan king, sought peace, Azevedo resumed the attack. He took Kandy and burnt it before withdrawing. Senarat came to terms with the Portuguese.

The new Captain–General, Constantine de Sa, who came to his post in 1618, began to take precautions against the Dutch assisting the Kandyans. He strengthened the existing forces and built new ones in Trincomalle, Batticaloa and Kalpitiya, all in the

Kandyan kingdom. Senarat resented this and, in 1627, attacked Kotte. de Sa repulsed him. In 1630 de Sa made an expedition. As he was preparing to attack Kandy, four of his chiefs, called Mudaliyars, and two thousand of his Sinhalese troops deserted him for Senarat. Compelled to retreat, he was brought to bay in Vellavaya. In that battle he was killed and his army routed. But, after this in 1633, Senarat and the Portuguese came to terms.

When, in 1635, Senarat, the Kandyan king, died and was succeeded by his son, Rajasinha II, (1635–87) the Portuguese made another attempt to seize Kandy. In 1636 Diogo de Mello took an army into Kandy. But the Sinhalese troops deserted and his army was cut to pieces. This was the last Portuguese expedition against Kandy. Thereafter they had too much to do fighting the Dutch to pay any attention to Kandy.

In 1658 they were completely expelled from Sri Lanka by the Dutch. Thus, their rule, which was confined to the coastal areas, had lasted 153 years. Scholars are divided on their views of the impact of their rule on the country. Arasaratnam says, "Direct Portuguese rule had been exercised over the maritime areas of Ceylon for just over half a century. This period was not long enough for any radical alterations to be made in the economic and social organisation of the land. This was further reinforced by the fact that, on assuming the administration of the land, they had summoned the native chiefs at Malwana in 1597 and promised to maintain and uphold the traditional customs and usages of the country. The organisation of the land and the relationship between the cultivator and the lord of the land was maintained by the Portuguese as it had been under native kings. In the actual operation of the system, however, certain differences did appear, arising from the different nature of Portuguese aims. But these changes were only made within the basic framework of the existing structure". [44]

Chandra Richard de Silva argues that the Portuguese introduced changes which were both radical and long lasting. "Upto the end of the sixteenth century dues from land formed the chief source of revenue for the rulers of the land. With Portuguese hegemony began an era in which the principal revenue of state was derived from the sale of a commercial product, namely cinnamon. Although in the end it was the traditional system of land tenure

much the worse for the suffering it received that survived, the Portuguese land policy had certainly not been one of preserving the organisation of land 'as it had been under the native kings'. Moreover, it was the Portuguese who first established the state monopoly of overseas trade in cinnamon. They anticipated the Dutch in efforts to profit from the trade in arecanut for which product they introduced a system of compulsory purchase. The cumulative effect of these changes distorted the economic structure of the south-western low lands long before the arrival of the Dutch. The changes in the Jaffna peninsula, though perhaps less important, were still noteworthy".[45]

It is in religion and social relations that the Portuguese impact proved strong. It loosened the bonds of traditional society. Roman catholicism, which the Portuguese propagated zealously, remains a powerful force. Many Buddhists still retain Portuguese names or surnames.[46]

The Dutch hastened the collapse of the Portuguese power not only in Sri Lanka but in South Asia generally. By the middle of the seventeenth century the Portuguese power was declining in the eastern seas. The Dutch in Europe who had fought a heroic war of independence against Spain were at the height of their powers. Except in Colombo, they had little difficulty in beating off the Portuguese.

The Dutch strategy in the east was different from that of the Portuguese.[47] The latter secured a monopoly of trade by controlling the entrances to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf in the west, the straits of Malacca and the Straits of Sunda in the east and by dominating the Indian waters. They could do this because theirs was the only European navy in the Indian Ocean and there was no indigenous naval power in the east. The Dutch could not follow this policy because theirs was not the only European fleet in the Indian waters ; there were the Portuguese and the British too. So, they decided to control the areas of production of the goods they dealt in, mainly spices. This involved political and commercial treaties with local rulers. The latter were quite willing to come to terms with them because they detested the Portuguese, and also because they could use Dutch help against indigenous enemies with whom they were fighting. Only where these methods were not successful did the Dutch occupy spice areas.

Rajasinha, the king of Kandy, who called in the Dutch, did not wish to exchange one foreign overlord for another. Rather naively, he expected them to go away after having served his purpose. But they were determined to stay on. At their head in the island was Admiral Ryklof van Goons. In 1659 he had been in charge of the attack on the Portuguese possessions in South Asia. After the Portuguese had been expelled, he was appointed Commissary and Superintendent over Coromandal, Surat, Sri Lanka, Bengal and Malacca, with his headquarters in Colombo. He had ideas which were different from those of his superiors in Batavia, in Java. He believed that it was Colombo, not Batavia, that should be the chief seat of the Dutch power in the east. He envisaged a major sphere of Dutch interest in South Asia based on Sri Lanka and the South Indian coast.

Under the circumstances, with the Dutch determined to expand their interests in Sri Lanka and the king of Kandy resolved to expel them, conflict was inevitable. It was military, diplomatic and economic. Rajasinha refused to recognise the legality of Dutch rule in the Maritime regions. At the beginning, except in Jaffna, where the Dutch took over all the Portuguese possessions, their control in other areas of the island extended to about half the area the Portuguese had controlled.

The Dutch East India Company, Vereenidge Oost indische Campagnie (V.O.C.) had been formed on March 20, 1602. It was composed of six "chambers", each of which traded with its own capital, but profit and loss were pooled. There were seventeen directors appointed for life by the Government of the town in which the "chamber" was situated, the most powerful of these, Amsterdam, appointed eight. The "seventeen", the "Heeren XVII" in Dutch, who met three times a year, had powers only to lay down the general policy. The "chambers" implemented it. The States General, the Parliament of Holland, delegated to the company several powers by charter. It received the exclusive right to trade in all countries between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan. In this area it could carry on war, enter into treaties, take possession of territory and erect forts. [48]

In 1609 a central authority was established in the east for the company, with a Governor–General and the Council of the Indies. Pioter Both was the first Governor–General. His successor,

Jan Pietersoon Coen, the real founder of the Dutch eastern empire, founded the seat of government in Batavia, in Java, in 1619. [49]

Kandy's relations with the Dutch under Rajasinha's successors, Vimala Dharma Suriya II (1687–1707) and Narendrasinha (1707–1739), the last of the Sinhalese kings of the Kandy line, who were followed by the Nayaks, were chequered, but mostly acrimonious. Each needed the other for external trade and for some necessities of daily life. On the whole, the Dutch, who occupied the entire Maritime region so that the king of Kandy could have no access to the outside world except by their leave, was in a stronger position.

There were phases when the two parties were friendly, more or less. Van Imhoff, who became Governor in 1736, based his policy initially on the fact that the economy of the country was inter-dependent between the Kandyans and the Dutch. The Kandyans required Dutch help in two principal matters. The Kandyan royal family as the only ruling house in Sri Lanka, looked to South India for its spouses. The Dutch readily helped in sending missions to South India for this purpose.[50] They also helped in sending them to the Buddhist countries of South-East Asia, principally Burma and Thailand, to maintain contacts and particularly to revive the *upasampada* and the purity and vitality of the Buddhist *sangha* in the island.[51]

On their part, the Dutch needed Kandyan good-will in collecting cinnamon for export [52] and in transporting elephants to Jaffna to be sent on to India and other countries. They required the king's permission to peel cinnamon in his territories. He could, if he wished, impede production in the Dutch territories because of his influence.

On the whole, however, the relations between the Kandyans and the Dutch were acrimonious. When the first Nayak came to the Kandy throne in 1739, the policy did not change immediately. But not long after, the Nayaks revised the attitude of their Sinhalese predecessors. It was this continuing attempt to expel the Dutch from Sri Lanka that led to the arrival of the British.

Before considering that development, it is necessary to discuss the origins of the Nayak rule in Sri Lanka and its implications both for Sri Lankan and South Indian History.

2

THE NAYAK DYNASTY

The Kandy king, Rajasinha II's (1635–87) son Vimala Dharma Suriya II (1687–1707) devoted himself to religious pursuits. It was his son Sri Vira Parakrama Narendrasinha (1707–39), the last of the royal Sinhalese line of Vikramabahu (1469–1511), who brought a South Indian Nayak on the Kandy throne to succeed him.

When Sri Vijaya Rajasinha, brother of Narendrasinha's chief queen, ascended the throne of Kandy in Sri Lanka in 1739, he inaugurated a dynasty mainly South Indian by blood. He traced his descent from the Nayaks of Madurai. Vijaya Rajasinha (1739–1747) and his three successors, Kirti Sri Rajasinha (1747–82), Rajadhi Rajasinha (1782–1798) and Sri Vikrama Rajasinha (1798–1815), were the four members of the Nayak dynasty. The British exiled the fourth in 1816.[1]

It was an old tradition with the royal houses of Sri Lanka to seek their brides from Madurai. Vijaya, the eponymous founder of the Sinhalese race, who has been ascribed to about the fifth century B.C., refused to be consecrated king without a queen of noble rank. Accordingly, so the national chronicle of the Sinhalese, the *Mahavamsa*, states, his ministers sent envoys "with many precious gifts, jewels and pearls and so forth, to the city of Madura in southern (India) to woo the daughter of the Pandu king for their lord, devoted (as they were) to their ruler ; and they also (sent to woo) the daughters of others for the ministers and retainers. When the messengers were quickly come by ship to the city of Madhura they laid the gifts and letter before the king. The king took counsel with his ministers, and since he was minded to send

Genealogical Table–1

KINGS OF KANDY



his daughter (to Lanka), he having first received also daughters of others for the ministers (of Vijaya), high upon a hundred maidens, proclaimed with beat of drum; 'Those men here who are willing to let a daughter depart for Lanka shall provide their daughters with a double store of clothing and place them at the doors of their houses. By this sign shall we (know that we may) take them to ourselves'. When he had thus obtained many maidens and had given compensation to their families, he sent his daughter, bedecked with all her ornaments and all that was needful for the journey, and all the maidens whom he had fitted out, according to their rank, elephants withal and horses and waggons, worthy of a king and craftsmen and a thousand families of the eighteen guilds, entrusted with a letter to the conqueror Vijaya. All this multitude of men disembarked at Mahatittha; for that very reason is that landing place known as Mahatitta"[2].

The Sinhalese "considered it a privilege to intermarry with the Madura dynasty". In the late seventeenth century it became a matter of policy for the chief queen [3] or queens of Kandy to have been princess or princesses of Madurai.

This might have been due to the fact that there were no other ruling Sinhalese family in Sri Lanka apart from Kandy, and the Kandy kings insisted on consorts of the *Suryavamsa*, or the solar lineage, to grace their coronation and also to produce an heir acceptable to the people. Perhaps also, the Kandy kings would not take queens from the noble families of their kingdom because many of these nobles were hostile to the throne and to marry their daughters would only be to strengthen them. They could hope to offset the intrigues of the hostile nobles with a faction of their own. In fact, a contemporary Sinhalese poem states that Narendrasinha married a lady from Madurai "in order to quell the power of his rebellious chiefs who were coveting the throne, and also to produce a pure royal line unmixed with the nobility. Therefore, he ignored the royal maidens of Ceylon who were of 'mixed descent' and invited the daughter of Madura".[4]

It was Rajasinha II who, in the late middle ages, revived the custom of securing brides from Madurai.[5] Interestingly, Rajasinha had also a Kandyan lady of noble birth for wife. To her he gave many gifts. But queenly rank and status was reserved for the Madurai lady.

His successor, Vimala Dharma Suriya II, in the words of the *Culavamsa,* followed his father's example and "as his *aggamahesi* he took the daughter of the *mahesi* in the town of Madhura".[6]

Some details are available of the way that Vimala Dharma Suriya II made an attempt to have his son and successor, Narendrasinha, married to a lady from Madurai. Early in 1705 the chiefs of Kandy requested the Dutch to grant passage in their ships to two envoys who were going to Madurai to seek a bride for the heir apparent.[7] The Dutch controlled the seas around the island and held the important ports (see map III). Without their consent communications with Madurai were impossible.

In 1706 two Sinhalese chiefs, Palkumbure Mahottiyar and Udovita Muhandiram [8] sailed in a Dutch ship from Colombo. The preliminary negotiations for a marriage alliance were in the hands of Venkatapathi Nayakkar and Ramanatha Pillai, two South Indians. [9]

Two Tamils who had settled down in Sri Lanka, Chidambaranatha and Adayappan, accompanied the two Kandy envoys as interpreters. [10] On arrival in Tuttukudi, the interpreters, the two middlemen and a few Dutch soldiers proceeded to Tiruchirapalli, at that time the capital of the Nayaks of Madurai. The envoys, who remained in Tuttukudi, left it for Tiruchirapalli in May, 1706. When they arrived within a league of the city, they were placed in charge of a Rangappa Nayakkar.[11] They then entered the city to stay with a chief named Raja Tondaman.[12]

In July, the envoys held an interview with Rama Nayakkar and Rangappa Nayakkar and an official called in the records, Mutuven Hayyen.[13] The Sinhalese envoys presented three letters, written in Sinhalese, Tamil and Telugu. asking for the hand of a Madurai lady for the Kandy heir apparent.[14] They were told that the king's request would be granted without delay. But nothing was done. The Dutch governor Simons states that even at the time of writing (16, December 1707), when Vimala Dharma Suriya, too, was dead, nothing had come out of this mission.[15] However, the Kandyan court acknowledged the facilities afforded and the honour done by the Dutch and thanked the Governor.[16]

Soon after the heir apparent succeeded to the throne on the death of his father on June 4, 1707, he again turned to Madurai for a queen or queens.[17] In the words of the *Culavamsa,*[18]

SRI LANKA DURING DUTCH PERIOD



MAP–III

the king, "who was an abode of discernment and manly virtues, in order to protect the royal dignity in Lanka, fetched princesses from the town of Madhura and made them mahesis".

Though the *Culavamsa* calls these ladies "princesses" the evidence available on the point is not unanimous. According to Schrender, the Dutch Governor of the Maritime Provinces from 1757–1762, the king was married to "a princess of the opposite coast, who was the daughter of one Pitti Nayakkar of the *Baddegas* caste. [19] It is important to try and settle the status of Narendrasinha's consort or consorts from Madurai, for it was a brother of hers or theirs who eventually became the first Nayak king in Kandy.

A Tamil document, "Narrative of the Affairs of Kandidesam,[20] happens to be the sole South Indian source available so far on the marriage alliances between Madurai and Kandy. It says that the Kandy envoys had an audience of the Nayak of Madurai. When they made their request for a Madurai princess, the Nayak became angry and refused to accept their presents and ordered the envoys to leave. He strictly commanded his relatives not to offer their daughters to them on behalf of the king of Kandy.

Nevertheless, adds this document, a poor man agreed to give his daughter in marriage. The envoys were asked to go to Ramesvaram. There the poor man and his family met them under cover of night. The parties then sailed for Kandy and there the nuptials took place. The consecration of Narendrasinha and the *mahesi* from Madurai was celebrated with great magnificence. Hulangamuve Mydaliya, one of the envoys, was given the village of Ambokka as a gift by the king for performing the service of going to Madurapura to fetch the bride for the uncomparable and extremely magnificent ceremony of consecration". [21] In January 1710, another bride was brought to Sri Lanka, from South India with her family and retinue.[22] After some time the king died childless and was succeeded by the brother of his queen under the title of Vijaya Bala Maharaja.[23]

Thus, the evidence of the Tamil manuscript directly contradicts the *Culavamsa*. There is no particular reason to accept the assertion of the manuscript.[24] It is true that Vijayaranga Chokkanatha, the Nayak of Madurai at the time, was a conservative in religious matters, and he might have objected to the

different religion of the king of Kandy, a Buddhist. But he must have known that the king's mother and grandmother had been princesses of Madurai, of his own stock and presumably of his own caste. He might not have turned down the Kandy request. The national chronicle of the Sinhalese, the *Culavamsa* is entitled to better credence. [25] After all, if the Nayak of Madurai could ride the high horse, the king of Kandy too could be punctilious and exacting. Would the people of Kandy, also conservative in their way, have accepted a woman who was not a princess as their queen and her son as king?

The social status of the Madurai lady in terms of caste becomes an important issue because, the union proving childless,[26] king Narendrasinha nominated as his successor a brother of that queen According to *Mandarampura Puvata*, [27] this brother had accompanied his sister from Madurai to Kandy and had remained at the court since. The *Culavamsa* 98, 1, confirms this. It says, "After Narindrasinha's death the younger brother of the Mahesi of this king became king, adorned with the ornament of virtue. Known by the name of Sri Vijaya Rajasinha, he was after the attainment of his consecreation as King, piously attached to the Triad of the jewels (that is, the Buddha, the *Sangha*, and the *Dharma*). To establish his own dynasty he fetched princesses from the town of Madhura and made them his chief mahesis".[28]

The accession of Sri Vijaya Rajasinha did not go undisputed. A powerful party at the court supported the claims of Unambuve Bandara, the former king's son by a woman [29] of the Vellala caste. But Unambuve seems to have declined the throne. "Later on he lived safe and sound at the court of Kandy".[30]

Why Unambuve did not succeed, either because he did not wish to or because he found discretion the better part of valour, sheds interesting light on the question of royal succession in Kandy. He failed because his mother was not of royal status. She was of the Vellala caste (called the Govikula in Sri Lanka), the highest in social hierarchy Nevertheless, she was not of royal birth. Therefore, her son could not succeed. Children born to the kings of Kandy from women who were not of royal blood were called *bhinna matuka*.[31] They had no legal right to the throne. But they became nobles, and were given lands and titles.

Genealogical Table–II

TABLE SHOWING SRI LANKAN NAYAKS' CONNECTION WITH THE NAYAKS OF MADURAI



The important question now arises why Narendrasinha chose the brother of his chief queen to succeed him and not a son of his sister, if he had any. His decision had no precedent in the history of Sri Lanka. The custom did not prevail among the Nayaks of Madurai either.[32] There is no satisfactory explanation of what Narendrasinha did. But it is important to remember that, unprecedented as it was, it received the support of the nobles and the people, and Sri Vijaya Rajasinha did succeed without any problem.

"Without doubt" says Geiger, [33] "the Sinhalese right of succession rests on patriarchy. Nevertheless in Sri Lanka as elsewhere in India, the remnants of an older matriarchy have been preserved. This is particularly noticeable in the part played by the sister's son, the *bhagineyya*. The fact of this relationship being designated by a special term is in itself significant (Skt. *bhagineya*). For a brother's sons no such terms exists. They are simply called *sunayo*. It is undoubtedly the case that the sister's son enjoyed a certain preference; the last remnant of that special position accorded to him under matriarchy". Lorna Srimathie Devaraja is tempted to say that it was the *marumakkathayam* principle, which means succession by nephews, popular in Kerala, that influenced the accession of Sri Vijaya Rajasinha to the throne of Kandy.[34]

While all this was true enough, there was something unusual in what Narendrasimha did. He introduced what to Kandy was a new principle of succession. As it happened, no other opportunity arose in Kandy, or for that matter in the whole of Sri Lanka, to apply it again quite in that form.

The three other Nayak kings of Kandy, Kirti Sri Rajasinha, Rajadhirajasinha and Sri Vikrama Rajasinha, succeeded under different circumstances. Sri Vijaya Rajasinha married the daughter of one Narenappa, a relative of Bangaru Tirumala Nayaka, who belonged to the collateral branch of Madurai Nayak family of Viswanatha Nayaka [35] (see genealogical table II). Narenappa Nayaka's paternal grand father, Periya Tirumala Nayaka, was married to a sister of a prince of Madurai.[36]

Sri Vijaya Rajasinha died on August 11, 1747. As he was also childless like his predecessor, he nominated his eldest brother-in-law, Kirti Sri Rajasinha, who had been living in Kandy.

He was then a boy of fourteen.[37] Thus the rule of the Nayaks continued in Kandy. His minority introduced a new factor in royal successions. The nobles became powerful. Two chiefs, Dumbara and Mampitiya, carried on the administration, though jealous of each other. Two of Kirti Sri Rajasinha's four queens were said to be the descendants of Vijayaraghava Nayak, of Tanjavur (1633-1673). [38]

When Kirti Sri Rajasinha died on January 2, 1782, of the effects of a fall from his horse, a brother of his succeeded him under the title of Rajadhi Rajasinha. The new king had gone to Sri Lanka as a child along with his brother, and he had been brought up as a Kandyan.

But the Sinhalese nobles, unremitting in their hostility to the Nayak at the court, were growing more and more powerful. Pilima Talauva, the First *Adigar* (the principal noble in the State and the highest State functionary) was one of them. According to custom, the First *Adigar* could help in the choice of a successor to the king. Talauva's ambition was to seize the throne for himself with the help of the British.

Rajadhi Rajasinha chose Muthusami, a brother of a queen of his, not as successor, but till such time as his queens should select a son of one of their brothers. When Rajadhi Rajasinha died in 1798, the victim of a malignant fever, [39] Pilima Talauva selected Kannusami,[40] the son of a sister of a queen of Rajadhi Rajasinha. Kannusami was only one of the many Nayak relatives of the late king who had claims to the throne under the system of matriarchy. Rajadhi Rajasinha had married two pairs of sisters. The first pair had seven brothers, Muthusami, Buddhusami, Kannusami, Chinnasami, Appusami, Ayasami and Rangasami. The second pair had one brother Kandasami. Any one of these could have been chosen under the system Narendrasinha had introduced. But Kannusami was chosen with Talauva's help. Kannusami was a very young man. Talauva called him "a contemptible person, weak in intellect"[41] His intention was to set him aside when opportunity offered. In the meanwhile, he made the new king who ascended the throne as Sri Vikrama Rajasinha, exile all the Nayaks and execute many opponents of his own including the Second *Adigar*. The queen and all the relations of the late king were imprisoned. He imprisoned the king's uncle also, and forcibly

married his two daughters. [42] Several royal relations managed to escape into British territory and were given pension by governor North who hoped they might be usefnl in future. Among them was Muthusami, one of the brothers–in–law [43] of Rajadhi Rajasinha. Talauva succeeded in making the new rule hateful and contemptible. "The pressures built up by this confrontation led to an irreparable breakdown in the political sphere, and the Kandyan kingdom, divided against itself, became a tempting prey to the British who already had an iron grip on the coast and were not disinclined to round off total control over the island now that a suitable opportunity had presented itself". [44]

This dynasty has not received attention it deserves from Indian historians. It ruled for only seventysix years, from 1739 to 1815. But its historical importance is out of all proportions to its brief term of rule. In the first place, it was a quasi–Indian dynasty in a foreign country, [45] called to the throne by the suffrages of the people and the nobles, and not as conquerors. It encountered the jealousy and hostility of many powerful nobles. [46] But when it fell, it was to the superior arms of the British.

In the second place, the dynasty quickly assimilated the Sinhalese ethos by adopting their names, language and religion. The kings were ardent Buddhists and made magnificent gifts to the *Sangha*.[47] They had necessarily to build up a faction of their own people to offset the influence of the nobles, many of whom, throughout the term of the dynasty, were intriguing against them, at first with the Dutch in the Maritime Provinces and, after the expulsion of the Dutch, with the British, who had supplanted them. Hence they took care to perpetuate their rule by intermarrying with their kith and kin in South India and nominating as successors to the throne one of their own blood relations. Nevertheless, the Nayak kings were able to keep the nobles at bay partly because they had the support of the people.

In the third place, the story of the Nayak dynasty of Kandy forms an important chapter in the history of Vijayanagar. The subsidiary dynasties of Madurai, Tanjavur, Gingee and Ikkeri, are well known to historians. The Nayak dynasty of Kandy should be added to the list.[48]

It was not on the same footing as the others. They were in power in the mainland of India, while it held rule in a foreign

country, though a nearby one. Its problems were different. Kandy, an inland mountainous kingdom, surrounded by aggressive foreigners all around, had always to fight for its survival. It depended for two of its essential products, salt and fish, on their forbearance. It could not carry on its foreign trade except with their consent. But it had its weapons. The cinnamon which the foreigners coveted was grown mainly in the Kandy kingdom, and the kings could close the frontiers against the rulers of the Maritime Provinces. They also enjoyed the sentimental support of most of the people in the Maritime Provinces as the sole surviving kingdom in the island. Their survival depended on their dexterity in making the most of their advantages as against their handicaps.

For nearly a century they showed themselves quite able diplomats. If they fell in 1815, it was only to the rapacious imperialism of the British, who were then making their power felt all over the world.

The Kandy Nayaks importance, specifically in Indian History, lies in their attempts to utilise their South Indian connections and influence in their struggles, diplomatic and military, against the Dutch. Their principal object was to get rid of these foreigners who had entrenched themselves in the Maritime Provinces. They believed that they could obtain help from South India in achieving this objective. They did not succeed, mainly because the Indian powers in the south were weak and were falling under the dominance of the British. Utilising the financial and military weakness of the Nawabs of the Carnatic, the British were establishing themselves in the south. Their victory over Tippu Sultan of Mysore in 1799 made themselves the supreme masters.

The Kandy Nayaks were perhaps unrealistic in expecting any significant help from the Indian powers in the south. But it was, in fact, from the south that the decisive interference in Sri Lanka affairs came. It was the British from Madras who expelled the Dutch from the Maritime Provinces in 1795, and who, twenty years later annexed the Kandy kingdom to bring the entire island under their rule. This South Indian intervention in Sri Lanka affairs proved far more decisive than any Indian invasion previously. We may now turn our attention to the events which led to the intervention of the British in the affairs of the Nayak kingdom.

3

CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH IN SOUTH INDIA

From the early days, Sri Lanka, which was at a strategic cross roads of international trade between the East and the West, has been visited by foreigners from time to time. But the first Briton (or, rather, Englishman in the period before the union of England and Scotland in 1707) to visit the island arrived only late in the sixteenth century. He was Ralph Fitch [1] who landed in Colombo in 1588.

But the best known Briton to live long years, though unwillingly, was Robert Knox. A captive in the Kandy kingdom for nineteen years, six months and seventeen days, he was compelled to live in many Sinhalese villages almost as one of the Sinhalese. He observed their life and manners very closely.

Knox was always hoping to escape. He succeeded in getting several letters to Colombo. One of them reached Madras. The Dutch Governor of Colombo took pity on the captives and sent them some money. But the captives had to rely on their efforts to escape.

Knox, writing in his autobiography which was discovered in manuscript only early in the present century, said bitterly. "The East India Company, in whose service 29 men were taken, use no other means (to save charges, I beleeve) than letters" to rescue them.[2] This was unjust. Sir Edward Winter, the Agent in Madras, was instructed from London to take steps to secure their release. Accordingly, Winter sent a ship to "Zeilon to redeeme the English captives". But the Dutch stopped her very near Madras and sent her back.[3]

But in the same year a letter from Winter did reach the king in Kandy. Shortly after, a Dutch ambassador, Hendrik Draak, went to Kandy for the same purpose. The king summoned all the captives to Kandy. But at this time a revolt broke out against the king. When he had suppressed it, he was not inclined to release the captives.[4]

The English failed to have the captives released mainly because of Dutch hostility. The Dutch were willing to pass on letters, but they would not do anything more. They suspected the English of trying to establish themselves in Sri Lanka in order to break their monopoly of cinnamon. They were justified. For, the Directors in London, in asking Madras in December, 1669,[5] to take further steps to have the captives released, also asked what the prospects were of bringing the king's cinnamon to a port on the east coast of Sri Lanka, which was not under Dutch control. Shortly after, another letter, while mentioning the captives, asked that some cinnamon plants be obtained from Sri Lanka and planted in St. Helena, the Company's settlement.

Finally, in 1679, Knox and another captive, Stephen Rutland, escaped, going through Anuradhapura, to the Dutch Fort in Aripu. They arrived there on October 18, 1679. The Dutch received them courteously and sent them on to Mannar. From there they went to Colombo, where the Governor, Ryckloff van Goens (Junior) received them. He accompanied them to Batavia. From there Knox proceeded to the English factory in Bantam and, finally, to London. He was there in September, 1680 after having been absent for over twenty three years.[6]

As already stated, the British endeavoured to find an opening for their trade. Their attempts to have Knox and his companions freed were not altogether altruistic or compassionate. The Directors in London thought that the correspondence with king Rajasinha in Kandy could be utilised to broach a proposal for trade relations. The British desired to break the Dutch monopoly of the Sri Lanka cinnamon trade, and to take their share in a flourishing India–Sri Lanka trade. The Dutch were quite aware of all this and did all they could to frustrate the efforts.

"The most menacing prospect for the Dutch lay in the trade the English and the Danish merchants who from the 1650's were

sailing into the port of Kottiyar in Trincomalee Bay in their port-to-port small scale trading in the Bay of Bengal ; the Kandyan ruler, for his part, actively encouraged this. The Dutch, on the other hand, were apprehensive about his control over the ports on the east coast, not merely because it threatened their economy and trading interests ; they realised that trade links could mature into political ones, and that it was through these ports that these would be established. All these questions assumed much greater urgency when the English East India Company began to show interest in acquiring a trading settlement on the east coast of Sri Lanka".[7]

In 1759, the Dutch Governor, Jan Schreuder, resolved to enforce the payment of arrears and dues on land.[8] These arrears had accumulated over a length of time because the administration was lax. The dues related to gardens planted with official consent which were liable for a third of the produce and those planted without consent which had to pay half. Large tracts of cultivated land had been abandoned by the villagers and occupied by others during a recent war. When the Governor decided to enforce the payment of arrears and dues, the problem of ownership of land arose. There was much unjust extortion. Troops were sent to enforce the orders. They had directions to destroy trees in case of opposition. Naturally this led to wide resentment.

There was also much anger over the Dutch policy of reclaiming land within the cinnamon growing areas which had been cultivated without official knowledge. The official policy, which set great store by the cultivation of the cinnamon, was that areas near cinnamon fields had to be abandoned, and some of these areas were paddy fields. The Government gave alternative land only for those areas which, though not held as grants, had still been paid for. Lands thus reclaimed were reserved for cinnamon. Whole plantations of coconut and jack fruit were destroyed. Further, collecting rent had been farmed out, and the renters were extortionate.[9]

A plot was formed in Kandy in July 1760, to assassinate the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha.[10] It was discovered and foiled by his father-in-law Narayanappa, and the conspirators were punished. He seems to have made the king believe that it was a Dutch plot formed in collusion with pro-Dutch elements in Kandy.[11]

War broke out in January, 1761. The Kandy forces won many initial victories, including the capture of Matara, in the south. The Dutch had been hampered to some extent by the intimidating presence of a British naval squadron under Admiral Cornish at Trincomallee. But the Dutch in South India, both on the Coromandal and the Kerala coasts, rushed reinforcements. Moreover, the Kandy forces had suffered heavy casualties.

It was during this period that the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha turned to South India. The main powers at the time, in South India, were the British in Madras, the Dutch in Nagapattinam and a few other settlements on both the coasts, the Nawab of the Carnatic, the Raja of Thanjavur, and the usurper, Hyder Ali, in Mysore. [12]

It is necessary at this stage to examine in detail the statement of a Sri Lankan scholar, V.L.B. Mendis. According to Mendis, "There are grounds to believe that after the outbreak of the 1760 rebellion the Kandyan court contemplated an international alliance against the Dutch into which the English East India Company would have been drawn". [13] He also says that the Nayaks of Kandy "entertained a plan to establish a close federation between Ceylon and the States of Tanjore and Madura mutual trade advantages with the union under one crown as an ultimate objective."[14]

It would be evident from the following discussion that both these projects were entirely visionary. The Nayaks were ruling over neither Madurai nor Tanjavur in the 1760's. The Marathas were in power in Tanjavur having displaced the Nayaks in the previous century. At this time and for many years to come, the British needed to be friendly with the Dutch.

The British attempted to utilise the dispute between the Nayak king, Kirti Sri Rajasinha and the Dutch for their own purposes. They opened negotiations with the king to acquire a trading settlement and concession in or around Trincomallee.

The Dutch, coming to know of the Kirti Sri Rajasinha's negotiations with the British, kept a close naval watch on the Kandyan ports. Therefore, the British could not send any official embassy to Kandy. However, they denied the Dutch claims of monopoly, and took their stand on the freedom of the seas and free mutual relations with Asian rulers. [15] It was not till during the

American War of Independence (1774–1785) in this period that the British came to blows with the Dutch over the right to search neutral vessels. Hence there was no question of any 'international alliance" against the Dutch. But it is possible that the Dutch, fighting for their survival in the Maritime Provinces, feared one.

The Kandyan Nayak turned to the French. A squadron under Admiral de la Haye "appeared off the east coast" of Sri Lanka, and with him the Kandyans sought an anti–Dutch alliance. de la Haye took possession of Kottiyar. [16] But he too could not offer the king what he wanted, armed help against the Dutch, also for the same reason as the British. France was then at peace with Holland. [17]

The Dutch reacted vigorously. They turned the French out of Kottiyar and carried the war to the Coromandal coast where they expelled the French from Santhome (now a part of Madras) which the latter had seized from the Portuguese.[18]

Excluding the Dutch and the British in South India what were the other possible sources of help for the Kandy Nayaks? In 1761 Hyder Ali, who later made himself formidable, had just established his usurped power in Mysore. He could not help. The Raja of Tanjavur was out of consideration.

The other possible source of help was Mohammad Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic. He seems to have considered the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha a sort of "country gentleman of Madurai or Tanjavur". He declined any help on technical grounds. The king's uncle, Konnama Nayakkar, had sailed to South India without official credentials lest the Dutch, who were in complete control of the seas around Sri Lanka, should seize them and the purpose of his visit to South India was known to them. The Nawab seized upon this fact. He asked why the Kandyan had no official credentials and why no official had been sent.

In any case, even if the Nawab had a mind to offer help, he could not have done so purposefully. By 1761 he had virtually become a protege of the British in Madras. It was they who were to fight his battles against Hyder Ali in the coming years. The Kandy Nayaks were unrealistic in expecting any assistance from him.

But they were justified in expecting it from the British in Madras. The British keenly resented the monopolist trade

practices of the Dutch. There was also bad blood over recent developments in Bengal, where the Dutch had a settlement in Chinsurah, near Calcutta. Nevertheless, the Kandy Nayaks' hope was a vain one, for it was the international situation that ultimately guided British policy at this time, and they were friends with the Dutch in Europe. They were not likely to jeopardise that in order to help the king of Kandy. In such a situation it is difficult to see how the Nayak king of Kandy could have fashioned an "international alliance" against the Dutch.

There is also a theory that the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha had deputed two separate emissaries to the different powers in South India. It was the king's uncle who visited Madurai and Tanjavur on his behalf. Another emissary called on the Nawab of the Carnatic and on the failure of that mission he met the British Governor and Council in Madras. The British names him the emissary "Makandar Moodiar", [19] and the Dutch "Uduma Lebbe, son of Maula Muhandiram".[20] He seems to have been a Moor, or a Sri Lanka Muslim. He met the Governor in Council three times, according to the Dutch records.[21]

When the British decided to send an emissary to the Court of the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha a new chapter opened in the history of Sri Lanka. John Pybus who was chosen to go to Kandy, received his instructions in a document dated April 6, 1762. Pybus was then a member of the Madras Council.[22] The Pybus embassy in 1762 was the first diplomatic attempt on the part of the British to penetrate Sri Lanka.

A letter Lord Pigot, [23] the Governor of Madras, wrote to Pybus on April 6, 1762, sets out his instructions. It began as follows :

"The king of Kandy and Emperor of Ceylon having sent here Makandar Moodiar as an Ambassador to solicit and obtain our assistance to protect him and his country from the oppression and usurpation which the Dutch had long endeavoured to establish and to prevent which he has maintained wars against them these two years. We have considered the representatians of his Ambassador of which you will receive a copy and resolved to send thither a trusting person to treat with the king on such matters as may be necessary and to make such observations of the country power and the nature of the government as may tend to promote

the future advantage of the Company with regard to trade on that island. To manage these negotiations and enquiry, our choice has fallen on you and we are persuaded you will discharge your commission to the best of your abilities. That you may thoroughly comprehend our intention on this occasion, we think it necessary to give you the following information and instruction for the rule of your conduct".[24]

Pybus was instructed to keep his mission a close secret lest it should alarm the Dutch. He was to accompany Admiral Cornish who was sailing to Trincomallee with a squadron and to land there without the knowledge of the Dutch. The king had already guaranteed him protection.

The most important instruction was that, since the Company did not intend to enter into any definite arrangements with the king or to quarrel with the Dutch, Pybus was to avoid making any promise or offering any definite proposals. Still, he was to act and speak as if the Company did intend to help the king seriously, and to learn from him what he expected of the Company and what he proposed to give in return.

Pybus was to secure the particulars of all the treaties and engagements that existed between the Nayak king and the Dutch. He was to ascertain whether the Dutch were empowered to protect all the ports and to ply a monopoly in Sri Lanka trade. He was also to study the country thoroughly for its political institutions, its economy, its armed forces, its trade and its roads.

Pybus was to examine the nature of the government He had to find out whether the Nayak King Kirti Sri Rajasinha was an absolute monarch, whether he was a man of enterprise and capacity, whether he took the field himself and whether he personally conducted the administration. He was also to learn whether there were any leading men who were likely to rebel against the king. In particular, he was to ascertain all about his revenue; whether it was in coin or species, how it was collected, and whether there were any royal prerogatives.

The envoy was also to learn whether the Kandyans had experience of navigation, whether they could build ships, and what materials they had for this purpose. He was also to study the climate and learn whether water was plentiful. "In short", concluded these extraordinary instructions delivered to an

ostensible diplomatic envey, "you are to make all such observations and enquiries as may tend to convey to us a just idea of the nature and produce of the country, the government, the forces, the revenues, the trade, the inhabitants, customs, dispositions and abilities in affairs of war, policy, commerce that we may form a clear judgement of what advantage may at present or herein be drawn from them for the benefit of the company".[25]

Pybus, who sailed to Sri Lanka in a naval squadron under the command of Admiral Cornish, landed in Muttur, off Trincomallee, on May 5, 1762. He left for Kandy the same day and arrived in Gannoruwa, the ferry point on the Mahaveli Ganga, on the road to Trincomallee, on May 23. He was lodged in a house on the Gannoruwa side of the river.[26]

An escort accompanied him on his journey. In a diary he kept, he explains the system of travel on the part of distinguished personages in the country. Village headmen "assemble the people from the Different villages to assist in any business of the king's, who are to accompany those who demand them on such service to the end of their district, where they are exchanged or relieved by others summoned by the Head men of the next district for that purpose, and this is practised in each district as you pass through".[27]

On May 24, Pybus had his first audience of the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha. Pybus's account of this fills many pages. He was a short tempered man by nature, and he resented the obligatory ceremony of presenting a letter to the king on bended knee.

All that passed by way of diplomatic negotiations at this audience was an inquiry by Kirti Sri Rajasinha whether the British in Madras were his "steady and sincere friends". Naturally, the British envoy replied that they were. The king said that "he esteemed my being sent to his court on the verbal representation of a Private Messenger from him, as a very great mark of our confidence in him, and that as he ever heard the English Nation were remarkable for their good faith, he had long been desirious of their friendship; concluding with desiring my opinion whether the Governor and Council of Madras were his steady and sincere Friends, or not; to which I answered, that although his messenger had brought no Letter, Yet, as we had no doubt of his being sent by him, we considered the Representations he had made to us in

the same manner light (sic) as if they had come from himself, and therefore did not hesitate upon dispatchg (sic) a person to his court, as he had desired: That I could take upon myself to assure him he would find the English punctual to any engagements they might enter into with him; That the Governor & Council of Madras, in particular, were very heartily inclined to be his steady and sincere Friends, and sent me to let him know so; and that I should be ready to wait upon him to discourse in Private upon Business whenever he thought proper. He then desired I might be told that he had not words to express the joy and satisfaction he felt at what I had said to him".[28]

From this Pybus drew, rather hastily, the conclusion that the Nayak King would "grant us any priviledge to induce us to settle on the island, and assist him in driving off the Dutch". [29]

After nine days, from May 25 to June 2, when "nothing particular" occurred, Pybus was taken to a house within Kandy. The officer in attendance told Pybus that "the more myself and servants kept within the house, the more pleasing it would be to the king ; as, by walking the streets, my Servants might probably get into some dispute & quarrels with the Cingalese, which would give the king much uneasiness". Rightly did Pybus conclude that the Kandyans were "not willing I should be too well acquainted with the place and its situation". He promised that "I would be careful my servants should not be seen in the streets". The court took other steps to isolate the envoy and his servants. A guard of of ten or twelve persons from the palace, armed with "Europe Arms" was quartered on the house. The officials made it out that it was a compliment to the envoy. But "I am satisfied it was (to) prevent my having any communication with the inhabitants". Further, "the Vackeel's Brother, who had continued with me all the time I was at Gunnoor, was now forbid to come, but by particular order when sent for by the officers who visited me daily, to act as an Interpreter".

On June 4, Pybus was informed that the king, to show "his desire to make every thing as easy to me as possible, had appointed a Council consisting of his Generals and other Head Men, to meet and enter into Business with me, who would acquaint him with that I might propose". [30]

Pybus met the council for the first time at 9 0' clock that night. Thus began the tortuous negotiations with each side attempting to outsmart the other. But they were foredoomed to failure because the English had not the slightest intention of granting what Kirti Sri Rajasinha was very eager and anxious about. They merely wanted to find out whether they could get something for nothing.

That the Kandyans had not the slightest inkling of the British attitude was repeatedly clear from what the spokesmen of the Court said on many occasions. Now, before Pybus met the Council, a "General", who, according to Pybus, "is a very sensible well-behaved man, a great favourite of the king's & seems well inclined towards the English", said in "a long Harangue" that the king had shown Pybus special favours (like the house in Kandy and permission to ride in a palanquin in town) because he wished "to enter into (an) Alliance and Friendship with the English Nation ; the Regard which had been paid by that Nation to the Representation made to them by a Private Messsenger of his only, without any Letter from him".

Then began a contest of wits. The Kandyans asked "what particular matter or Business the Governor & Council of Madras had empowered me to communicate to him" (The Nayak king of Kandy). [31] Pybus replied that he had been sent on the king's representation, to learn what proposals he had to make to the British and what he expected of them. "But they declined giving me any answer upon these points to, alledging that their directions were to hear from me what I had to propose". [32]

This was an impasse. Pybus broke it to some extent by asking whether the king would "grant the English liberty to settle upon this island, and upon what footing, or with what Priviledges". [33] The Kandyans made no direct reply to this, but asked specifically "in what manner, and how far, the English could Assist him (the king), both by Sea & Land, in his Enterprizes", [34] against the Dutch. The courtiers said that the king had "sent a person to Madrass to represent to the Govr. & Council of Madrass that the Dutch, who had been settled upon this Island for many years, had till very lately behaved themselves well towards the king, and complyed with whatever he had recommended to them ; That within this year and a half or 2 years they had observed a very

different conduct, and shown no regard to the king's orders or advice ; whereupon he had commenced a war against them, and sent his armies by Land to punish them, which he was sufficiently well able to do". [35]

Till now the Dutch were administering the Maritime Provinces as servants of the Nayak king. This was only a legal fiction. It was not a fact that only two years previously, about 1760, the Dutch had become 'disobedient'. There had been many clashes between them and the Dutch. Nor was the present war going well for him. In 1765 a Dutch military expedition against Kandy succeeded, and the King Kirti Sri Rajasinha had to accept a harsh treaty.

Pybus had his answer. "I was not impowered to make any promise or engagements, and could only in General Assure them, that the English were well inclined to enter Friendship & Alliance with the king, and that it was necessary, before anything was concluded, that the Govr. & Council of Madrass should be acquainted, what Priviledges the King was willing to grant them, should they determine upon sending him Assustance ; which I therefore desired they would communicate to me". [36]

Strangely enough, Pybus is more frank in his official report than in his private diary on this point. The Kandyans, he says there, urged that "as they had made me accquianted with what his Majesty demanded from us on his part, it rested with me to let know what indulgences we expected in return. This appeared but reasonable..."[37]

Pybus says he had two alternatives at this stage. "Though I saw the very little probability there was of entering into Treaty with them on such a footing and your Honour & (that is, the Governor or Madras and his Council) had furnished me with no directions on the subject, I had no other alternative left but of declaring my real sentiments, or of making some proposals that might carry with them the Appearance of an Intention on our parts to cultivate an Alliance and Friendship with them..." He chose the latter alternative, "declaring, however, at the time of making them, that they were not to be considered, or in any respect construed, as a treaty or agreement finally concluded or entered into, but subject to such alterations or Additions you as might see proper".[38]

Pybus proposed a draft treaty. In brief, he suggested that the English East India Company be permitted to establish "a settlement or settlements" in Trincomallee Bay, or Battaicalao, or Chilaw, or at any other place in the island which it might find convenient. It would have liberty to procure cinnamon, and the king would order his subjects to furnish the commodity to it on the same conditions under which they provided it to the Dutch. Pepper and betelnut should be sold only to the English. The people should be prohibited from trading with any settlement other than English. The English should be allowed to erect forts, warehouses and other suitable buildings. At any time when it was necessary for the English to help the king with troops, he should provide the troops with their needs at his charge and pay the officers the *batta* as followed on the Coromandal coast. The king should "make over to the East India Company certain countries or from whence they may be enabled to reimburse themselves for such charges" on military establishments and fortifications.

The articles would have placed an onerous burden on the king. He was to give the British a territorial foothold, a rigorous commercial monopoly, and access to the king's resources if the need developed. Even as his articles were translated into Sinhala to be placed before the king, the Kandyans "pressed me very earnestly to declare whether or no, if the king should grant every thing I had proposed, I would take upon me to assure him that the Governor & Council would assist him against the Dutch". [39]

When Pybus trotted out his stock reply, His Majesty might be assured the English were very desirous of cultivating his Freindship and Alliance, but I was not empowered to enter into any particular engagements with him, nor could I take upon myself to say how far you might approve of the proposals I had made, or others what you might have to make",[40] the Kandyans replied very reasonably in Pybus' own words, "that as the Govr. & Council of Madrass, in consequence of a representation made to them by his Majesty's Vackeel of the situation his Affairs were in with the Dutch, and that he wanted our Assistance, had thought proper to send me, a member of their Council, to treat with him, it appeared somewhat surprising that I was not empowered to enter into any Agreement or give any possitive (sic) assurances whether he might

depend upon our assistance or not".[41] Pybus himself admits that "this method of reasoning carried with it some weight [42] and that his "inconclusive answers"[43] made the Kandyans "little satisfied, as they had reason to be". His lame answer was that this was because the Governor of Madras considered the proposals "a matter of too much consequence to leave to the management of one person".[44]

Pybus met the Kandyan negotiators again on June 7. He expected to learn what the king had to say about the proposals he had made. Instead, they "several times pressed for a positive answer, whether, if every thing I had proposed was complyed with, the English would assist them".[45] Pybus replied that he could not say, "I had not come to determine anything conclusive, but to hear what the king expected from & what Privileges he was willing to grant, the English Nation; that I had only in general mentioned such points as seemed to be of the most consequence; That the Govt. & Council would probably have Alterations to make to these proposals ; That in particular the Reseption (sic) of English ambassadors was a matter that must be left to them to determine; that for these Reasons, I could not take upon me to give any Possitive (sic) Assurances with Respect to the Assurances they were to have from the English; that I could not deceive them by promising what did not depend on me to perform: but that, in Genl., I was empowered to assure them the English were very well disposed to be their Friends and Allies".[46]

When, dissatisfied with this answer, the Kandyans asked Pybus whether he had anything further to propose, he "answered no; but repeated, that I could not tell what the Govr. & Council of Madrass might have further to offer ; and that I must them understand, that what I had said upon this subject was considered to be conclusive or determinate ; that every thing must be referred to the decision of the Gentlemen at Madrass & that I supposed his Majesty would send some one from hence to bring him their determination".[47]

The final meeting was held on June 19. The Kandyans, in discussing Pybus' proposals, objected a long time upon the subject of the Cinnamon Trade ; The difficulties that attended collecting it ; acquainted me with the manner in which the Dutch collected it and with the method the king proposed (we) should be supplied

with it". [48] The Kandyans also objected to the proposals that, in times of war, the king should bear all the expenses of the English army, "such as Stores, Batta to Officers, Xc".[49] To this Pybus replied that "as no Body could answer for the fortune of war, should we undertake one in support of the King, it might perhaps continue as long as the War upon the Coast had done, the Expenses (sic) of which had amounted to an immense sum of money ; and that it was not reasonable, if we undertook it, that the Company should bear the charge of carrying it on, as it would be done at the king's particular request".[50]

Pybus was not anxious to discuss the points. "It was to little purpose our saying much upon these subjects, as they would be fully & finally answered by the Govr. & Council of Madrass".[51] This meeting ended at past 3 in the morning. All of Pybus conferences started late at night and lasted till early in the morning.

On June 24 Pybus obtained leave to depart. He was in Trincomallee on July 2. He sailed for Madras the same day on board 'the Falmouth', the flagship of Admiral Cornish. Pybus had asked for permission to leave by way of Batticalao, evidently to spy out the land. But he was not allowed to. All through his journey and stay in Kandy, he was under close observation. [52]

Nevertheless, Pybus devotes more than half his report to an account of what he saw and heard. Naturally, he devotes much attention to cinnamon, which he calls the "most important Branch" of the "Trade carried on to & from this island by the Dutch East India Company".[53] The article of Beetlenutt is the next most considerable export this Island affords"[54] and "pepper is the only other export of any consequence the Dutch company reserveto themselves".[55]

The Dutch also captured between a hundred and fifty to two hundred elephants a year for export, though the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha allowed them to take between twenty and thirty.[56] The imports, Pybus says, were silk, tea, sugarcandy, chinaware, piece goods from the Coromandal coast and Bengal, iron and steel from Europe, and "Japan Copper from Batavia". [57]

The draft treaty that Pybus proposed is preserved in the Tamil Nadu Archives, Madras. It contained fourteen articles.

It is important to note that, in the first Article Pybus does not specifically ask for Trincomallee as a place of settlement for the British. It is only one of many choices. Pybus would have been glad if Batticalao or Chilaw or any other place had been offered. This disproves the view that the Pybus mission had the acquisition of Trincomallee for an objective because of its strategic importance. [58] It was only later, when the French admiral, de Suffren, showed the strateagic value of Trincomallee, that the British became aware of the fact. [59]

There are no records in Tamil Nadu Archives at Madras of the details about the arrival of the envoy from Kandy, the copy of the instructions given to Pybus by Madras office to which he refers, the contents of the letter he took to the king Kirti Sri Rajasinha or of the letter to him received on the 'Falmouth' on his return. The Report of Pybus is to the 'Select Committee'. It is possible that the Committee maintained secret archives which have not been preserved.

Pybus did his best to procure economic and other information as he had been instructed. This is embodied in the official report he submitted to the Governor of Madras on his return. But he was not a successful eavesdropper on Kandy. [60]

On the day Pybus arrived in Gannoruwa [61] the Vakil who had accompanied him from the coast was replaced by his brother, who was appointed his companion. The new man was a Government agent who was set more to spy on Pybus than to give him information. According to Pybus this man was his main informant. Possibly, the agent supplied Pybus with misinformation at the orders of the king Kirti Sri Rajasinha. Further, the envoy was kept under strict confinement throughout his embassy. The Nayak king perhaps became aware that Pybus had instructions to spy. Perhaps also, he wished to keep Pybus' presence in Kandy a secret from Dutch spies. Yet another reason why Pybus was not a good spy was that he was not a patient man. Difficult to please, he was prejudiced from the start of the embassy. He began to despair of it even when he was in Gannaruwa, on the way to the capital. He grumbled perpetually and was eager to find fault. He created a bad impression. That was the view of the Dutch spies. [62]

For the information he brought back to Madras was vague and superficial, though, as far as it went, it was not very inaccurate.

Pybus himself admits that what he learnt of local conditions was obtained with much difficulty and, what is more, only at second hand. He says, "...No one was suffered to come near the House (in Kandy) where I lodged but such as had the king's permission ; no person allowed to converse with my servants in the Malabar language but the Linguist appointed by the king to attend twice a day, when the Officers paid their visits ; and neither myself nor servants were permitted to go out of the House after my removal to the Town of Candia (Kandy) but when sent for to the p(a)lace on Business. It must have been very difficult under such circumstances & such Government, to have procured any intelligence or information that could be depended on".[63]

The Pybus embassy was doomed to failure from the start because the company in Madras could not possibly commit the Directors in London or the British Government to a war against the Dutch, which would have seen the result had they given armed help to the king. The king was bound to be disappointed. He and his advisers could not have been well informed if they expected British help in the then prevailing international situation. But the Madras Council had no objection to what was in reality a spying expedition.

The Directors of the East India Company in London, in a first letter to Madras which had reported the embassy, urged, in their reply dated March 3, 1763, caution, but gave tacit approval of what they had done. In a second letter dated December 30, 1763, which was in reply to a communication from Madras of November, 1762 they approved the Council's action. They said that they proposed to refer the question of Dutch trade monopoly to a conference between Britain and Holland that was then in session to try and resolve their differences.[64]

But the British Government, to which the Dutch Ambassador in London made a representation, became angry with the Company. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Bute, reprimanded the Directors sharply. The Government was eager to be friends with the Dutch at this time. The Company's action, he said, was prejudicial to the national interest.[65]

The Directors in London were of the same view when they came to know of the embassy "long afterwards". They hoped that Madras had not given any offence to the Dutch. They did not

think that they could accept from the king any grant of Dutch settlements, but they had no objection to any other part of the king's dominion which was not under the Dutch. So long as the Anglo–Dutch treaties were not contravened, they approved the initiative that Madras had taken towards creating a foothold in the island. In fact, Madras "should lay hold of the opportunity to procure some cinnamon plants which are ripe in the month of September and from which the tree is cultivated. These could be sent to Bencoolen, Anjengo, Bombay, where they may thrive".[66]

But the Directors feared that the Nayak king would insist on military assistance as the price for any concessions. The British could not offer this help without violating the Anglo–Dutch treaties. "We should not draw upon ourselves the odium of involving the nation in a new war". [67] The Directors also feared that the Pybus embassy might lead to undesirable consequences. If Madras did not help the king militarily, he might turn to the French, and they would be only too willing to assist him. If, on the other hand, the British did send military help to the king, the Dutch might declare war against Britain and join hands with the French. The French danger to the British had by no means ended in South India. Though Lally had been defeated, there were many Frenchmen hoping to retrieve the situation. Though the Directors and the Madras Council were one in hoping to utilise the Pybus embassy as an opportunity to learn about conditions in the Kandyan kingdom at first hand, the Council seems to have been oblivious of the possible international implications and consequences of what they had done in deputing Pybus to Kandy.

The Sinhalese had said of Rajasinha II that, in seeking the Dutch help to expel the Portuguese, he had "given pepper and received ginger". They might have made the same remark of Kirti Sri Rajasinha. His invitation to the British in South India cost him dear.

4

THE DUTCH REACTION

The Pybus embassy took the Dutch in Sri Lanka by surprise. At the outset, before the full facts came to light, they were dismayed. They were, in 1762, fighting the king. The juncture at which Pybus chose to visit Kandy made them assume that he had gone there to offer British military assistance against them. The full story can be pieced out from the proceedings of the Dutch Secret Council that year.

The Dutch first came to know of the Pybus embassy from a letter that Christian van Teglingen, the chief of the Dutch settlement in Nagapattinam (now in Tamil Nadu) wrote them under date April 30, 1762. It was discussed at a meeting of the Council held on May 28.[1] It said that Teglingen had heard from Jacobus Dormieus, the Chief in Pulicat (now in Tamil Nadu, a little north of Madras), that an envoy from the Kandyan court had arrived in Madras and had met the Council there three times. He had criticised the Dutch rule in Sri Lanka. The Madras Council had sent an envoy to sail with admiral Cornish, who had left for an unknown destination with four warships. There were rumours in British circles in Madras that a Scottish High land regiment was on board and that it would stay in Sri Lanka for six months. A head servant of Josias du Pre [2] also was on board. He was a "crafty knave", had lived in Sri Lanka, and was now to be an interpreter with the expedition. The British pretended that six months in Sri Lanka were needed to repair the ships.

Teglingen added that it was certain that the British, who were acquainted with the situation in the island, would seek to make a settlement there. It was also definite that Pybus had sailed with five warships as envoy to the Kandyan court.

The Dutch Council immediately sent a copy of this letter to Martin Rein, the Chief in Trincomallee, instructing him to verify these reports and to prevent correspondence between the envoy and the Kandyan court to avoid coming into a collision with the British.

The Council resolved to frustrate the activities of the British and to impress on the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha the determination of the Dutch to preserve their lawfully obtained lands, forts and rights. Though the Council was conciliatory towards the King, he was not disposed to be friendly and insisted on his claims to certain territories which he had recently seized [3] and in his request to send two *dhonis* [4] to India with arecanuts. The British were intriguing with the Kandyans in order to obtain a settlement in the island. This view was strengthened by a report that already there were four Englishmen at the Kandy court, that Cornish's fleet was riding in the Trincomallee roads and that a British infantry Major and Captain were about to sail to Madras in a twomasted vessel. As for further action, the Council decided to wait for reports from three spies sent to Kandy. van Teglingen was instructed to make every effort and find out what the British designs were.

Martin Rein, in Trincomallee, reported to the Dutch Governor, L. J. Baron van Eck who succeeded Jan Schreuder in 1762 and retained office till 1765, in a document dated July 8, 1762.[5] He said that Admiral Cornish had arrived in Trincomallee on May 1 with five ships and had asked permission to enter the inner bay, some of the ships needing repairs. Permission was granted. It was learnt soon after that a Kandyan envoy had travelled in the ships from Madras and that, after landing with an Englishman, had gone inland. "As I had set guards on the shores, and a thony *(dhoni)* to prevent any small boat leaving the Bay, I did not believe this report, the more so that it was also reported that when the Admiral was asked for help by the Candians, and for powder and shot, he replied that it would cost him his life did he do so without orders from his King, and had besides been very friendly to us, and had punished most severely and excesses committed by his men".

"But since soon afterwards Teylingen informed me that a Candian Envoy was on the way with Cornish, I could no longer doubt the report, and doubled the guards and sent out spies, coming to learn that the (British) Envoy was now near the river

Kinke[6] and had not yet had any audience. I sent spies there, but they returned without further information, and I had to content myself with giving strict orders to the guards to attempt to intercept him on his return. It was also learned that the Court Dignitaries were disinclined to negotiate with him, but that the King was favourable. Cornish entirely denied the report when I mentioned it to him".

"It being then reported to me that an English longboat had sailed out of the Inner Bay, apparently making for Coetjaar (Kottiyar, or Koddiyar) I sent to advise the Admiral that I hoped none of his men would land there, since the (Dutch East India) Company had exclusive possession of this Island, to which he replied that he must seek for provisions, nothing being purchasable in the Coy's lands; but that if I would provide his ships with them he would abandon the project if not, he would carry it out and listen to no further protests. I however made a protest in writing, since the weakness of our fortifications and garrison precluded the use of force".

"On the 25th I received a report that the Envoy was about to leave Candia for Coetjaar, with two Mohatiaars[7] and a suite of about 200 men, an therefore sent out more spies and two thonies in that direction. "On the 3rd at day break a three–masted English vessel was sighted, the 'Falmouth' with Cornish on board sailing out to meet her, and both anchoring near Coetjaar".

"Next day Cornish sent his Secretary to take leave of me, and on the 5th he sailed from Coetjaar, followed by the other ships lying in the Inner Bay, except two which are not yet repaired".

"Meanwhile my spies reported that the Envoy had come rapidly to Coetjaar and had embarked in one of the English ships there, being accompanied and seen off by the Dessave[8] of Tamblegam".

This report shows that the Dutch were able to keep themselves acquainted with what was going on in broad essentials. They had feared that in the wake of the Pybus embassy an invasion fleet would follow. But they realised that these fears were unjustified. Recovering their nerve, they organised a counter campaign against the Nayak king, Kirti Sri Rajasinha. This was both military and diplomatic, or rather diplomatic intrigue.

Baron van Eck, the Dutch Governor, resolved on a hostile demonstration. He built a fort in Matara which, from its shape, is called "Star Fort". He captured Chilaw and Puttalam, both on the west coast. He then sent an expedition against Kandy. But it failed. The Governor had not realised the enormous difficulties of such an expedition. For a full century the Dutch had carefully abstained from mounting such expeditions.

The Kandyans were good guerilla fighters. They knew they had no chance against a trained army in the plains. But the Kandy kingdom was mountainous, had no roads and was ideally adapted for guerilla defence. There were a few pathways, but they were deliberately kept dilapidated and unrepaired. At the approach of an hostile army, the inhabitants would flee to the woods. The invaders would obtain no supplies. They would have to maintain an unbroken line of communications all the way with Colombo. Small garrisons left to protect posts of communication would be overpowered.

"Conscious of their inability to resist the regular attack of European troops", wrote a British officer later, "and aware of the advantages they possess in being familiar with the country and inured to the climate, the Kandyan generals avoid close combat, preferring an irregular and desultory warfare. They harass the enemy in his march, hanging on his flanks, cutting off his supplies, interrupting the eommunication between his divisions, and occupying the heights which command the passes, they fire with perfect security from behind rocks and trees. They aim principally at the coolies who carry the ammunition and provisions, well knowing that, without these, a regular force can make but little progress. To dislodge them from these heights is a task of extreme difficulty, as the paths leading to them are mostly on the opposite sides of the mountains, and only known to the inhabitants".

"They are accustomed to impede the march of hostile troops by feeling and placing large trees across the defiles. In narrow passes, where they cannot be avoided, this contrivance presents a most serious obstacle to the march of troops, for cutting up and removing a large tree is not the business of a moment".

The Dutch realised the truth of all these by this time. The expedition advanced far enough to be involved in difficulties. The Kandyan guerillas were so active that the Dutch had to return.

But the Dutch realised that they could afford this defeat, for that would prejudice their efforts to make Kandy accept the fact of Dutch sovereignty over the Maritime Provinces. A second expedition, strengthened with reinforcements from Batavia, was despatched in 1765. It proved successful, and the Nayak King of Kandy had to accept a harsh treaty. This was the indirect result of the king Kirti Sri Rajasinha having sought the help of the British in Madras.

The military action was the culmination of the diplomatic efforts the Dutch made to weaken the Nayak king. They had spies at the Kandyan court to tell them what was happening In 1760 the king Kirti Sri Rajasinha had escaped from an assassination attempt organised by some of his nobles. The plot came to light, and he punished its leaders severely. There was much bitterness at the court The Dutch tried to exploit it.[9]

The Kandyan chiefs might not have been opposed to the British, but some of them certainly hated the king and to that extent they were receptive to the Dutch approaches.

At the same time as the Dutch were trying to incite the anti–Nayak faction at the court, they were also attempting to please the king. The object was to strengthen the pro–Dutch elements at the court and thereby win over the king. At a meetieg of the Secret Council on June 16 it was resolved that "every claim put forward by the Court shall, as it were, be conceded and the Council shall then not only follow the policy and advice given by the Disawa but shall also conform to the terms of the Ola last received. It was the only experience which would tend towards diverting the Court, if possible, from all negotiations with the English".[10] The *Disava* referred to was Dumbara Ralahamy, of the Three and Four Korales. He had written a letter to the Dutch hinting that the King Kirti Sri Rajasinha was abandoning an old love for a new mistress. The Dutch seized on this hint that there was an anti–British group at the court and tried to encourage it. Their propaganda included a suggestion that it was an insult for the aristocracy of Kandy to be ruled by foreigners. An *ola* was a letter written on plant or tree bark, the same as *olai* in Tamil.

But the Dutch realised soon that their attempts to appease the king were doomed to fail. It was with this that they called for

military reinforcements from Batavia to invade Kandy and bring the Nayak king to kneal.

By the end of July, 1762, the Dutch came to realise that their fears of a British invasion were groundless. Their spies in Kandy gave conflicting reports. The first, a Moor named Meera Pulle Marikkar Lebbe, said that he had learnt that twelve English boats had arrived on the east coast, between Trincomallee and Batticalao, in response to a request by the king. He added that the commander of the ships had been conducted to the court in a palanquin but, because he would not follow the court protocol, had failed to recive an audience of the king.[11] A second spy reported that the British envoy had been received in audience, but, since he had not behaved properly, had been sent back to his lodgings. However, according to a third spy, the British would invade Sri Lanka with an armada and the king would support them from the land with troops and provisions. This spy added that, by the king's command, the envoy had been in public, presented with seven silver swords, a gold ring set with a ruby, and four caskets, and that, in return, he had given the king a "notable" gift. This spy also said that most of the king's subjects were opposed to the king's dealings with the British ; they very much preferred the Dutch. [12] Though, thus, the spy reports from Kandy were conflicting and the Dutch could not determine whether Pybus had succeeded or failed, they took some active steps by themselves. The Dutch Governor resolved to protest to the Governor of Madras and to Admiral Cornish, off Trincomallee.

A letter from Teglingen, the Dutch Chief in Nagapattinam, dispelled the fears of the Dutch. Dated July 6, 1762, it said that the British seemed to have abandoned their plans to invade Sri Lanka. [13] They had planned this expedition on the strength of a report from the Madras Council, transmitted through Aleppo, that a revolt had broken out in the island, in which the Dutch had been murdered and the cinnamon trees destroyed. Brigadier Draper had been ordered to Sri Lanka to take advantage of the unrest. But, on arriving in Madras, Draper had realised that the report was all false. He, therefore, called off the expedition.

When the Dutch Council met on August 13, 1762, the Dutch learnt clearly and authoritatively that they had nothing to fear. [14] Definite information, the Governor said, had been received through

Aleppo that Spain had declared war on Britain, and that the latter were seeking Dutch support under their treaties. He confirmed that Admiral Cornish was about to leave on an expedition against Manila.

On this information the Council resolved that nothing need to feared from the British for the time being. To prove to the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha that the British had abandoned him, the Dutch would impose a ban on British Shipping and prevent the shipment of the cinnamon which, under the king's orders, had been peeled for them in Matara and Sabaragamuwa districts. It was also resolved that the king be asked to receive an embassy in Kandy in order to resolve the differences. It was, further, decided that Batavia be asked to be firm in its dealings with the king, since there was nothing to fear from the British. In particular, it should reject the Nayak king's demand for the restoration of some territories because the Dutch had acquired these by right of conquest from the British. [15]

The Dutch, in their irritation with Kirti Sri Rajasinha, bore heavily on him. After an expedition of theirs had sacked and occupied Kandy in 1765, he was compelled to sign a very invidious treaty, the so called "treaty of ever lasting friendship" on February 14, 1766. This treaty is regarded as the high-water mark of Dutch rule in Sri Lanka.

The treaty accorded legal sanction to the presence of the Dutch in the island. It confirmed their sovereignty over their existing possessions, the *disawanis* (provinces) of Matara, Galle, Colombo, Jaffna and the districts of Kalpitiya, Mannar, Trincomallee and Batticalao. To link their coastal territories, so that they could control the entire seaboard, the Dutch were granted a coastal strip "the breadth of one Sinhalese mile inland more or less as a situation of the hills and rivers permits". In return, the Dutch recognised the Nayak king's sovereignty over the rest of the island and agreed to pay him a sum equivalent to the revenue from the territories he had given away. The Kandyans were allowed unhindered access to the salt pans in Mambantota (on the South Coast) and in Puttalam (on the West Coast). The Dutch could peel cinnamon without hindrance in the areas below the mountains. The Kandyans were to deliver cinnamon from areas east of Balana exclusively to the Dutch and also to hand over to them their export

trade in cardamom, pepper, arecanut, coffee, ivory and wax. The Dutch were to be the sole suppliers of foreign goods the king needed. They engaged to protect the king Kirti Sri Rajasinha against foreign invasions, and he, on his part, could not make treaties, or hold correspondence, with other European nations.[16]

By this treaty the Dutch obtained all that they had been seeking from the beginning. The Nayak king now acknowledged them as co-rulers of the island. He was now virtually their prisoner, dependent on them for vital supplies and export trade. Above all, he was completely cut off from communications with the outside world, and could not seek any foreign help against the Dutch.

In fact, the Nayak king did seek foreign help. He tried to communicate with the French. But Pilima Talauva, his First *Adigar*, intercepted it and informed the Dutch. The Dutch Governor, van de Graff, thought of a punitive expedition to Kandy to punish the king. But Batavia vetoed it.[17]

Unfortunately for the Dutch, at this stage, Britain went to war with Holland in Europe and that transformed the situation in Sri Lanka. This is the background for the next stage in the relations of the British in South India with Sri Lanka.

5

BRITISH INTEREST RENEWED

For twenty years after the failure of the Pybus embassy in 1762, Madras paid little attention to Sri Lanka affairs. It was passing through a troubled period in its history. The administration was exceedingly corrupt. Mohammad Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic, used to borrow money on a huge scale, promising exorbitant interest. Officials of the Government, from the Governor downwards, lent him money. He had to assign whole districts to his creditors.

The British, nominally subject to him, were really his masters. They fought his wars for him, and he had many wars to fight, against the Raja of Tanjavur, against the Polegars *(Palayakkarars)* in the southern districts, and above all, against Hyder Ali, of Mysore. The Nawab had to pay them exorbitantly for their assistance in these wars. Added to his debts these bills laid a crushing burden on him. The unscrupulous Britons in Madras made great fortunes from all this corruption.

One of the Governors at this time, Lord Pigot, was arrested by the members of his own Council in August, 1776 and died next year. Though he had originally taken huge sums from the Nawab, he later turned against him. That was the cause of his undoing The Nawab, though weak militarily and politically, was an adept in intrigue. He bribed most of the Governors of this time. He could not bribe Lord Macartney, who was Governor from 1781 to 1785 and took a leading part in Sri Lanka affairs, as related in the sequel below. Soon after he had taken charge, he paid a visit to Mohammad Ali at the latter's invitation. The Nawab offered him a sum equivalent to £ 30,000 and "handsome money presents to the officers of his suite".

A member of Parliament said in a speech in the House of Commons in 1806, three weaks before Macartney passed away, that the Governor "expressed his astonishment to the Nawab; declined to accept the money; and inquired what had prompted His Highness to offer it. The Nawab replied that it was quite a customary present to every new Governor, and had never before been refused. So he pressed Lord Macartney to reconsider his decision as, in His Highness's opinion, it was a proper compliment for him to pay to the Head of the Government, especially as since the capture of Pondicherry he had regarded the British rather than the French as his protectors. But Lord Macartney remained firm in his refusal, though he assured the Nabob that refusal would not affect his discharge of his duty to render His Highess every support in his power... The Nabob's assertion that he had only followed precedent in making his offer involved a reflection upon Lord Macartney's immediate predecessor, Sir Thomas Rumbold, whose son was living when Mr. Keens (the member of Parliament) obtruded the incident on the notice of the House. Yet it was not repudiated by any member of the Rumbold family".[1]

To add to this tale of corruption were the wars with Mysore. The Madras administration totally mismanaged these wars. The Mysore troops raided Madras in 1767 and, again, in 1769. On the second occasion they nearly captured the Governor. He could escape only because, providentially for him, there was a boat moored on the Cooum river near his residence. On the first occasion, Hyder Ali dictated peace at the gates of Madras. He himself nominated the British envoy to treat with him, he did not give the privilege, to the Council. Josias du Pre, the second Member of the Council, was his choice. He wrote to du Pre engagingly, "I have been desirous of seeing you this long time, and being now arrived in your neighbourhood have wrote to the Governor to send you hither to carry a negotiation of peace". So du Pre, and not anybody else the Council might have wished to nominate, obligingly trotted off to St. Thomas Mount to sign on the dotted line.[2] Such was the disreputability to which the administration in Madras had sunk.

There were a few more corrupt Governors after Macartney, like John Holland, whom the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis,

suspended and who fled to France to escape arrest. But, corruption subsided after Macartney. When in 1799 the British killed Tippu Sultan, Hyder Ali's son and successor, in their siege of his capital, Srirangapatna, their last enemy of any consequence disappeared. Not the least part of the danger he represented to British power in South India was his hobnobbing with the French.

The main factor in international relations in the years between 1762 and 1782, was the attempt of the French to take revenge on the British for their humiliation in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). Both in India and in North America, the main centres of conflict, the French had been worsted. Their ambitions of founding a colonial empire had been destroyed. Instead, it was the British who were building one.

Revenge was an objective of Due du Choiseul, who was Foreign Minister of France from 1763 to 1777. He reorganised the navy and expanded trade, for he saw that Britain's security and economy were beginning to depend on its overseas empire so that it was vulnerable to superior sea power. His idea in the event of a war, it appears, was to keep the British Navy confined to its ports by a part of the French navy while another would range over overseas waters and create diversions. The Royal Navy would, at this juncture, be compelled to rush to the endangered area, and that would leave Britain open to an invasion.[3]

The opportunity to strike at Britain which France had been hoping for, came with the outbreak of the War of American Independence in 1775. At first the French only supplied the rebel colonists with arms and money. But when, in 1777, the American victory in Saratoga showed that they were winning, they entered the war on the side of the colonists. Their intervention proved decisive.

Directly in relation to Sri Lanka affairs was the fact that in 1780 Britain declared war on Holland. The British were insisting on searching neutral ships sailing to the American colonies in an attempt to prevent any warlike supplies reaching them. This ranged almost all of Europe against them. At the initiative of Catherine the Great, of Russia, many European countries, in 1780, formed the "Armed Neutrality" to defend the right of neutral shipping against British search. Among its members were Russia, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Naples, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark.

Britain's war against Holland resulted not only from the dispute over searching neutral ships for articles of war but also from the French prodding and encouragement. Though, during the Seven Years' War, Britain had been very careful not to hurt the Dutch susceptibilities in Sri Lanka, and it was mainly due to this policy that the Pybus embassy failed utterly, the relations between the two were not cordial and had deteriorated. The demand to search ships had created anti–British feeling in Holland and the French took advantage of it. The outbreak of the American war fanned this feeling. The intellectuals in the country, who were coming under the influence of the French Encyclopaedists like Dierot, felt affinity with the young nation across the Atlantic which, like the Dutch themselves against the tyranny of Philip II of Spain in the seventeenth century, was struggling for freedom against despotism.[4]

The Dutch possessions in South America became centres of a flourishing clandestine trade in contraband with the American rebel colonists. The British seized some Dutch ships on the ground that they were carrying contraband. The Dutch Navy was took weak to prevent this. Finally, in 1778 Britain intercepted papers relating to secret negotiations which the Dutch authorities were holding with American representatives in Paris, Franklin and Lee.[5]

It was through India that the effects of these developments so far away from Sri Lanka were felt in the island. Though the Treaty of Paris of 1763 had established the British power in India, there were many unofficial Frenchmen at the Indian courts who were prepared to make a bid for French recovery.[6] They were encouraging some of the Indian powers to oppose the British. They were chiefly active in Srirangapatna, Tippu Sultan's capital, and in Pune, the Maratha capital. But they were also to be found in many other courts and centres of trouble.

The French were in even a stronger position in the seas outside India. They had a superb naval base in Mauritius. The British had, at the time, nothing like it in this region. Their principal base was Bombay. But Bombay, on the western coast of India, is far removed from the Coromandal coast, which, was where the decisive struggle for supremacy as between the British and the French was to take place.[7] Trincomallee, of course, was a

splendid natural harbour. But at this time it was in the hands of the Dutch, who were neutral at this stage. A big threat was hovering over the British in India and Sri Lanka as long as the French could use Mauritius and the British had to make do with Bombay and could not use Trincomalle. This threat became a reality in 1782 when the French sent a land expedition under de Bussy and a naval expedition under Suffren. Both were launched from Mauritius.

It was a time of the gravest travail for the British in South India. Hyder Ali was ravaging the Carnatic. At this time the writ of the Company scarcely ran beyond the walls of Madras. But three factors saved the British. De Bussy's expedition failed, Admiral Sir Edward Hughes doggedly held his own, and General Sir Eyre Coote arrived from Bengal to fight Hyder Ali.

The Madras Council had so mismanaged the military arrangements that Coote could never follow up his victories in the field for lack of cavalry. "The cavalry maintained in Madras by the Company consisted at this time of only a weak troop of Europeans, some 33 in number, under a Lieutenat Younge. For native cavalry the Presidency depended on the Nawab of Arcot, who maintained several regiments officered by Europeans, some of which belonged to the Company's service, others to that of the Nawab. A regiment of this force was in camp at the Mount, when Sir Hector Munro was about to march for Conjevaram (Kanchipuram) but the men's pay was fourteen months in arrear and they declined to move without it. This the Nawab refused, and the Company having no funds for such a purpose, the men were disarmed and sent to Madras. The cavalry which eventually accompanied Munro consisted of the 33 European troopers and some 56 native cavalrymen, mostly native officers and non-commissioned officers".[8] This was typical of the state of the armed forces available to the Company in Madras at the time. The settlement had been badly demoralised by the scandals of the Nawab of the Carnatic's debts. When Coote arrived in Madras, he came with an order from the Supreme Government in Calcutta suspending Whitehill, the Governor.

Coote was not uniformly successful against Hyder Ali, but he prevailed on the whole, and ultimately the grave threat to the British disappeared. Repulsed in Chidambaram, he recovered in

Parangipettai then called Porto Novo. The modern village is a few miles from Chidambaram. The battle was fought on July 1, 1781. But Pullalur, a few miles from Kanchipuram the site of two other battles, one in the seventh century A.D. and the other in the eighteenth was not so successful. This battle was fought on August 27, 1781. However, more decisive was fought at Sholinghur (now in North Arcot district of Tamil Nadu) on September 27, 1781.

It was after the respite that Sholinghur provided that Lord Macartney resolved to send an expedition against the Dutch in Sri Lanka. He also decided to send an official Hugh Boyd,[9] on a embassy to the Kandyan king to serve as a kind of diplomatic support to his scheme to capture the Dutch settlements in South India and in Sri Lanka. He brought this mandate with him. "When Lord Macartney arrived in Madras on the 22nd June, 1781, he brought with him news of the war with the States General (Holland), and authority to operate against the Dutch settlements on the coast".[10]

Macartney's plan went well at the start. This plan was independent of Coote, who was then on campaign against Hyder Ali in the districts. Captain George Mackay, commandant of Chengalpattu, appeared at Sadras [11] on June 29. Its chief, Jams Peter Deneys, had no option but to surrender without any resistance, since his sepoys deserted him and his European garrison consisted of fifty four soldiers, with ten civilians.[12]

Three days later, Pulicat, the chief Dutch settlement in the seventeenth century on the Coromandal coast, surrendered. It was taken by Major Elphinston, who was sent from Madras with orders not only to capture it but also to destroy its fortifications.[13]

By this time Macartney had expanded his original plan to seize Trincomallee in addition to all the Dutch settlements on the Coromandal coast. His scheme now was to capture all the Dutch possessions in Sri Lanka too. He drew up this plan when he received word that an expedition under General Medows [14] which had been sent to attack the Cape of Good Hope, was now sailing farther east. Macartney resolved to use these troops against the Dutch in Sri Lanka. He explained his scheme in an official note.

"All our instructions imply a hope in the Court of Directors that we should scarcely leave the Dutch a footing in the East.

The effort to have peace with the Marathas gives hope of relief from that theatre. It may enable (General) Goddard to make diversions in other theatres in Hyder's country on the Malabar coast and draw him away from the Coromandel coast. Treaties with Poona and Hyderabad will eventually curb Hyder's action. These considerations lead one to think that the great reinforcements now on the way should be employed to some great and paramouut purpose for the Company. Nothing offers so certain to effectuate or so solid in its advantage or indeed so essential in its possessions in Bengal or Coromandel as well as necessary for his Majesty's fleet in India as the possession of the whole coast of Ceylon. After the conquest of the most useful and desirable island, to be undertaken before it will receive any formidable reinforcements, there will still be time next session to proceed against Mangalore. And if we shall be at peace with India powers, a part of your (that of Hughes) squadron with a few land forces might soon go from Ceylon to Batavia where the easy destruction of the island of Onroost and the capture of the chief navy and trade of the Dutch company would give that nation a fatal blow and secure to us the promise of power in this part of the world.[15]

But the success of Macartney's enlarged plan against Dutch Sri Lanka depended on an early capture of Nagappattinam. When on December 20, 1780 Britain had declared war on Holland, Hyder Ali had agreed to cede to the Dutch the British district of Nagore, near Nagappattinam, and to protect Nagapattinam itself provided the garrison helped him when he asked it to. Macartney had been told to seize all Dutch settlements on the Coromandal coast to prevent Hyder Ali, who possessed no ports there, using any.[16]

The task of capturing Nagappattinam was entrusted to Colonel Braithwaite, who was commanding in Tanjavur. He was asked to act speedily. But he did nothing, and at the end of September, 1781, he said he thought that Nagappattinam could not be taken. Hughes expressed the disappointment felt in Madras at this. "Our views had been so invariably aimed at the reduction of Nagapatnam as an event of last importance to an officer that no advantage to be obtained over the enemy could compare with our disappointment to find that Braithwaite has

been diverted from it by any other pursuit".[17] The Madras Council replaced Braithwaite by Munro. Macartney's instructions to the latter as he assumed the command said that he should seize Nagappattinam before the onset of the monsoon with the help of Hughes from the sea. After Nagappattinam had fallen, he was to assist Hughes in capturing Trincomallee. Hugh Boyd had been sent to Kandy to negotiate with the king and "conciliate him to our interest". What was expected of the king was the supply of provision for the British troops that may "remain in any place that may fall to our arms".[18]

Munro captured Nagappatinam on October 30, 1781. Its defence, said Macartney, was "more spirited than we expected". He now expected that Hyder Ali would have to leave south Tamil Nadu and he could expect no naval assistance from France. There were now troops to capture Trincomallee and other Dutch possessions in Sri Lanka. Macartney had even higher hopes. He thought the entire island would be captured "with the assistance of a part of the large reinforcements which are expected from Europe". He wrote to Hornby, President in Bombay, that Hughes "intention is to proceed immediately to the reduction of Trincomallee and after that we are not without hope of his making a very considerable impression upon the coast of Ceylon, especially if the squadron from England should join us here in time."[19]

Macartney, who, by a division of military command his council had sanctioned, but which later the Directors condemned, was in charge of the southern theatre of war, seems to have planned an invasion of Sri Lanka as a joint action. Hughes would attack Trincomallee from the sea, while Munro would take an expeditionary force that would seize the rest of the Dutch possessions. Munro was to have under his command the force which his capture of Nagappattinam had released and the troops that would arrive with Medows. Preparations for Hughes to leave were under way by the middle of November.

But then many difficulties arose. First, bad weather prevented Hughes from setting out at all. Secondly, Hughes did not have enough men. The battalion of 733 men assigned to him had no European officers and Hughes feared that they would not be effective. In January, 1782 this battalion deserted and was

replaced by a detachment of 506 men. "It was drawn from the rabble of all the companies that had fought in Negapatam and included two hundred coolies".[20] Hughes wrote to Macartney that this rabble could render very little service.

As for Munro's expedition in support, which was to capture the rest of Dutch Sri Lanka, it did not leave at all. In the first place, Hyder Ali returned to the Tanjavur country, against all expectations, and so Munro could not leave South India. He was about to despatch a force to occupy Jaffna that would pave the way to Hughes' attack on Trincomallee. In the second place, the expedition under Medows did not arrive in time. The fleet in which the troops were sailing was scattered by bad weather.[21] At last Hughes' expedition did leave. It disembarked in Trincomallee on January 4 and 5, 1782 and took one of its two forts, Fort Frederick, by surprise on the latter day. The other fort, Ostenberg, fell on January II after an assault.

On January 8, Hugh Boyd arrived in Trincomallee on his embassy to the king in Kandy.[22] As indicated earlier Macartney sent Boyd to Kandy as a kind of diplomatic support to his naval and military plans against Dutch Sri Lanka. He wrote to the Directors.

"As Edward Hughes intends to attack Trincomallee and as the arrival of troops under Medows may enable us to take further enterprise against the Dutch in the island of Ceylon, the President (of the Madras Council, that is Macartney) had judged it proper that a gentleman of ability should be sent on the part of the Company to negotiate with the king of Kandy and conciliate him to our interest. We accordingly appointed Mr. Boyd a gentlemen whose knowledge and capacity renders him well qualified for such a commission and furnished him with instructions for guidance and a letter and presents for the king of Kandy".[23]

Boyd was in Trincomallee when Hughes expeditionary forces had taken both the forts there, Frederick and Ostenberg. The burden of the instructions that he had received from Macartney was that he should negotiate with the king of Kandy so as to "conciliate him to our interest". He was to conclude a treaty of defence by which, while the British would provide the king military help against the Dutch, the king would supply the British troops left behind in the island with their needs.

Having learnt from Pybus' boorishness twenty years earlier, Macartney advised Boyd to observe every form of ceremony required of on envoy at the Kandy court. He was to make friends with the inhabitants through kind treatment. He was appointed the Company's agent in Trincomallee.

Boyd had an early intimation that he was not very welcome to go to Kandy. In Trincomallee he had to wait for three weeks for a reply to a letter he had written to the king. It was returned to him unopened. But he set out all the same. He left Trincomallee on February 5, 1782 with an entourage of 173 persons. His route was almost the same as that of Pybus.

But he had a hard journey. Provisions were scarce for his large entourage; the local inhabitants, evidently under orders, would have nothing to do with him; and the officials were obstructive evasive. Boyd wrote to this, "It was some comfort in our starvation to find that it was rather from scarcity than neglect. Rice had not been plentiful and quantities had been collected higher up" the road to Kandy.[24]

There were some good reasons why Boyd's journey was a difficult one. Since his entourage was so huge, the inhabitants must have thought that it was the vanguard of a hostile army, and so they made themselves scarce. Secondly, this part of the countryside was in a ravaged condition at the time. In all probability, this was due to the recent Dutch war or to the Nayak king's deliberate policy to interpose barren territory between his kingdom and Trincomallee, where he hoped to isolate the Dutch garrison. Thirdly, there is reason to think that it was at the instigation of the faction at the court that was friendly to the Dutch and opposed to the Nayaks that difficulties were placed in Boyd's path. Matale district, which Boyd traversed for most of his journey, was under a *Disawa* who was a member of the pro-Dutch clique.[25]

Boyd began to suspect the ministers and generals at the court of being supporters of the Dutch at the first audience itself. He said that the negotiations should be conducted quickly. But, in the words of his report, "the latter part of what I said was lost in the Sinhalese channel it passed through, for his Highness, without taking the least notice of it, proceeded to ask me whether I wish to retire".[26]

But at the second audience, which followed, the king was more forthright than he had been at the first. For, he said that the Governor's letter had given him the greatest satisfaction, and he asked Boyd to convey to the Governor in the strongest manner his friendly attitude towards the English and his approval of the overtures now made to him.

However, the ministers, who were determinedly pro-Dutch, continued their tactics of obstruction when they met Boyd for the second meeting after the second audience. Boyd asserted that the Governor of Madras was quite competent to conclude a treaty with the king. The ministers retired to consult among themselves. When they returned, they completely changed the subject and went on to expatiate on the misdeeds of the Pybus embassy. They then proceeded to subject Boyd to a searching cross examination on questions that had nothing to do with the proposals he had brought. They asked about the military plans of the English in India and their military activities in Trincomallee. They were more concerned to extract information from Boyd than to carry forward his suggestions to an accomplishment. They scrupulously refrained from entering into any concrete discussions of Boyd's offer.

Finally, the Boy Mission was doomed when the king said that a proposal for a treaty should come directly from the king of England. All this while the king could not have been unaware of the precise diplomatic status of the Governor of Madras. One of his own predecessors had been perfectly willing to conclude a treaty with an earlier Governor of Madras in the previous century.

It was patently a pretext to get rid of Boyd. It was true that the king's reply did not apparently mean that the Madras offer had been rejected. But, in fact, Boyd had failed because time was of essence to him in relation to the projected British expedition. He left Gannoruwa on March 17 and reached Trincomallee nine days later. There he found that the British fleet had left on the approach of Suffren. He set out in a hired vessel, but was captured by a French frigate, *La Fine*. He was taken, first, to Mauritius and then to Reunion. Later, he was released. Subsequently he died on October 19, 1794, in his fortyeighth year.

Why did his expedition fail? While Pybus, before him, had atleast obtained the then king's provisional consent to a draft

treaty Boyd returned empty-handed. His failure was more thorough than theirs. He had started with some disadvantages. Kirti Sri Rajasinha, who was favourably disposed towards the British, was not alive to receive Boyd, and the new king was angry because the British had captured Trincomallee without his prior permission.

Nevertheless, there is no indication that Rajadhi Rajasinha deliberately wrecked the Boyd embassy. In fact, he was in two minds. Like his predecessors, he wanted to be rid of the Dutch. But he was not certain that the British would help him in that attempt. It was also doubtful whether they could, even if they wished to. For in the years 1780-82 the British power in South India seemed to be collapsing.

There can be little doubt that it was the pro-Dutch ministers who wrecked the Boyd embassy. Boyd himself suspected that they were in the pay of the Dutch. The British reputation had sunk in South India following their failures in the field against Hyder Ali and the rampagning activities of Suffren. The Ministers could ask how the king could depend on the British for any effective military help against the Dutch. On the other hand, he would only be bringing down the wrath of the Dutch on his head, as his predecessor had. Then there was always the painful memory of the Pybus embassy to invoke. Boyd, could not contend against all these factors.

The Madras Council reported to the Court of Directors on th failure of the embassy. It said that the court's change of policy towards the British had coincided with the death of the old king and the establishment of the new regime. The envoy had been received with much civility; the letter had been "graciously received many promises and general assurances of friendship made". The real cause of the failure was not so much the king's anger at the capture of Trincomallee as the "irresolute and wavering Councillors of the new administration and their fears of the Dutch, together with some suspicion of our intending to possess ourselves of the island... The Kandyan Ministry stood too much in awe of the Dutch to join with us against them until we shall have such a force in the island as will afford us a certainty of success".[27]

Yet, considered in the light of later history, the Boyd embassy was not a total failure. It was followed by a British military expedition which resulted in the capture of Trincomallee, the first British territorial acquisition in the island. With this a new era had begun. The British were no longer unwilling to seize Dutch possessions as they had been in the previous century. William Pitt, the Prime Minister of England, wrote to Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis "to seize Trincomallee from the Dutch, so soon as hostilities began, in order that the French might not use it as a base, and the English might possibly for an attack on the cape of Good Hope".[28] New developments in Europe allowed them to take Dutch territories where they could. "Out of this event sprang the movement which led to the British conquest of Ceylon.[29] Boyd, therefore, not Pybus, was the real pioneer of British power in Ceylon". The Directors themselves wrote, "We have made the first step towards the connection with that Ministry which we trust we should soon have an opportunity of improving"[30].

6

THE DUTCH EXPELLED

"If there was one single factor which impelled British interest in Ceylon (in the nineteenth century), it was the harbour of Trincomallee".[1] The strategic value of this splendid natural harbour became clear after the British had established themselves in Bengal and South India. "The British were the first European power to attain this position and, hence, to them Trincomallee became vital. The French were anxious to gain control of Trincomallee mainly in order to use it as a weapon against the British Company's possession".[2] It was the American War of Independence and the developments that followed in west Europe that made Trincomallee a valuable prize. The great harbour of Trincomallee is located on the north-east coast of Sri Lanka at a north latitude 8 22' and at east longitude of 81 28'.[3] It is 320 miles from Madras. The harbour is a small part of the vast Trincomallee or Kottiyar Bay, the entrance to which is four miles wide. The bay itself extends five miles east to west. The inner harbour to the north of the bay are made up of rocky headlands. The inner harbour is said to be the fifth largest in the world. To the north of the bay a rocky peninsular rising in parallel ridges protects it from the sea. The area encloses twelve square miles of harbour, called the Back Bay. It is said that five hundred ships could anchor in this Back Bay.

Trincomallee was vital in the days of sailing ships because it could give shelter to an entire fleet during the north-east monsoon period, which usually breaks in violence over the Bay of Bengal and the Coromandal coast in October and November. Sometimes its effects are felt till March of the next year. Since it was the

only protected roadstead on India's eastern side, a fleet using it as its base held undisputed supremacy in the Bay of Bengal for as many as six months, from October to March. It is obvious that the naval power which possessed this prize had a tremendous advantage over its enemies.

Trincomallee's strategic importance was not realised till the seventeenth century. In 1672 the French occupied it briefly.[4] In the five to six decades of the eighteenth century the British fleet used its facilities frequently. But it was only in 1780 that Trincomallee became very vital to the British. That year Britain declared war on Holland in the aftermath of the American War of Independence. Both Holland and France supported the rebels. With the declaration of war, Trincomallee, hitherto a neutral port, became a potential base for French attacks on British interests in India. It had become the key to India.[5] Its possession was the principal issue between Britain and Holland till the former captured the Maritime Provinces of Sri Lanka.

The war of American Independence, which involved Britain in hostilities with Holland also, proved disastrous for the latter. There were serious consequences for the Dutch in India. Till then, the British, while resentful of the Dutch monopolist practices in trade, had not attacked their territorial possessions. That attitude underwent a change now. As stated earlier, the British seized Nagappattinam on the Coromandal coast and, for a time, Trincomallee too.

These losses exacerbated public opinion in Holland against Britain and strengthened the party of the Patriots who were hostile to the Stadtholder, or governing prince, who was generally friendly with the British. His partymen came to be called Orangists. Further, the merchants of Amsterdam had suffered much shipping losses in the American war. Britain was alarmed by these developments and sought to protect its interests by seizing Dutch territories wherever it could. The Dutch possessions in Sri Lanka, thus, came under potential danger.[6]

The Peace of Paris, of 1784, ended the conflict in Europe, but it did not remove the differences between Britain and Holland. The Patriots attempted to utilise the popular bitterness against the British, and the French were looking to strengthen their position

in Holland through the Patriots, who were their willing instruments. The Patriots seized control of the Dutch East India Company, which was governing the Dutch possessions in Sri Lanka. They even contemplated a defensive alliance with the French, whereby the French would become responsible for the defence of the Dutch overseas possessions. Finally, in November, 1785 such an alliance was concluded. This was a serious threat to Britain. The Stadtholder, William V, was weak and irresolute. A masterful and overbearing British Minister at the Hague, James Harris, once wrote, "If the Prince of Orange possessed mainly virtues or if those who call themselves Stadtholder were not a composition of dullness, timidity and indolence, something might still be effected, but there is no working with such fools, and misfortune may attend him who attempts to use them" [7]

Following the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, the revolutionaries were keen on spreading their ideas abroad. In 1792 General Dumouriez invaded Holland, but the results were not lasting. However, three years later, a second invasion followed, and the French occupied Holland. A Batavian Republic was proclaimed. The British considered it a puppet regime under the thumb of the French. They had to consider the possibility that the insurrection might spread to the Dutch overseas possessions and that the French, under pretence of support to the Dutch revolution, would seize them, or at least to gain access to them. Britain's wars against revolutionary French, thus, became a colonial war too, Sri Lanka got enmeshed in this.

When the French revolutionaries, under Pichegru, invaded Holland and over ran it in 1794–95, the Stadtholder fled to England and was installed in the Kew Palace, near London. The Patriots, now triumphant, abolished the Stadholderate and proclaimed the Batavian Republic. The Republic took over the administration of the overseas possessions of the Dutch East India Company, now practically moribund.

These developments placed the Dutch colonies, Sri Lanka included, in an anomalous situation. The British might legitimately attack them if their control vested in the Batavian Rupublic. However, if they remained loyal to the exiled Stadtholder now in England, the British policy would be difficult to decide. It was known that the French were attempting to seize the Dutch colonies

in Sri Lanka, Java and the Cape of Good Hope. Their schemes were "within measurable distance of fulfilment".[8]

Lord Grenville, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, conceived a plan to involve the Stadtholder in a scheme to place the Dutch colonies under British protection. He suggested to the Stadtholder that, in pursuance of "what he owes as much to the interests of the Republic as to those of his own House and of the high dignity with which he is invested", he "give to the different officers and commanders of the forts and vessels of the Republic such orders as may distinctly mark the real situation in which His Serene Highness is placed, and may anthorise them to avail themselves of the protection which His Majesty (of Britain) is desirious of holding out to them, according as circumstances may permit"[9]. The British were willing to give "any assurance that he might wish that any ships of war or forts, surrendered in consequence of such order, would be restored to the Republic at the conclusion of a general peace, by which her independence and constitution should be secured".[10]

The Stadtholder agreed to issue the order on condition of an "assurance in the most authentic form possible, that everything that is ceded will be restored to the State", that is, Holland, at the conclusion of a peace. Then, on February 2, 1795, the British Government undertook " in the most formal manner possible that any vessel, fort or place whatever which will place itself under his (the King of Britain's) protection as a result of the said order will be held in trust and restored to the Republic of the United Provinces (Holland) as soon as His Majesty and the Republic will be at peace with France and the independence of the Republic and its lawful constitution, guaranteed by His Majesty in 1788, will be assured".[11]

Accordingly, the Stadtholder issued the following instructions, under date February 7, 1795, to J.G. van Angelbeek, the Governor of Dutch Sri Lanka in Colombo.

"We have deemed it necessary to address you this communication and to require you to admit into Trincomallee and elsewhere in the colony under your rule the troops of His Majesty the king of Great Britain which will proceed there, and also to admit into the harbours or such other places where ships might safely anchor the warships, frigates and armed vessels which will be despatched

on behalf of His Majesty of Great Britain; and you are also to consider them as troops and ships belonging to a power that is in friendship and alliance with their High Mightinesses (the Dutch States-General) and who come to prevent the colony from being invaded by the French".[12]

It is instructive to note that the Stadtholder's letter as sent to the colonial Governors differed in two important respects from a draft note that Grenville had suggested. The order as communicated to the Governors demanded the admission of British troops into the Dutch colonial forts, whereas Grenville had proposed the actual delivery of the forts to the British. Secondly, the Stadtholder added the statement that these troops belonged to a friendly power which had intervened to save the colonies from the French. Even so, the letter is imprecise in some important respects. For example, if there was no immediate danger of any French attack on Dutch Sri Lanka, what was to be the position of the British ?

The letter was sent to Cochin, Malacoa, Ternate, North-East Coast of Java, the Coromandal Coast in India, Macassar, the west and east coasts of Sumatra, Borneo, Cheribon, Palembang, Bengal, Surat, Amboyana, Banda, Bantam and the Cape of Good Hope apart, of course, from the Maritime Provinces of Sri Lanka.[13] The great majority of the colonial governors rejected the Stadtholder's summons. Only Amboyna, Surat, Pulicat and other settlements on the Coromandal coast yielded in terms of the Stadtholder's letter. Some others submitted in terms of a modified settlement. Some others declined to surrender, but were compelled to.

The responsibility for action against the Dutch Sri Lanka was entrusted to the Government of Madras. The Governor then was Lord Hobart (1794 to 1798).[14]

The Stadtholder's letter was sent to him with the following instructions.

"As the conquests lately made by the French in Holland will of consequence be followed by an endeavour to secure the distant possessions of that Republic, particularly in the Eastern seas, His Majesty has judged it expedient, in concert with the Prince Stadtholder (who has retired to this country) to take such measures as appear to him best calculated for frustrating that design, the

effects of which, in the event of his succeeding, would be highly prejudicial to the Company's interests.

"With a view to this object, the Stadtholder, under the authority vested in him, has given orders to the several Governors and Commanding Officers of the different Settlements in the Indian Seas to admit the Ships and Troops belonging to His Majesty, in order to protect such Settlements against the Enemy, and to hold possession of them, under the condition of their being restored to the Republic at the conclusion of a General peace by which its Independence and its Constitution, as guaranteed in 1787, shall be maintained and secured".

"In consequence of this determination, orders will be sent by His Majesty to the Commanders of His Forces by Sea and Land in India to co-operate with you in carrying into execution such measures as you may determine on for the purposes above-mentioned. And we authorise and direct you, if it should appear consistent with the safety of our possessions, to detach, on any expedition, any part of the European Troops and Sepoys that can be spared and to advance such sums of money as may be necessary for such expedition".[15]

This order was transmitted direct from London to Madras in view of its urgency. The order to Cochin came from Calcutta. Copies of it were sent to Vice-Admiral Peter Rainier, the Commander-in-Chief of the East Indies squadron, and to General Abercrombie, the military commander. The order differs in some respects from the Stadtholder's letter to his Governors and commanders. For the first time, it specifies the restoration of the Dutch constitution as guaranteed in 1787. Thus, the Madras Government had to follow a course of action that was different from the Stadtholder's orders.

By himself, Hobart added a forwarding letter to the orders he had received from London in communicating them to Angelbeek, in Colombo. He detailed the terms under which the British would protect the Dutch possessions. The British would respect the existing laws and would maintain friendly relations with the inhabitants who would be given trading facilities within the Company's territories on a "most favoured nation" basis. But, if there was any resistance to the Stadtholder's orders, the British would employ force to seize the possessions.[16]

What Hobart demanded of Angelbeek in effect was that the British be allowed to occupy the Maritime Provinces temporarily. The territory would be held in trust for the Dutch until a peace was signed restoring the constitution signed in 1787. Angelbeek was told that he would find "no difficulty" in "paying immediate obedience" to the Stadtholder's orders in consonance with the British interpretation of these. If Angelbeek did so the British troops would, during the occupation, seek the goodwill and friendship of the inhabitants and give them all indulgences and immunities that could, consistent with general British interests, be extended to them. Their laws and customs would be respected, new taxes and duties would not be levied on them if proper provision was made for the expenses of internal administrations. The Dutch Government officials would not be interfered with. The European troops in the Dutch service would be employed by the British on their present terms of service.

Hobart's letter informed Angelbeek of a British expedition to Trincomallee. Angelbeek was told that "the smallest delay under existing circumstances will be considered a refusal of the offered protection".[17] Major Agnev, a British officer, delivered the letter to Angelbeek on July 25 in Colombo.

The Madras Government resolved in July to "send a force to Trincomallee under the command of Colonel Stuart [18] for the purpose of securing that important place against any attempt on the part of the French". Stuart's force consisted of the 72nd Regiment, 748 strong, under Major Fraser ; the flank companies of the 71st and 73rd Regiments, 351 strong, under Major Dalrymple ; fortytwo men of the Royal Artillery under Captain Lieutenant Dixon ; two companies of the Madras Artillery under Captain Carlisle ; the Ist. Battalion Native Infantry, consisting of fourteen Europeans and 643 Sepoys, under Captain Fergusson ; the 23rd Battalion, with fourteen Europeans and 643 Sepoys, under Captain Campbell ; a pioneer corps of 221 men under Lieutenant Dowse ; and six companies of gun lascars. There were twelve staff officers.[19] The invasion fleet to Trincomallee consisted of a squadron of three ships of the line under Rainier ; the Suffolk (seventy–four guns), the frigate Bombay, the store–ship of the same name, Bombay, and the packets Swallow and John.[20] Rainier considered the possession of Trincomalle so important that he "determined to proceed thither himself".[21]

Meanwhile, the Dutch in Colombo had received news of the developments in Europe from their factors in Tuttukudi, on the Coromandal coast. Enclosing the "Madras Gazette" of June 27, which gave the information, the factors asked in their despatch, dated July 7, for instructions as to how they should deal with the British. [22]

The Dutch Political Council in Colombo replied on July 12 "after much serious consideration". Its instructions related to all the settlements under its control. Those such as Tuttukudi and Jaffna, where the garrisons were weak and to which reinforcements could not be spared, were told that "we know nothing whatever concerning any change in the constitution of our Republic ; and that we faithfully and steadfastly adhere to the old constitution of the same under the States–General, with the Stadhtholder at its head". But, if this declaration proved unavailing and the settlements could not resist any attack, they were, while capitulating, to stipulate for the right to withdraw to Colombo with the Company's effects and documents and for the free right to private property. [23]

But Trincomallee, Galle and Colombo, being "strong and defensible fortresses", were instructed to defend them "to the best of our ability", though all the three were unprepared for a protracted siege. In precaution, two companies of Malays stationed in the Vanni and in Mannar were ordered to Trincomallee and Colombo respectively. [24]

Thus, when Agnew arrived in Colombo with Hobart's peremptory demand, the official decision was to defend Colombo [25] and Trincomallee, in addition to Galle, while leaving the other Dutch settlements to their fate. But that letter led to a change in this attitude. By this time news of the Stadtholder's flight to Britain had been received. It was also discovered that the Dutch Government in Sri Lanka was totally unprepared to face a crisis of any magnitude.[26]

The Government was already in great difficulties, for the supplies received in the previous year from Batavia the capital of the Dutch eastern empire, had been inadequate, and none could be expected in the present year. The treasury was empty, and the rice supply adequate only for less than six months.[27] At the headquarters of the Company in Europe, it was clear that its activities must be moribund.

If there was to be any relief from these embarrassments, only the British could provide it. Rejection of Hobart's demands would mean that there was no hope of this at all. In fact, it would also cut off all rice supplies from South India. Further, should Jaffna, Mannar and the factories in South India fall to the British, as was only to be expected, Colombo's revenues would be badly hit. Jaffna, in particular, was a very profitable commandment (or Dutch province). Once the British secured a foothold in Sri Lanka, it would be very difficult to dislodge them. If the Dutch resisted them and lost, they would not make any restitution, for they had promised restoration only for voluntary surrender.[28]

Therefore, on the Governor's proposal, the Council decided upon that it called "a middle course". This was designed, on the one hand, to avert the hard consequences of a flat rejection of Hobart's demand and, on the other, to ensure that "we or our superiors should remain absolute masters of our possessions". The latter objective was emphasised because the Council felt that it could not rely upon the British promise to restore the territories at the conclusion of a general peace. "According to the State craft in vogue these days, pretexts are always found to repudiate the fulfilment of such promises".

Accordingly, the Council determined to decline "totally" the British promise of protection as a "detestable and abject" course of action. It would admit no British troops into its territories except eight hundred auxiliaries, who were to be placed in the Dutch Company's service, on the same footing as similar number of the Dutch company's troops who had been taken into the service of the British on the Coromandal coast.[29]

van Angelbeek replied to Hobart's letter in these terms. It was despatched through Agnew to Rainier and Stuart, who were then off Trincomallee. Angelbeek asserted his Government's adherence to "the old and lawful Government system of the Republic of the Seven Provinces, with the States–General and the Hereditary Stadtholder at its head, as guaranteed in 1787; and that we still acknowledge the English as our close allies". [30] The Dutch forts in Sri Lanka were in a good condition of defence and did not badly need the protection the British offered. Still, the Colombo Government would be happy if the Madras Government reciprocated the previous year's manifestation of Dutch friendship

by sending eight hundred troops to Sri Lanka. Three hundred of these were to be stationed in Ostenburg (one of the two forts in Trincomallee), a similar number in the forts of Negombo and Kalutara, and the rest in that in Matara, near Galle. "But thereby we ought to inform you that we are destitute of money; and this we beg that your Government will charge itself with the payment, to be indemnified hereafter by our superiors". The Colombo Government was confident, with this aid, of repelling any enemy attacks, the more particularly because their forts were of good military strength and were provided with ample supplies and also because of the determination and zeal of the officers and the men.

The letter continued, "The recommendation of His Serene Highness our Heriditary Stadtholder and Chief Governor-General to give every possible help in our harbours to His Britannic Majesty's ships shall be obeyed according to our power. But respecting the proposition of Lord Hobart to put our settlements under the protection of His Britannic Majesty, I am obliged to answer that we are in duty bound to keep them, for our superiors, and not to resign the least part of them. I trust that this declaration will be approved of by you, as the letter of His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange on which His Lordship grounds his proposition does not make the least mention thereof, as you will see by the copy which joins this". The proposed British occupation was not necessary, "especially if the English Government pleases to supply us with the aforesaid troops and His Majesty's ships please to cooperate for the defence of our coasts and harbours".[31]

van Angelbeek handed over the letter to Agnew, adding that from friendship "they had perhaps done more than they could justify to their superiors". In fact, however, Angelbeek's reply was not in any "middle course"; it was a virtual rejection of Hobart's demand and, what must have been more important for the Dutch Officials in Colombo, of their Stadtholder's order to them. Nevertheless, Agnew gained the impression from talks with the Governor and the military leaders that "they were friendly to the British Interests as the Allies of the Republic, the ancient constitution of which as guaranteed in 1787 . . . they considered as the only legal authority by which the Seven Provinces could be governed, and that which they had sworn to obey".[32]

Agnew and a Dutch merchant by name Francken carried orders to Major Jan Georg Fornbauer, the commandant in Trincomalle, to admit two hundred British troops into Fort Ostemburg, to supply them with cannon and stores, and to discuss with Rainier and Stuart what necessary steps should be taken. [33] Angelbeek also sent secret instructions to Fornbauer as to how the British were to be received. [34] It is clear that Angelbeek hoped to achieve two objectives, to preserve the independence of his territories and to avoid British hostilities. The British commanders seemed willing to accept a kind of compromise. But developments in Trincomallee caused a rupture.

Agnew arrived in Trincomallee on August I. He delivered Angelbeek's letter and sought a discussion as to when the British troops were to be disembarked. Fornbauer replied through Renaud and Hoffman, of the de Meuron Regiment (which, as stated below, was to play a prominent part in the fall of Colombo to the British) that he was prepared to follow the duties of the commandant of an allied power. But he had heard of British warlike preparations against the Dutch in Sri Lanka and he wanted a written assurance, on the British commander's word of honour, that he had no aggressive intentions. In default of this, "I ask him to allow me to refuse entry into the Bumenbaay to any English warship until I receive definite orders from the Governor-General of the Island, and that until then I shall not be able to enter into any negotiation on the subject contained in the letter sent to me through Major Agnew". [35]

In their reply to this, Rainier and Stuart said that the Dutch Governor already knew of the object of the British expedition and that he had now instructed Porunbauer. The British had come as "ancient friends and firm allies of the Republic of the United Provinces to protect with the troops of His Britannic Majesty the possessions of his allies and to prevent their falling into the hands of their common enemy, under the express condition that as soon as the constitution of the Republic of the United Provinces is re-established as guaranteed in the year 1787, the places occupied by His Majesty's troops shall be restored". [36] They had instructions to use force if their proferred protection was rejected.

Fornbauer replied on August 2, stating that, while he would permit British ships to enter the bay in view of the assurance that

the British would not invade Sri Lanka, he nevertheless would not admit the three hundred British troops into Fort Ostemburg because of a technical error in Angelbeek's orders to him, that the Governor alone had signed the orders. But by the Dutch Company's constitution they had to be signed by at least the majority of the council. The Governor was old and was dying, and Fornbauer would be liable to the penalties of high treason if thereafter it was found that there was no justification for admitting British troops into a Dutch fort. He wanted a delay until the problem could be solved. This delay could be used in preparing for the reception of the British troops. Fornbauer added that he had orders, should the French make an attack, to ask the British for help, and he would carry out his instructions faithfully. [37]

Rainier and Stuart, who had been waiting for a peaceful solution in Trincomallee, had already broken Hobart's instructions. These were that Trincomallee was "the principal object of your equipment, either to give sufficient defence to it in the event of it being delivered up to you in the manner which has been required, or to enable you to compel the delivery of that important post to you. It is my wish that you should be able to defend this important possession if required ... to the last extremity ; and with this view it must be decidedly settled that although the Civil and Military servants of the United States of Holland are to remain in their several situations in the event of their placing themselves voluntarily under the British protection and the latter entering into the British service, the entire command of all the land forces, means, and resources for defence or other military operations must be vested in you". [38] Now, on receiving Fornbauer's reply they said that they had not expected a mere technicality to hinder the agreement which the Governor had proposed. This agreement was not what they had originally wanted, but they had agreed to prevent any hostilities. Now they formally demanded that the forts under Fornbauer's command be delivered to the British, "to be protected by them against the French". If Fornbauer rejected the demand that would be considered a declaration of hostilities.[39] Fornbauer did reject it. He protested against the menacing tone of the reply and invited the British to do their worst.

That challenge was mere bravado. The fighting which followed was largely one sided. The British troops broke ground on

August 18, opened their batteries against Fort Frederick (one of the two forts in Trincomallee, the other being Fort Ostemburg) five days later, and in three more days completed a practicable breach. The garrison in the fort was mutinous. On the night of August 24 a Malay detachment from the fort made an attack on a British outpost and inflicted many casualities. But it was not followed up. There was little fight left in the garrison. When summoned to surrender, Fornbauer asked for a truce of twentyfour hours. He then offered to capitulate on condition that his troops retire to Colombo and Jaffna. This was rejected. A bombardment was in progress when some European mutineers in the fort lowered the Dutch flag. The British, ordered an assault, and Fornbauer capitulated. The garrison was found to consist of two Companies of Dutchmen 147 in number, the 5th Company of thc de Meuron Regiment (84 men), two Companies of Wurtembergers (136 men), three Companies of Malays (284 men), a Company of Sepoys (79 men), a detachment of artillery (35 men) and three staff officers. Of these 768 officers and men, eightynine were sick or wounded. The number killed is not known. But, since the de Meuron Regiment alone lost thirty men, the fatal casulties must have been heavy. For their part, the British lost fifteen men killed and fiftyfour others wounded.[40] The other fort in Trincomallee, Ostenburg surrendered soon after.

Hugh Cleghorn, who rose to the position of first Colonial Secretary in Sri Lanka later, persuaded Count de Meuron to sign a provisional agreement on March 30, 1795 Dundas confirmed it on April 13. Under it, the regiment was to leave the Dutch service and join the British It was guaranteed employment under the British for the same number of years as it had served the Dutch. The British also guaranteed its arrears due from the Dutch. The count, who received a solatium of £ 5,000, was to accompany Cleghorn to India in order to supervise the transfer. The Madras Government was to co-operate.[41]

Hobart decided to send Agnew again to Colombo, thinking that the transfer of the regiment might induce the Dutch to "an acceptancc of the proposition made some time since to Mr. van Angelbeek".[42] He hoped to secure a peaceful occupation on trust of the territories that still remained to the Dutch. "The avoiding of the various contingencies to which an expedition

against Colombo and Point de Galle must be liable... the injury their fortifications would probably undergo from a siege—the necessary expense of repairs...the possible loss of men... and the delay which would certainly take place are all points which have strenuously urged the Board (the Madras Council) to make the attempt".[43]

On his second mission to Colombo Agnew carried three letters. While two were from Count de Meuron and Cleghorn to Colonel Pierre de Meuron, the third was from the Madras Council. The third letter told Angelbeek of the transfer of the de Meuron Regiment and said that, despite what Fornbauer had done in Trincomallee, there was still scope for a peaceful settlement of the Dutch territories that had not been captured. "It may at the same time be expedient that you should explicitly undestand that our proposition goes to putting the Dutch settlements in question completely under His Britannic Majesty's protection and control, the troops to be stationed for that purpose to be either British or selected from among those now in your service, according to the disposition we may think it advisable to make, under the impression of existing circumstances". The letter from Count de Meuron informed his brother that "in consequence of the dissolution of the Government with which I had made in 1781 the Capitulation of my regiment, I have resolved to withdraw it from the Dutch army in the intention of transferring to the service of His Britannic Majesty who has given his protection to the Hereditary Stadtholder, and who has guaranteed the preservation of the constitution of the States General established in 1787".[44]

Despite the prospect of losing the best part of its defence forces to the British with the transfer of the de Meuron Regiment, the Dutch Council in Colombo decided on October 9 to reject the offer Agnew had brought from Hobart. The voting was six to three, with the Governor voting in favour of the decision. According to the British "one of the leading Members of Council is in the interest of France, and had sufficient influence to obtain a majority to support his opinion".[45]

The Dutch Council, replying to Hobart in a letter dated October 13, censured Fornbauer's disobedience to Angelbeek's orders, "as the Governors of Ceylon have always in matters of the greatest importance given orders to the subordinates by letters

signed by them".[46] In this particular case Angelbeek alone had signed the orders only because Agnew was anxious to leave Colombo quickly for Trincomallee in view of the threatening monsoon. Still, if only the British in Trincomallee had waited for a few days, the misunderstanding would have been easily cleared up. Even if what Fornbauer had done had justified British hostilities in Trincomallee, there was no justification for what they had done in Jaffna and Mannar.

The Council protested against the transfer of the de Meuron Regiment. Its proprietor had no right to transfer it because, by the twenty-fifth article of the "capitulation" of 1781, he had permanently handed it over to the Dutch for as long as the Company might require its services. The Count's assertion that the Dutch Government was "dissolved" was unjustified. "But the Government is not yet dissolved, as will appear at the conclusion of a General Peace in the Netherlands. In the meantime we are the representatives of the same, and as such you acknowledge us by your letter of September 22nd last...Although we are deprived of that part of the regiment which is here (Colombo), and which consists of five hundred men, we are, however, not destitute of resources to defend what has been confided to us, and if we are at last crushed by a superior force, we will find sufficient consolation in the reflection that we have done all that could be expected from loyal officers who prefer their honour and their duty to every other consideration".[47]

According to Cleghorn, Angelbeek "in vain endeavoured to prevent his (Agnew's) communication with the Commanding Officer of the Regiment de Meuron, who knew this new situation, and waited only for an authentick copy of the Capitulation to act in consequence of it. Angelbeek then threatened to detain the regiment prisoners during the siege, but being told by the Colonel that they were now in the service of Britain, and that if he attempted to disarm them they would bring the matter to instant issue in the Fort, he was obliged to their leaving the garrison on no other terms than that they should not appear against it during the siege".[48] In another letter [49] Cleghorn says how he got into communication with Colonel de Meuron in Colombo. He prevailed upon a ship captain to carry an "open note" to him. "In this note I said only that I had seen his friends well in Switzerland

some months before. But the owner of the ship agreed to give him a Dutch cheese, into which I put a letter informing him of the arrival of his brother in India, of the general articles of the Capitulation, and that the transfer of the regiment would be instantly demanded on the part both of the British government and his brother the Colonel and Proprietor of it".[50] The entire regiment arrived in India in November, 1795. Cleghorn congratulated himself on what he had contrived. "In consequenee of what I have suggested and executed we withdraw from the defence of the Dutch settlements in India add European force amounting to 950 men, and we add this strength to our Army in the Carnatic where its service is at present most urgently required. And this great force has been obtained without putting government or the Company to the expense of levy or transport money. I have saved therefore to the public a sum nearly equal to £ 100 per man".[51]

Though Agnew thought that the Colombo garrison, when attacked, would surrender immediately, and it was holding out only because it thought that the British could muster enough force and that a "French Force, which the Emissaries of that power have led them to expect in India, may occupy our Troops in other Quarters", [52] the garrison did prepare to withstand a siege. The troops in Galle were brought into Colombo, local levies were recruited, and a militia was embodied. Still, the garrison could not have withstood a seige. For one thing, the defection of the de Meuron Regiment had taken away the most efficient part of defenders, particularly experienced officers. For another, Colonel de Meuron gave the British a large amount of the most valuable military information concerning the forts in Sri Lanka and with advice as to methods of attacking them.

On Agnew's return to Madras, the Madras Council resolved "on the necessity of resorting to force in order to get possession of Colombo". This decision was made on October 27.

The British commander, Stuart, was waiting for the north-east monsoon to die down before resuming his operations. Considerably reinforced from South India, so that he had a total force of 2,236 Europeans and 4,649 Sepoys, he marched to Negombo, a few miles north of Colombo on the west coast. There he was joined by reinforcements from Bengal and by a naval force. The Dutch withdrew all their forces in the rest of the island into Colombo.

Meanwhile, the Kandyans had mobilised in the seven, four and three Korales and it seemed the Sinhalese in the Maritime Provinces too would rise.

On February 13, 1796, the Dutch withdrew into Colombo fort. The next day the British summoned the garrison. Pointing out that because of their naval superiority the Dutch could expect no help from Europe or from other Dutch possessions in Asia, they demanded the surrender of all the possessions in Sri Lanka that still remained to them. If they refused and surrendered later, that surrender would have to be at discretion.[53]

The Dutch Council considered the letter that afternoon.[54] Angelbeek said that the earlier decision to resist had been taken in the hope that Batavia and Holland would send reinforcements, that a French fleet would appear in the eastern waters, and that Tippu Sultan of Mysore would create a diversion in South India. None of these had happened. He had consulted the staff officers. With one exception, all had recommended surrender. They thought that the fort could not hold out longer than three days.

The council resolved to surrender.[55] Accordingly, the fort capitulated.[56] The easy surrender, so much in contrast to the bitter defence the Portuguese had put up against the Dutch, from October, 1655, to May, 1656, has been attributed to treachery on the part of Angelbeek[57] and to Jacobinism among the troops. Neither charge seems justified from a study of the available records. The fact was that the Dutch morals had been sapped and there was little will to fight.

According to the terms of the capitulation,[58] private property was safeguarded. The garrison was to march out of the fort with the honours of war and sent ultimately to Madras as prisoners of war. But European civilians could remain in Sri Lanka or return to Europe as they wished, but on parole. The capitulation was signed by Angelbeek and Agnew and approved and confirmed by Stuart, and Gardner, a naval officer.

All the remaining Dutch settlements in the island were included in the surrender. Troops occupied Galle, Matara and Kalutara. There were difficulties with the Kandyans in Kalutara. They had already occupied it before the capitulation was signed in Colombo. But ultimately a British force occupied it without disturbance.[59] "Such was the inglorious end of the Dutch regime".[60]

7

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Apart from sending an expeditionary force to Sri Lanka, Lord Hobart despatched an emissary to the court of the king of Kandy to negotiate a treaty of defence and friendship. He did this on his own initiative. Neither the British Government nor the Court of Directors nor the Supreme Government in Calcutta had asked him to. This emissary was Robert Andrews, a Company servant in Madras. [1]

Andrews received his letter of instructions on July 21, 1795. [2] He landed in Trincomallee on August 13 and arrived in Kandy on September 27. His letter of instructions said, "The importance of establishing British influence upon the island has upon former occasions attracted the attention of the government, but no justice of circumstance has ever offered so favourable an opportunity of accomplishing this object as the late subversion of the government of Holland". [3] The attitude of the Dutch towards the king of Kandy lent hope that the latter would accept an alliance with the British. Andrews was authorised to conclude a treaty on the most favourable terms. What these terms were to be would depend on the actual situation. If the British became protectors of the king, they would undertake to abstain from any hostile actions against the king which would not preclude any commercial pacts. The proposed treaty was to be a preliminary to another, a more comprehensive one of alliance and commerce, which would have to be submitted to the Board of Control for Indian Affairs in London.

If the Nayak king should complain about the British having captured Trincomallee without his permission, as his predecessor

had done to Boyd after the first capture, Andrews was to say that it was meant to prevent a civil war and to forestall its seizure by the French. He was to impress on the king the dangers he would face from the French, emphasising the "detrimental tendency of French principles, and particularly the zeal with which they are endeavouring to propagate them in all parts of the world".[4] He was to secure minute information about Kandy's relations with the Dutch along with copies of their treaties. He was also to obtain the Nayak King's permission to construct a factory in a convenient location in order to trade and to erect fortifications to defend the factory. The land so granted should belong to the king of England for ever. Once the land was ceded, the British would discuss with the king terms of trade in cinnamon. Hobart hoped that, when the king compared these offers with the "narrow trading habits" [5] of the Dutch, he would accept the British suggestions.

Andrews was given two alternative letters to be delivered to the Nayak king. He was to judge which of the two he was to hand over, depending upon the circumstances. In the first letter Hobart said that the British wished to free the king from oppression by the Dutch and to save him from their ally, the French, who were proposing to invade Sri Lanka in order to "take away your life, as they have done that of their own king".[6] The British had invaded Dutch Sri Lanka to save the island from that calamity. The king was invited to conclude a treaty with them; this would be a preliminary to a perpetual alliance of friendship between British and Sri Lanka. He was requested to supply provisions to the British troops in Trincomallee.[7] The second letter, to be delivered to the king if the Dutch surrendered their forts without any resistance, contained an additional promise, that the British operations would not extend beyond the Dutch territories.[8] Since the Dutch did resent, it was the first letter that the Nayak king received.

Andrews arrived in Kandy on September 27, 1795, and remained there till October 14, had an audience with the Nayak king and several meetings with the ministers. Difficult as his task was, he unwittingly embroiled himself in the political intrigues that were raging in the court. When on his way from Trincomallee to Kandy, he met Denegamuwa, the *Disawa* of Uda Palata, and nephew to Arawwawela, the Second *Adigar* and rival of the First

Adigar, Pilima Talauva.[9] Denagamuwa told Andrews that his uncle, whom he called "Prime Minister", was a friend of the British, and that everything needed to make a success of his mission to Kandy would be done. What he should do was that he should communicate with the court solely through Arawwawela. Denagamuwa offered Andrews the draft of an undertaking to this effect,[10] The envoy, ignorant about the situation at the court (in fact, he confused the nephew for the uncle, thinking that Denagamuwa was the treasurer, whereas it was Arawwawela who held that post), offered an alternative draft. Denagamuwa accepted it, and Andrews signed an undertaking that he would not "ever accept or listen to the advice of any other minister or people of distinction in the island". He realised quickly that he had been misled when he interviewed two other ministers, Migastenne (Senior), the *Disawa* of the Four Korales, and his son, Migastenne (Junior), the *Disawa* of Sabaragamuwa and, later, of the Seven Korales.[11] The father was a son of Pilima Talauva. The result was that, all unknowingly, Andrews had offended the First *Adigar*.

Andrews' discussions related mainly on the possible return of the Dutch to Sri Lanka. The Kandyans said that, if the proposed treaty with the British was to be useful to them, the Dutch should not be allowed to return. Andrews was not much interested in this aspect; all that he wanted at the moment was the king's assistance, against the Dutch. The king produced a draft treaty according to which the British "would not allow the Dutch government by any treaty a footing on the island and should repel by force any attempt which they make to re-establish themselves on the island" and, further, "it was incumbent on the (British) Company to guard and protect the king and religion of the country against all its ememies". [12] Andrews suggested the deletion of the first demand and the addition of an article providing that the British should, if the Dutch wished to regain their former possessions on any, pretext, prevent "even a foot of such ground" being returned unless the king's permission was first secured. The ministers agreed to the modification and, at Andrews' request, preparations were made to send an embassy along with him to Madras to conclude a preliminary treaty. But the king declined to sign the draft treaty. Therefore, the article had to be deopped.[13] But, though the negotiations seemed to have collapsed, the

proposal to send an embassy to Madras stood. There was an immediate gain from Andrews' embassy. The king ordered provisions to be sent to the British forces in Trincomallee. [14]

Before the Kandyan ambassadors, Denegamuwa and Migastenne arrived in Madras on December 29, 1795, Hobart had been engaged in a controversy with Sir John Shore, the Governor–General. Shore objected to the terms of the draft treaty with Kandy. [15] His Government considered the treaty "premature, unneceassary and dangerous". It would give the king a perpetual guarantee against all enemies in return for a fort and trading rights. But "a guarantee of a prince or state is the most serious obligation which a nation can impose and therefore all risks and obligations should be weighed". [16] In this view, the proposed treaty had overlooked some serious implications. The peace treaty that would be signed in Europe at the end of the current hostilities might restore their possessions to the Dutch and compel the British to abandon the king. Further, the king was under no obligation to assist the British against their enemies.

The company was now in a dilemma ; whether to sign an unfavourable treaty or make an enemy of the king by not signing it. The Madras Council, which had suggested the treaty without any positive authorisation from Calcutta and which had failed to stipulate, as it should have, that the treaty was subject to ratification or rejection by the Supreme Government, was responsible for the dilemma. Calcutta agreed that a treaty was needed, but it should be of a very different sort. It should make only general expressions of friendship and goodwill. If the king offered trade concessions, they should be accepted. But the company would not be committed to any action on his behalf. Therefore, the Madras Council was to inform the Kandyan envoys that, while the company desired the King's friendship through a treaty, the proposed treaty itself could not be accepted because it was incompatible with Britain's international obligations. If the envoys insisted on the treaty, the Madras Council should accept it subject to its ratification or rejection by the Company within two years.[17]

The Council, at a meeting on December 4, 1795, adopted a resolution, undertaking to follow these directives, but without accepting responsibility for any consequences and disagreeing with

Calcutta's view that the proposed treaty would create difficulties in Europe or in India. Hobart himself replied to Shore in a letter, [18] stating that the latter's objections "have shown to the utmost pitch of possibility every imaginative evil which human ingenuity could devise".

The proposed treaty was essential to the British both then and in the long run. There would be no international or local difficulties were their possessions restored to the Dutch. It would not be easy for them to turn the British out of the island. Further, without a treaty, it would not be possible to obtain what the British forces in the island wanted most of all, supplies. As the forces continued their movements, they would need the supplies even more.

Hobart had a note included in the minutes of the meeting in which he said that it was important for the Company to have a satisfactory establishment in Sri Lanka to secure the trade and commerce of the company in South India against likely invaders. The suggested treaty offered good commercial prospects. Therefore, this was a good opportunity to obtain what the previous Governments in Madras had attempted to secure, revenue from the conquered provinces, trade concessions, and help from the king in return for protection against the Dutch.[19]

The two Kandyan ambassadors who arrived in Madras on December 29, met Hobart two days later and handed over to him a letter addressed to him by the king enclosing a draft treaty. [20] Andrews had to tell them what the Supreme Government in Calcutta had directed the Madras Council to do. They were angry and accused the British of making false promises. Andrews suggested that Calcutta might change its attitude with further British military successes in Sri Lanka.[21] The envoys agreed to stay if a treaty could be concluded.

Prolonged haggling took place when the negotiations were resumed on January 13, 1796. Though all these efforts were ultimately to prove infructurous, it is necessary to indicate the suggestions and counter suggestions. An article of the Kandyan draft ran, "Company may erect forts and warehouses in such places as may be pointed by the king out of his gracious pleasure agreeable to the purpose of stationing troops for constant protection and trade". [22] Hobart would have none of any "gracious pleasure".

but asserted that, by the right of conquest, the British were entitled to all the possessions of the Dutch, to whom Kandy had ceded them in the past. The envoys replied that the Dutch were only the king's "watchers" he had employed to protect the kingdom and that he could replace them at will. [23] But Andrews replied that it was not for the king to grant Dutch possessions to the British.

The envoys proposed an alternative, the "Company shall not interfere but at places as the king may cede to them". Andrews suggested a modification ; "the Company should not interfere with any part of the present possessions except such as shall henceforth be ceded to them by the treaty". The Kandyans rejected this. Andrews now suggested, "the company shall investigate the subject as soon as they had captured the Dutch possessions and restore to the king on conclusion of the war and should they remain in permanent possession of the Dutch settlements such internal situations as he may appear to have just claim to". [24]

Andrews submitted a draft treaty with this amended clause. The envoys accepted it after adding a clause, "notwithstanding the preceding article, as soon as the Company becomes possessed of the Dutch settlements on the island, they shall restore to the king the situation upon the coast for the sole and express purpose of procuring an adequate supply of salt and fish for the consumption of the people". [25] The ambassadors were persuaded to accept this only after much hesitation. Finally, on February 12, 1796, they did so. [26]

It is not easy to understand their attitude. The draft treaty was not only far less harsh than the one the Dutch had imposed on Kandy in 1766, but also had provided the Kandyans with a source of supply of salt and fish under their own control and, in addition, a base and outlet for their external trade, on which they could employ ten ships. It appears that the envoys insisted on the myth, or legal fiction, that Kandy exercised sovereignty over the Maritime Provinces, where the Dutch were only the king's "watchers". The Dutch treaty of 1766 had expressly said that it was the Dutch who exercised sovereignty over these regions by right of conquest from the Portuguese. The British did not know of this treaty at this time. But it was only a question of time before they did. [27]

Andrews went to Kandy again in August, 1796, to secure the Nayak king's ratification of the treaty. But the king asked for

more ports.[28] Andrews would not agree, and the treaty remained unratified. To the British this did not matter, for, by this time they had conquered all of the Maritime Provinces, including Colombo, and soon they come to know of the 1766 treaty. They realised that they were the legal successors of the Dutch in the Maritime Provinces. As for the king, he had now for neighbour not a weak power, but a strong one, which, if it wished, could easily conquer the entire island.

Everybody concerned knew that the future of the Maritime Provinces would be settled by negotiations in Europe. For the time being at least, the British decided to treat the occupation as provisional. They entrusted the administration to the Madras Presidency. This, of course, meant the East India Company. It was its troops which had conquered the Maritime Provinces and had spent much money over it. The British Government allowed it to see whether it could not recoup its expenditure.

The Madras Council did not quite know what it has succeeded to. It was not aware of the extent of the former Dutch possessions or what rights the king of Kandy had. Pybus and Andrews had been asked to secure copies of Kandy's treaties with the Dutch. The Company did not know of the pact of 1746 under which the Dutch had acquired a legal right to the Maritime Provinces by conquest from the Portuguese. It was fortunate for it that the treaty of 1795 was allowed to "expire in embryo".[29]

The pre-occupation of the Madras Council in its administration of the Maritime Provinces was collecting revenue. Andrews was appointed "Superintendnet of Revenue". He was already holding the post of "Permanent Ambassador to Kandy". There were three assistants under him, John Jervis, Robert Alexander and Garrow.[30]

Soon after Colombo fell a separate Commercial Department was also set up under Joseph Greenhill as "Commercial Resident". His appointment was "for the purpose of exclusively attending to the provision of an investment of cinnamon and other spices".[31]

Improvisation was the keynote of the administration that Madras introduced, probably because it knew that it had a short time and the future was uncertain. On March 1, 1796, Stuart was given "a discretionary authority as well as Civil as Military on the island of Ceylon". The revenue and commercial officials

were placed under him,[32] but the head officers had the right of direct correspondence with Madras. Stuart asked that all correspondence between Madras and the island should pass through him.[33] But he was only sent copies of all correspondence. Though Stuart was authorised to announce publicly that the civil servants were "liable to obey any order you think proper to issue for the advancement of the Public Service",[34] the civil departments continued to be semi–independent.

Disputes arose between the civil and the military authorities, particularly in regard to judicial matters. Before civil authority was established, the local military commandants had been authorised to appoint courts martial for "arranging all disputes which may arise among the inhabitants and doing strict justice to such as may ... be aggreved". [35] This was the only judicial administration, by courts martial, until Andrews and his assistants arrived. They immediately claimed all revenue disputes as coming within their exclusive jurisdiction. That claim was conceded.

It was the revenue department which, for all practical purposes, became the only instrument of civil administration. Stuart ordered [36] on April 25, 1796 that the military commandants in the districts were not to interfere with the civil government. He placed control of the police under the Collectors and empowered them to adjudicate in all offences except the more serious, which were to be referred to him. This meant that, in effect, such judicial authority as existed was in the hands of the revenue officials.

All these show that the new administration was hesitant and ill informed. It is hardly surprising that it began to make mistakes. Andrews feared that the *Mudaliars*, or the local official heads, of the "Korales", or districts, who held both civil and military power, subject to Dutch spervision at the centre, might "not only prevent his obtaining thorough acquintance with the resources of the country, but be the means of entirely undermining his own authority"[37]. He replaced the *Mudaliars* with *Amildars* from South India.[38]

By a proclamation in August, 1796, the *Mudaliars* and headmen were deprived of their powers.[39] *Amildars* from South India replaced the *Mudaliars*. They were subordinate to the Collectors alone. Under them were the *Peshkar* who carried out orders concerning the revenue, the "*Sumpready*" who kept Tamil accounts,

the *Kotwal* who kept order in the bazaars, and the *Maniakar*, the *Rayasam*, the *Kanakkupillai*, the *Gumastha*, the "*Respadoor*" etc. who looked after the daily collections of revenue.[40]

It has been customary to attribute the disturbances that followed to the mistakes of the new Madras administration. The British officials in charge at the time and immediately after found it convenient to throw all the blame on the South Indian officials. Lord Wellesley wrote of their "acts of rapine and cruelty".[41] Lord Valentia, a visitor at the time, said that this "swarm of Dubashes... seem to have considered the land given up to them to be devoured"; North, soon to arrive as the first Governor, castigated "the excesses committed by a set of profligate Malabar Servants of Revenue in the harsh, unjust and impolitic introduction of a system of finance and judicature confessedly defective even where it has long been established and carried on by the natives of the country, but which became altogether insupportable when it was introduced in direct contrariety to the usages, laws and habits of the people and executed by men unconnected with their fortunes, enemies to their religion, and having no interest but in oppressing and despoiling them".[42]

This diatribe comes from a man who was opposed to the Madras administration root and branch. So moderation in view or expression is not to be expected from him. The reference to those "unconnected with their fortunes, enemies to their religion" is applicable to all colonialists in the history of the world. Some later scholars have studied the question more calmly and without prejudice. "It was not the degree of extortion which caused the shoe to pinch, but the new and unexpected mode of levy (of a coconut tree tax, mentioned below). What was responsible was the ignorance of the Madras officers in attempting to carry on a system with which they were unfamiliar, and not their avarice".[43]

"A crowd of adventurers" followed in the wake of the South Indian officials. According to Jervis, by the end of 1796, there were over 32,000 of these.[44] Wise after the event, Hobart, who had the power and the authority to prevent the invasion, wrote in February, 1798, "I am certain that no mode of destroying a country could have been devised, that was more likely to accomplish that end, with despatch and aggravation; and which was more completely calculated by the vexations with which it must be

inevitably attended to create amongst the natives and resident inhabitants the most rooted abhorrence of, and disgust to, the British Government".[45]

There was widespread discontent in the Maritime Provinces, but that was caused by the Madras Council's policy decision to import the Madras system of administration. Two revenue measures brought matters to a head. These were the imposition of a tax on coconut trees and the abolition of service tenures.

"The entire coastal plain between Chilaw and Matara was an almost uninterupted coconut plantation, estimated to contain ten million trees".[46] These plantations were untaxed, whereas grain lands paid quite heavy imposts. Hobart "particularly" asked Andrews to consider whether "some mode may not be adopted for levying an equitable tax" on them. Accordingly, Andrews announced in July 1796 that "a tax is intended to be levied on the different coconut plantations where such plantation exceeds fifty trees in number, the rate of taxation to be one silver *fanam* a year for every tree bearing fruit or yielding Toddy. Any plantations of fifty trees or less to be exempt from duty which is meant as a relief to the poor".[47]

The tax was rated at one-twelfth the value of a tree. On September 6. Andrews asked for latitude in levying the tax on the ground that, in some cases, the *fanam* might be excessive. But Hobart, who asserted that the rate was the lowest possible, refused any latitude. [48]

The tax was unfair and discriminatory. The value of coconut trees varied, depending as it did on their productivity and on their proximity to ports and towns and, in addition, the cost of transport. The nature of the soil was important ; some trees produced even eighty nuts a year, some others hardly ten. In some cases the entire value of the produce did not amount to the tax levied. Further, it was difficult to arrive at a fair individual liability, for ownership in land was often sub-divided very minutely. Above all, the coconut was a necessity of life.

The most serious grievance, however, was that the tax had to be paid in money, and money was scarce. There was an offer to pay it in kind, as one-tenth of the product. But this was refused. Some petitioners said that the tax had been collected from gardens with less than the prescribed fifty trees.

Along with his announcement of the coconut tax, Andrews said that labour was to be paid for in future, thus abolishing *rajakarya*.[49] There were two kinds of customary service; compulsory and paid, as in the duty of Salagama caste people to serve in the Cinnamon Department, and compulsory and free, as in the common liability of every inhabitant to work on the repair and upkeep of the roads and bridges in his district. Castes and individuals held arable land from the king on condition of performing specific services in return for their holdings. Instead of the usual levy on produce, these holders of land served the State for a certain number of days in the year without any pay.

The two measures added to the popular discontent. The *Mudaliars* were affected by both, as owners of large extents of coconut land and as holders of service lands they had received in lieu of salary and held free of tax as long as they held office. The common people were affected even more. In the Sinhalese districts service lands were common, their holders owed services far from onerous and, in fact, had much fallen into disuse. Further, many of them had an interest in coconut land.[50]

Within two months of the announcement of the two changes, revolt broke out. Even in the Tamil areas, where the coconut tree is scarce (far more common is the palmyra tree), Jervis reported on September 24, 1796 "the particular opposition which has been given to my people who were employed to number of the coconut trees, as well as the disposition the inhabitants in general manifest to oppose my collection of the tax".[51] But, naturally enough it was in the Sinhalese regions that the opposition was the strongest. In December, 1786, Andrews had to go with troops to an area near Colombo, Royigam Korale, and rescue a renter whom the local people had imprisoned when he had gone there to collect the tax. Andrews, very mistakenly, thought that was the end of the matter.[52]

In fact, disturbances flared up in many areas, particularly near Colombo and near the frontier with the Kandyan kingdom. In March, 1797, Major-General Welfare Ellis Doyle, who had succeeded Stuart,[53] had to send a guard to protect a renter, a South Indian. In the Vanni, an *Amildar* was murdered by the populace in a Government building.[54]

Convinced of the just cause of the rioters, Doyle suspended collecting the tax in March, 1796. But Madras reprimanded him for this. Hobart said that the tax was justified and it was low in relation to the increased prices of coconut produce. At the end of April, he ordered that the collection of the levy be resumed. Doyle obeyed, but did so under protest "the inhabitants of all descriptions are at present discintented, several Corles (Korales) in open revolt, and in many I fear no Revenue can be collected but at the point of the Bayonet". [55] Angelbeek wrote a letter supporting this stand.[56]

In the meantime, Hobart formed "an opinion in favour" of abolishing the coconut tax ; [57] he had taken "a more enlarged and distinct view" of the levy. He decided that he wanted accurate information about the conditions and, so, on June 9, 1797, he appointed "a committee for investigating the state of the Revenue and other important matters on the Island of Ceylon". Brigadier General de Meuron was appointed its President, and Andrews and Agnew its members. In a Minute Hobart ordered that the coconut tax be abolished and recommended, in its place, export duties on coconut produce. Further, while the revenue farming system could not be removed, "if it be true that the farms now rented are most of them held by Malabars, who, since our possession of the Dutch Settlements, have gone forth for that purpose", the committee was to direct the Superintendent of Revenue (Andrews) to deny any ' Malabar" the renting of any farm after the current year had expired. [58]

But, on July 2, 1797, Doyle died, and Hobart gave de Meuron the "command of the troops and the general control of all the Company's affairs in the island until a more permanent arrangement can be made". [59] de Meuron took steps to quell the disturbances and by March, 1798, he succeeded; [60]

The de Meuron committee, which administered the captured territories from June, 1797, to November 12, 1798, recommended the restoration of *rajakariya* and the restoration of the *Mudaliars*, with the dismissal of the South Indian *Amildars*. On May 16 the Madras Council accepted these recommendations. Hobart had visited Sri Lanka in December, 1797 and January, 1798, and returned with the conviction that the disturbances were due to the "premature and impolitic alteration of the ancient Revenue system",

Before the committee concluded its labours (it held its last meeting on November, 12, 1798) Madras authority over the Maritime Provinces was abolished. This was not due to the revolt, for the decision had been taken before news of it reached Britain. By this time it became certain that the Maritime Provinces would not be returned to the Dutch.

Peace negotiations were held between Britain and France in Paris in 1796 and in Lille the next year. If these talks had succeeded the course of Sri Lanka history would have been changed. The island became a factor as a likely compensatory restitution. Britaln wished to retain it as well as the Cape of Good Hope. It is not quite clear whether William Pitt, the Prime Minister, valued one of the two more than the other, Sri Lanka or the Cape. But scholars generally agree that he preferred the Cape, but that Dundas ultimately persuaded him in favour of Sri Lanka.[61]

Negotiations were resumed in Lille in 1797. But these too failed. Britain failed to secure Sri Lanka because France could not persuade the Batavian Republic in Holland to agree to the sacrifice. Finally, it was at the Peace of Amiens of March 27, 1802, that Sri Lanka was formally ceded to Britain. This had already been agreed on at the preliminary peace concluded between Britain and France in London on October 1, 1801.

It was after the failure of the Lille negotiations that the British Government decided to place the Maritime Provinces under the Crown, but with a difference.

The new form of government lasted from October 12, 1798, to January 1, 1802, when a Crown Colony was established. Dundas had always wanted to set up a Crown Colony in the Maritime Provinces, but he could not act until after the failure of the Lille negotations. He then decided to place the actual administration under the Crown, but to allow the East India Company "the administration and disposal of the Revenues". This arrangement set up a "dual control", for there were two sets of officials in the Maritime Provinces, those of the British Government and those of the Company.

The story of Sri Lanka's relations with the British in South India which would have ended had the Maritime Provinces been made a Crown Colony directly, has to continue over the period

of the "dual control" because its officials continue to serve there and, in fact, were involved in a controversy with the Governor.

He was Frederic North, the third son of the second Earl of Guildford, and previously Chief Secretary of Corsica. His commission stated that he had been appointed Governor and Commander–in–Chief, but that, since it had been appointed to place the Maritime Provinces "as far as circumstances will permit under the direction of the...Company and especially that all commercial intercourse there with should be under the control of the said Company", he was to "correspond with the Court of Directors of the said Company and with our Secretary of State through the medium of the said Court...and that you should obey such orders as you may...receive from the said Court or from the Secret committee of the said court...or from the Governor General of Fort William in India in Council in the same manner as the Governments of Fort St. George (Madras) or Bombay... and especially subject to the powers of superintendance and control vested in the Governor General in Council over the other Presidencies or Governments in India". The revenues were specifically placed under the direction of the Company "with power to make such alterations therein...as they think fit, in the same manner as the Revenue of the several Governments in India are disposed of and subject to the same control".[62]

From the very start North fell foul of his civil service which, under orders, he recruited from Madras. Within a fortnight of his arrival, be complained of "that spirit of click (clique) and party...the height of which in this country...renders it advisable to mix as much as possible in the same service and in the same place persons whose habits, connections and future expectations are different".[63] Within a year matters came to a head.

In the middle of 1798, a Dr. Ewart was appointed directly by the Company Physician General to the king's Forces in the island.[64] In May, 1799, Ewart wrote directly to Lord Mornington, the Governor–General in Calcutta, that the troops were endangering their health by drinking too much. They were encouraged to do so by "its being customary for officers holding certain situations ... to draw a profit from the Arrack and Toddy sold in Garrisons and cantonments proportionate to the quantity consumed by the troops". He proposed some measures to restrict the heavy

drinking. North protested against Ewart writing directly to Calcutta, particularly as Ewart's communication implied criticism of his own measures. North was in Madras during this controversy. He had come to discuss judicial reforms with the Governor of Madras, now the second Lord Clive (1798–1803). [65]

When North returned to Colombo, he found that the Madras civilians were bitterly opposed to the new legal arrangements. Cleghorn, [66] who had been appointed the first Colonial Secretary in Sri Lanka, was particularly active in the campaign against North. A Madras civilian of whom North fell foul soon after was Garrow in Trincomallee. Garrow had already had a quarrel with Champagne, the Commandant of Trincomalle, over the supervision of arrack rents and over a gifted elephant. Soon after Garrow complained against Champagne to Madras. But it was discovered that it was Garrow who was culpable in the matter. He was then ordered to apologise to Champagne. [67] Thereafter, in North's words, he "declared War against Trincomallee" and even attempted to "cut off the supplies of the place". On the present occasion it was found that he had illegally arrested four persons. North suspended him on July 31, 1799. [68]

On the same day North suspended another civilian, John Mac Dowall, the Deputy Secretary and Collector of Colombo. He was exonerated but within a month he was dismissed for "offensive and impertinent" behaviour. North said that he was the "primum mobile of the Civil, or rather Civilian, War" against him. [69]

Yet another civilian was punished. Atkinson, the Commissary at the Military Board, was found to have "bought up condemned salt pork when sold at outcry (according to the nefarious directions of the Company) and to have issued it again as good provisions to the Troops, making poor John Company pay full price for it". Atkinson was reprimanded from India. By the end of the year his post was abolished.[70]

Still another scandal was revealed in the pearl fishery of 1799. North wrote to Mornington that an investigation had exposed "a scene of corruption which will terrify the Company's servants and their duty for a century to come". [71] The commissioners had embezzled Government money. Following this, Hugh Cleghorn and Lieutenant Tournour, the Commandant at Manner, were dismissed in December, 1799.

The pearl fishery investigation ended in the fall of a more distinguished Madras civilian, Andrews himself. It produced evidence against him. By this time he was in India. But, following North's report, the Court of Directors suspended him.[72] Some scholars have suggested that he was responsible for the "evils" of the Madras administration.[73] Turner says, "The documents at present available appear to leave a decided balance of evidence against Andrews". North, of course, was not behindhand in pressing the charges. According to him, Andrews showed "no disposition either to overthrow his old system or to reform its abuses", and he had not punished a single one of those servants of his who had "betrayed his confidence and committed his reputation".[74] With the action against Andrews the oppsition of the Madras civilians to North virtually collapsed.

The "dual control" certainly placed North in a difficult situation, but it is a question whether, with tact and understanding, he could not have carried the Madras civilians with him. The corruption in high places in the Maritime Provinces in his time had its parallel with the disorder in Madras about the same time, when the questions of the debts of the Nawabs of the Carnatic set many leading officials by the ears. But his later career in Sri Lanka shows that he lacked many qualities of the ruler, particularly judgement of men.[75]

In 1803, Governor North, not yet forty years old, was a sick man and asked to be recalled.[76] His greatest failure, apart from his inability to get on with the Madras civilians, was in relations with Kandy. The first Kandyan war of 1803 was a disaster for the British. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to say that he was wholly blameless in his disputes with the Madras civilians. It must be remembered that the surviving documents on this issue are all from his side.

There is a note of hysteria in some of his complaints against the civilians. He wrote to the Secret committee in London on October 5, 1799, that his appointment as Governor was disagreeable to them and that they were working for his recall. He spoke of "that determined and systematic spirit of opposition and hatred which has guided them in all their actions, and which has made them turn every mark of confidence which I have shown them and

every authority with which I have invested them into engines to discredit my person and to thwart my Government". [77]

This was rhetoric. But undoubtedly there were two capital difficulties in the working of the "dual control". The Governor of the Maritime Province could exercise no direct control over officials directly appointed by another Presidency, Madras. It was to Madras, not to Colombo, that they would look for their advancement. Secondly, salaries and prospects of promotion in Sri Lanka were so much less attractive than in Madras that no civilian seconded from there was willing to remain long. As Madras was unwilling to release its better men, North had to employ persons "totally useless to the Service or loading the least productive of your (the Company's) Settlements with an establishment more expensive than that of the most opulent and important of them". Further training in Madras was unsuitable for work in Sri Lanka. Therefore, North proposed that only three posts, Collector, Accountant General and Commercial Resident, be reserved for the Company's employees and that he be allowed to draw from all the three Presidencies in India, not Madras alone. The Burghers (persons of Dutch descent) could easily fill the lower grades.

In the meanwhile, these plans and schemes became unnecessary. Dundas had decided to make the Maritime Provinces a Crown Colony, with no participation (except for cinnamon contracts) on the part of the East India Company and, therefore, of Madras. With this the history of the connection of Madras with Sri Lanka comes to an end.

On December 30, 1800,[78] Dundas wrote to the Court of Directors of the Company, "I am clearly of opinion that it is my duty to advise His Majesty to place the island of Ceylon upon the footing of a Royal Government". The "dual control" had been "prematurely and inadvetently" imposed upon "a very superficial knowledge of the subject and upon an erroneous supposition that such a measure was necessary to preserve the unity of our Indian Empire". It would benefit both India and Sri Lanka. It would take a long time before Sri Lanka became self supporting and it was "inexpedient" to charge India with its expenses. The appointment of Madras civilians had "immediate bad consequences". Services in Sri Lanka would be unattractive except to men of

inferior skill, for its establishment would have to be organised on a moderate scale.

But Dunads provided a sop. "But although I am of opinion that the political Government of Ceylon should be carried on in different hands from those which are engaged in the Government of India, I am equally of opinion that in every commercial point of view the settlement ought to be held upon a footing more beneficent to the East India Company than even the territories under their own immediate administration. Our Indian possessions are open to the trade of all other nations as well as to that of our own Company, but this cannot be allowed with regard to the trade between Ceylon and Europe. In that respect the settlement must be held upon strict colonial principles and a monopoly of its trade must be reserved for the Company".[79]

Accordingly, cinnamon contracts were given to the Company. In 1822 these contracts expired, and, says a Sri Lanka historian, "With that disappeared the last vestige of Indian control of Ceylon".[80] From January 1, 1802, the Maritime Provinces became a Crown Colony. It was not till 1815 that Kandy fell so that the whole of Sri Lanka became a Crown Colony. In this development Madras had played no part.

8

THE END OF THE NAYAK RULE IN SRI LANKA

When Governor North assumed charge of the Maritime Provinces, he was not very particular in annexing the Kandyan kingdom. He was interested only in consolidating the British hold over the import and export of commodities from the interior of the island. This is reflected in his letter to the Nayak king, Vikrama Rajasinha. [1]

Pilima Talauva, the First *Adigar* who enabled Vikrama Rajasinha to ascend the Kandyan throne found to his dismay that the king could not be treated like his puppet. Therefore, he decided to dethrone him. When Talauva met Governor North, in 1798, [2] the latter made it very clear to him that the treaty of 1769 was null and void since it was not ratified in time. The talk between them, at that time, was inconclusive.

During subsequent meetings Talauva unfolded his plan to dethrone Vikrama Rajasinha with the help of the British and occupy the throne himself. North was averse to the idea.[3] He was however willing to consider it, if the transition was smooth and the king Vikrama Rajasinha's life was spared. At the end of one such meeting between them it was agreed to send an embassy to Kandy to negotiate a new treaty.

Major General Hay Macdowall was sent to Kandy, escorted by the British troops, in March 1800, to meet the Nayak king. Macdowall proposed that the king should agree to station a British garrison in his country to protect him. The Kandyan officials rejected it stating that the native soldiers of Kandy were sufficient to do that job and it was the duty of the English to defend the coasts from all the enemies.[4] Macdowall was disappointed and

left Kandy without achieving anything. However he learnt a lot about the topography, the climate and the roads delibrately kept in bad shape by the Kandyans. It helped the British very much later when they invaded Kandy in 1803.

The justification for the invasion was indeed a flimsy one. In July 1802, the Kandyan officials had seized some stock of arecanuts from the Mooreman belonging to the coastal area. The British demanded adequate compensation from the Kandyans. When it was not forthcoming, they decided to invade. It is probable that Pilima Talauva was responsible for this development in the hope that it would eventually help him.

The British forces managed to reach Kandy. They found to their surprise no one in the capital except a few dogs. The king, Vikrama Rajasinha and the entire population of Kandy had by then left, with their valuables to an unknown place. General Macdowall on learning that the king might be located at a palace eighteen miles away from Kandy despatched his troops. When they reached the palace they were disappointed again. The king had already fled from there! In utter disgust the British troops set fire to the palace and returned to Kandy.

In the meantime Governor North threatened to support a rival claimant to the throne if Vikrama Rajasinha refused to come to terms with him and grant the concessions sought by the British.[5]

He proclaimed Muttusami, one of the brothers-in-law of the late king, Rajadhi Rajasinha, as the new king of Kandy. Prior to this Muttusamy was paid a small pension by Governor North and was left in-charge of the Collector of Jaffna. He was brought to Kandy and installed as the king. In return he was forced to cede a large part of the Kandyan territory to the British. Muttusamy was convicted for fraud in the past. As per Kandyan custom he could not occupy the throne. Consequently he was ignored, not only by the influencial chiefs in the kingdom but also by his ordinary subjects.

The prolonged stay at Kandy increased mortality and sickness among the British troops, a problem faced by all the Europeans who had invaded Kandy. General Macdowall left the troops at Kandy in-charge of Major Davie and returned to Colombo to persuade Governor North to evacuate the survivors of the garrison.

It was clear at this stage that it was difficult to avoid the inpending disaster. The political outlook was also bleak. North's mistake in sponsoring Muttusamy was becoming obvious. North asked the British troops to vacate Kandy and return. [6]

But, before North's instructions could reach Major Davie at Kandy the Kandyans descended on their capital in large numbers. The British troops, outnumbered by the Kandyans, found it impossible to repulse the attack. Major Davie decided to surrender. As per the terms of the surrender the British troops were to be allowed to leave Kandy unharmed. The Kandyans also agreed to take care of the sick and wounded British troops.

They did take care of them, but not in the way Major Davie had expected. As soon as he marched out of Kandy with his men, which included the puppet king Muttusamy and his family, the Kandyans "began to butcher indiscriminately every one in the hospital ... spitting in their faces ; they mostly knocked out the soldiers' brains with clubs, etc then pulled them out by the heels, the dead and the dying, threw many of them into a well, and numbers of the bodies were left in the streets and devoured by dogs, but none were buried..."[7] According to Sergeant Theon, a survivor of the ghastly massacre, one hundred fortyeight Europeans were dead. [8]

Major Davie was camping on the banks of Mahawelli Ganga with his troops, uuable to cross the river which at that time was in floods. A lone survivor of the massacre at Kandy brought the news to him. At that time four officials sent by the Nayak king met Davie and demanded the surrender of Muttusamy and his family before allowing his troops to proceed further. Davie informed Muttusamy about his inability to protect him. In shock, Muttusamy exclaimed to Davie : "My God ! It is possible that the triumphant arms of England can be so humbled, so as to fear the menaces of such cowards as the Kandyans".[9]

Muttusamy, his relatives and servants were taken to the king, Vikrama Rajasinha. The king ordered them to be beheaded. Only some servants managed to reach Trincomalle. [10] The Kandyans came back to Davie and wanted his men to surrender their weapons. Davie, without realising what is in store for his men ordered them to lay down their arms.

The Kandyans separated the Asian troops from the British and asked the former to proceed to Kandy. The British troops were then led to a secluded spot near the river bank. There, behind a thick bush, they started chopping them down, two at a time, with large swords. Major Davie and captain Rumley, his second in command, escaped the executioners sword when the First *Adigar* Pilima Talauva appeared there and ordered his men to take them to the king. At Kandy those among the Asian troops who agreed to defect to the king's camp were spared. The rest were butchered. [11]

Governor North made Major Davie a scapegoat for the disaster [12] The fate of Davie was not known to the British then.[13] When it was known, North neither attempted to get in touch with him nor find out ways to get him released. [14]

The Kandyans continued to harass the British in coastal areas also. Retribution from the British followed. The British came out of their fortifications to repulse the Kandyan attack. The atrocities committed by the British during these operations were extensive. They raided unguarded villages and burnt them, destroyed the paddy and killed as many Kandyans as possible. [16]

In May 1803, Major General David Douglas Wemyss succeeded General Macdowell, the last link the island had with East India Company at Madras, as commander of the British forces. Wemyss sent an expedition to Kandy in the same year under Captain Arthur Johnston. Johnston reached Kandy with his troops. When he realised that the expected reinforcements might not reach Kandy in time he decided to return to Trincomallee to avoid the fate of Major Davie's troops.

In 1805 Governor North was recalled and Major General Sir Thomas Maintland, "the rough old despot", assumed charge. Instead of wasting his energy and the slender resources of the island Government by involving himself in the Kandyan affairs he decided not to continue the war with Kandy, [18] cut the military expenditure [19] and bring order in the fiscal matters. [20]

Maintland was not very keen in a treaty with Kandy. But once he tried to negotiate a treaty. With the assistance of John D'Oyly, the Chief Translator and the head of the British intelligence in the island, he got in touch with Moratota, the *Maha Nayaka Unanse* (head of the priesthood) a man known to the

Nayak king Vikrama Rajasinha and his First *Adigar*, Pilima Talauva. Nothing came out of this effort. But Sri Lanka enjoyed peace for the next seven years under Maintland's Governorship.

During this period, in his grim struggle against Pilima Talauva, the king Vikrama Rajasinha emerged as a ruthless autocrat. [21] When the office of the Second *Adigar* fell vacant, it passsed on to Ehelepola, Pilima Talauva's nephew. Upset by the king's hostile attitude towards him, Talauva was constrained to remind Vikrama Rajasinha that it was he who placed him on the Kandyan throne. He was sore about the king's failure to take his advise. The king, true to his inborn nature, told him that he was not to be led by his chiefs but they were to be directed by him.[22] The First *Adigar* also found fault with the king for the public works undertaken in recent years, making use of *Rajakarya*, which caused hardship to the people. The flash point in their relationship was reached when Talauva proposed a marriage between his son and the grand-daughter of the late king, Kirti Sri Rajasinha. The king saw in this alliance a direct threat to his authority and rule.[23]

The neglect of some minor official duty by Pilima Talauva was used by the king to remove him from his office and exile him to his home Province. Stung by this insult, the old *Adigar* struck back. He fomented a rebellion in the Provinces and bribed the head of the king's guard to assassinate the Nayak king. Both plans misfired. Pilima Talauva, his son-in-law and some chiefs were promptly arrested and the king ordered them to be beheaded.

King Vikrama Rajasinha was now really concerned about his life. [24] He tried to counteract the power of the chiefs by strengthening the village administration and the provincial committees. [25] He curbed corruption among the officials [26] and leaned on the common man for his support. He protected them from the tyranny of the unpopular provincial officials. [27]

Ehelepola, late Pilima Talauva's nephew succeeded his uncle as the First *Adigar*. It is strange that this happened inspite of the king's suspicion about Ehelepola's involvement in the plot to overthrow him. Subsequent developments prove that the king's suspision about Ehelopola's loyalty was correct. The First *Adigar* was in touch with the chief of the British intelligence, D'Oyly. D'Oyly had substantial funds at his disposal to collect information about Kandy and engage in subversive activities against it. [28]

Ill-health forced Governor Maintland to lay down his office in 1811. He was succeeded by Lieutenant General Sir Robert Brownrigg on 11 March, 1812. Maintland made it a point, after his return to England, to inform the British Government that his successor should not meddle in Kandyan affairs. The Government instructed Brownrigg accordingly, as soon as he assumed office. [29] It would be evident from the events narrated below that Brownrigg decided to ignore the advice but waited for a valid excuse to intervene militarily in Kandyan affairs.

After Pilima Talauva's execution, events moved rapidly, partly because of the king Vikrama Rajasinha's actions. In his attempt to root out opposition to his rule, he alienated all sections of the population; first the nobles, then the clergy and finally the peasantry. It nullified the goodwill he gained when he introduced reforms in the administration, controlled the price of food and cloth and thus eliminated profiteering. [30]

The lingering suspicion about Ehelepola forced the king to take action against him. He charged him with extortion and misappropriation. We are not sure whether these charges were fabricated by him to fix the *Adigar*. The king was childless by his earlier marriages and he took two new wives in 1813. Vikrama Rajasinha found fault with Ehelepola for presenting unworthy gifts at his wedding. [31]

Humiliated by the king, Ehelepola left for his native Province. He immediately wrote to D'Oyly. He requested the British officer to send him a gift—a shot-gun. D'Oyly responded to Ehelepola's letter with enthusiasm. He agreed to make enquiries about the gun and wrote to Ehelepola, on 6 September 1813 : "Ourselves also being anxious to promote in the happy island of Lanka the Prosperity of the World and Religion, I shall rejoice to receive from you an explicit communication by what Means you propose to accomplish the beneficial Object". [32] Ehelepola replied to D'Oyly and urged him to act "without Delaying". [33] D'Oyly hinted to Ehelepola that the British might help if a large scale rebellion broke out in the Kandyan kingdom.

King Vikrama Rajasinha was aware of what was going on between his First *Adigar* and the British. Ehelepola was also capable of predicting, correctly, what the king might do in such a

situation. Anticipating that the king might deprive him of his office, he fomented a rebellion in his home Province and sought the help of the British. It is unfortunate that the First *Adigar* had not learnt any lesson from the fate of his predecessor in office. The Governor Brownrigg had his own doubts about the outcome of the revolt. He kept quite. Ehelepola's supporters also did the same.

In such a situation the king was always alert. He quickly despatched one thousand men, under his court official, Molligoda, to Sabaragamuva, the home Province of Ehelepola. The encounter with the rebellious forces resulted in driving their leader, Ehelepola, to the British territory and seek refuge there.

Ehelepola's disloyalty aroused the violent nature of Vikrama Rajasinha's character. From now on his treatment of his subjects was almost bordering on near-madness. He let loose retributive terror. Unable to trust any of his Sinhalese officers, he depended on his Nayak kinsmen for support. He resorted to the use of brutal force to silence his opponents and thus retain his throne.

For their part in the rebellion the *Dissawa* of Matale Province, Ehelepola's brother-in-law (son of the *Dissawa* of Uva Province), a priest and several headmen were summarily tried and executed by the king.[34] Banking on the Sinhalese aversion to illtreat women, his former First *Adigar* did not take any steps to move his family out of Kandy before raising the banner of revolt against his king. It was a miscalculation. The king showed no mercy to his family.

Ehelepola's three children (one was a girl) and a baby were taken to the public square in Kandy. There, watched by the king himself, the three children were beheaded. According to Sinhalese tradition milk was supposed to have oozed out of the lips of the baby as its head was severed. The children's heads were placed inside a rice morter and the unfortunate mother was forced to pound them. Then, she along with other members of the family were taken to a lake. After tieing stones to their necks they were sent to their watery grave.[35] This event provoked nothing but disgust. The people who watched it wept in sorrow and went without food on that day.[36]

Now a point of no return to normalcy in Kandy was reached. The British decided to prepare for an invasion and waited for an excuse. Some traders of Colombo were robbed of their goods in

the Three Korales Province. They were accused of being spies and tortured at Kandy. Seven of them were dead. The three survivors reached Colombo with their limbs hanging around their necks.[37]

After this incident Governor Brownrigg saw no moral objection to invade Kandy.[38] To start with, he sent an advance force to occupy a forward post and plunged into further action. King Vikrama Rajasinha responded by mobilizing his men. He also smuggled into his kingdom some Tamils from the coastal areas.

Ehelepola joined the troops sent in advance by Brownrigg and moved forward with Major Hook towards Kandy. Similar columns of troops were instructed to reach Kandy from different directions.

Molligoda, the man who suppressed Ehelepola's rebellion earlier was in command of king's troops. True to the nature of Kandyan officials who served the Nayak kings of Sri Lanka in the past, he did not fail to get in touch with D'Oyly, the chief of the British intelligence. He also met Major Hook secretly and promised not to offer resistance to the advancing British troops. When he succeeded in bringing his family members out of Kandy, where they were held as hostages by the king, he surrendered to the British. With little or no resistance, a column of British troops reached Kandy without difficulty. As usual, the king, his retinue, the valuables and the inhabitants of Kandy had vanished. Stray dogs were, of course, there to greet the British.

Meanwhile another column of British troops came across a party of fleeing "Malabars". Among them was Vikrama Rajasinha's cousin, yet another Muttusamy, not to be confused with the one slain earlier. When captured by the British, he informed them about the whereabouts of the prize catch, the king Vikrama Rajasinha. Eknelligoda, an associate of Ehelepola, came to know the exact location of the house where the king was taking shelter. He reached the place and hammered on the door and burst it open. The king and his two wives were caught, stripped of their clothes and golden ornaments, bound like pigs with wild creepers and draged out of the house.[39]

When Major Hook and his men arrived on the scene they freed the king and his wives, provided them with clothes and carried them in palanquins. The next day D'Oyly called on the king, assured him of his safety, respect and attention.

That Vikrama Rajasinha was anticipating [40] the invasion and its aftermath is evident from his act as soon as Ehelepola fled to Colombo. He arranged to pack his treasures neatly and entrusted them to his village and court officials retaining only the sword of the state. He also kept some gold coins with him to present to people who might help him. Most of the treasures were later handed over by their respective custodians to the British and Ehelepola. Some were kept in private hands. Part of it was looted. The British auctioned what they got, except some important items. [41]

When Governor Brownring was informed about the capture of the king, he ordered Major Hook to take the king to Colombo without touching Kandy. At Colombo the king was lodged in a spacious house.

Vikrama Rajasinha, the ex-king of Kandy, was surprised by the treatment given to him by the British. [42] His fortitude appealed to many in the British Camp. On 24 January, 1816, Vikrama Rajasinha embarked the ship "Cornwallis" for Madras with his wives and relatives. He was accompanied by William Granville, a civil servant. The four weeks voyage to Madras enabled Granville to have first hand knowledge of the king. [43] Granville was impressed by the king's intellect, sound judgment of character and ability to view his defects dispassionately. [44] Even in adversity the king retained his affability and sense of humour. Strangely the same king was described later as "having no qualification for majesty except a portly figure and scarcely a single virtue to palliate a thousand crimes." [45]

Vikrama Rajasinha's detractors ensured that he was not given credit for what he did to improve the living condition of his subjects but were keen in perpetuating the memory of his crimes. Earlier it was Governor Brownrigg. Later, in recent years, it is the Sinhala chauvinists in the island. But one must realize that he was far from being alone [46] in his ruthlessness and cruelty.

The last Nayak king of Kandy was taken to Vellore, now in North Arcot district, Tamilnadu, from Madras. There he led a peaceful life in exile and died on the 30th January, 1832, aged fifty two years and leaving one son. His son died in 1843. The former Nayak king's relations are living at Vellore even today.

At Kandy the transition was smooth. In a glittering ceremony, held in the ornate hall of the former Nayak king, the "convention" was held. Attended by the nobles of the former ruler and the British, led by the Governor Brownrigg, the convention to establish a new order in the island under the British crown was signed on 2 March, 1815. [47] The Union Jack was formally hoisted.

John D'Oyly, [48] the brain behind the bloodless British victory, was appointed as the Resident of the newly annexed Provinces. The former First *Adigar* Ehelepola [49] vainly nourished, till the end of the war, the ambition to occupy the throne and revive Sinhalese rule at Kandy. He was disappointed. However, he declined all the honours, married again and lived in near regal style at Kandy. The faithful Molligoda [50] was appointed by his new masters, the British, as the First *Adigar*. The Nayak rule in Sri Lanka came to an end.

9

CONCLUSION

It would be evident from this study of the chain of events from 1739 to 1815 that the main participants during this period were : the Kandyan King of Sri Lanka, the Dutch who were occupying the Maritime Provinces surrounding the former's kingdom, and the British who were emerging as a powerful force in South India.

A careful study of the records cited makes it clear that all the three powers had a common aim. They were after the control of trade in cinnamon. The "Helen or Bride in the contest" of the island of Sri Lanka was "the finest and purest cinnamon". Trade in this spice was so lucrative that it attracted all the European countries engaged in commercial activity in the eastern waters. The Portuguese came first, then the Dutch, and after them the British. All of them shared the same purpose.

Even though the Kandyan kings wished to export this commodity themselves, they were unable to do so, having allowed foreign powers like the Portuguese and later the Dutch to surround them, They also lacked infrastructure facilities to take this commodity to international markets. The Kandyan kings were prisoners in their own land. When they invited the Dutch to drive out the Portuguese occupying the Maritime Provinces, they thought that the Dutch were only mercenary forces, and expected them to go away once their job was over. This was a miscalculation. The Dutch agreed to drive out the Portuguese because they wanted to step into the former's shoes. With this aim in view, after "the operation clearance", they presented the king of Kandy with an exorbitant bill towards the cost of expenses involved in the military operation, fully aware that he could not

afford to settle the dues. To justify their occupation of the Maritime Provinces they claimed that they were holding it as collateral security for the money due from the king of Kandy.

The Kandyan kings of the time, the Nayaks from South India, tried, unlike their Sinhalese predecessors, to use their South Indian connections to expel the Dutch from the Maritime Provinces. There were only two indigenous Princes who could have helped. Mohamad Ali, the Nawab of the Carnatic and Tippu Sultan, of Mysore. The former did not take any initiative. The latter could have helped them if he wanted to. He hated the British and had been conspiring with Napoleon Bonaparte of France against them. But there is no indication in the available records of the Kings of Kandy seeking his support.

When the Kandyan kings approached the French, they did send a fleet and took possession of Kottiyar. The Dutch acted swiftly and turned the French out of of Kottiyar and carried the war in the Coromandel coast where they expelled the French from Santhome, in Madras, which was seized from the Portuguese by the French.

Similarly, when they found that the Kandyan ruler was keen on encouraging trade by the British, in the Bay of Bengal, from their ports in the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, the Dutch became apprehensive about the Kandyan ruler's control over these ports since they feared that it threatened their economy and trading interests. There was the danger that "trade links could mature into political ones". Hence, to forestal such developments, they acted quickly and took possession of Trincomalle in 1665, fortified it, and kept a naval watch on the ports.

The British who were carrying on small scale trade in the Bay of Bengal between the ports in the region were naturally waiting for an opportunity to break the Dutch monopoly in cinnamon trade and take their share in a flourishing South Indian–Sri Lanka trade. The main constraint for them in taking any hasty steps to achieve their object was that they were not only guided by local considerations, but also global ones. At that time, the Dutch and the British were at peace in Europe after signing the treaty of 1667. Under article 34 of the treaty, "the fleets or vessels of one of the powers entering into the ports of the other should not undertake hostilities or anything which may do the least prejudice".

Therefore the British could not send any official embassy to Kandy for trade purposes. However, they denied the Dutch claims of monopoly and took the stand on the freedom of the seas and free mutual relations with Asian rulers.

The lure of cinnamon was so strong that the British broached the subject of trade with Sri Lanka, when they attempted, in the previous century, to free, through correspondence, Robert Knox and his companions, imprisoned by the Kandyan king, Rajasinha. The harsh terms of the treaty of 1766 with the Dutch, and the restriction on free trade forced the Nayak kings of Kandy to turn to South India and seek British help to expel the Dutch. The British did manage to send Pybus to Kandy on a spying embassy. They were not willing to offer him any help, but vainly expected the king to give them concessions in trade. Thus the Dutch relations with the Kandyan kingdom were on the verge of getting intertwined with the wider network of power rivalry in South Asia. In a sense, the advent of the Nayak kings of Kandy was the first step that paved the way for the coming of the British.

What the British first sought from Sri Lanka was its precious cinnamon. Lord Hobert, the British Governor of Madras, advised promotion of trade with the Kingdom of Kandy by bartering rice, salt and cloth for cinnamon, pepper and betelnut. Later, while cinnamon continued to be desirable, Trincomalle became another focus of attention in Sri Lanka. Along with it came the necessity of denying the use of this fine natural harbour to the French in their design to conquer India. Though the British embassies from South India under Pybus, Boyd, and Andrews were failures, the British army paved the way for the capture of the Maritime Provinces which coincided with the political and economic decline of Holland.

Though cinnamon was the chief attraction, it was the interplay of economics and politics that drew the British to Sri Lanka from South India. In any case, the island could not have escaped the attention of the leading power on the mainland. That has been the case at every period of South Indian History. It shows how foreigners from six thousand miles away could first make conquests in India, and then in the neighbouring island wholly or entirely due to their command of the sea.

An important factor that favoured the British intervention in Sri Lanka was the strained relations between the Dutch and the local rulers. However, the British were very cautious in their approach. Their position in international affairs was not very favourable. In fact, as in the case of India, the political vicissitudes of Europe shaped the British policies and manoeuvres in Sri Lanka. The British were gaining a foothold in India in the Madras Presidency, and so naturally, they operated in Sri Lanka through Madras.

The British followed a go-slow policy which they could well afford. After all, they already had a footing nearby ; if Sri Lanka could be occupied, it would merely be an additional gain, but if they failed, they lost nothing. But they were careful not to prejudice their political relations with their neighbours in Europe. They were not willing to antagonise the Dutch in India at the risk of their own rise in European politics which could be hindered by the enemity of Holland.

The British were also benefited by the Kandyan Nayak kings' perpetual struggles against the Sinhalese nobles. The presence in the Kandyan Capital of many collateral branches of the royal family, the relatives of the innumerable queens, present and past at any given time, led to disunity and conflicts. In the reign of the last Nayak a relative claimed the throne and sat on it for a few precarious days before being executed. No doubt unity among Nayak kings and Sinhalese nobles would have prevented the consolidation of British power in Sri Lanka. Their failure to achieve it undoubtedly provided opportunities which the British empire builders made use of. On the whole, the Nayak dynasty led a distracted existence and was bound to succumb to the British, who, early in the nineteenth century, had already begun sweeping the world.

It is often said that the "Madras Officials" were responsible for the problems that confronted the British after their take over of the Maritime Provinces. But it must be remembered that this was the first time that Indians went to Sri Lanka as civilian officials in the employment of a second foreigner. Indians have been visiting and settling down in an island hardly twenty miles away, for centuries. But the Indians who went to Sri Lanka in the wake of

the first British conquest belonged to a different category. They were employees of a foreign conqueror and inevitably attracted the dislike of, to put it no higher, the erstwhile subjects of another foreigner, the Dutch. It was hardly likely they would be welcomed with affection. In fact, on the other hand, it is alleged that their "extortions" were mainly responsible for the revolt of 1796–1798. There is no basis for this harsh view. What was responsible for the revolt was the ignorance of the officers who went from South India in attempting to run a system with which they were not familiar, and not their "avarice".

If the final verdict on South India's association with Sri Lanka during the period of this study is that it was a failure, it should be realised that the British in Madras laboured under many handicaps. They were foreigners in India, and were dealing with another foreign country, Sri Lanka.

Further, the eighteenth century was a time of lax administrative probity in India, The official robberies in Bengal, in which every British functionary from Clive downwards flouted rules and amassed quick fortunes, and the widespread corruption in Madras about the same time centering on the debts of the Nawabs of the Carnatic, influenced the Madras officials, and they took the bad habits to Sri Lanka. This explains the unpopularity of Madras civilians. As for the Indians who accompanied them, they were only doing what their betters were doing. But between themselves, the British officials and the Madras lower officials brought a bad name to Madras administration in Sri Lanka.

The British in Madras were not free political agents. They were under the control of two masters, in Calcutta, and in London. These two masters did not always agree between themselves. The long delay in receipt of the orders from these places also contributed to an enervated administration. Consequently, the British at that time had no clear idea about the administration of conquered territories. However, when the Peace of Amiens finally made over the Dutch possessions in Sri Lanka to the British in 1802, William Pitt described it in British Parliament as "the most valuable colonial possessions on the globe, giving to our Indian Empire a security it had not enjoyed from its first establishment".

Though Governor North succeeded in establishing the judiciary and fiscal system, of the Provinces conquered from the Dutch, upon

sound lines, he failed miserably in his ambition to control the Nayak king of Kandy. Maintland, North's successor avoided a confrontation with the Nayak king. But, Brownrigg who succeeded Maintland had ambitions to complete the task left unfinished by North and he exploited the anti–Nayak feeling among the nobles of the Kandyan court. The king had to struggle.

"It was the struggle of a single man of alien race against the powerful oligarchy of native aristocrates through whom he had to rule". Ultimately, years of intrigue, diplomacy and espionage helped the British to extinquish the Nayak rule in Sri Lanka in 1815.

Martanda Varma, the "merchant prince" of Travancore, expeled the Dutch from his shores and subsequently introduced State trading in spices. The Nayak king Vikrama Rajasinha also tried to expel the Dutch and find an opening for his external trade. The British foiled his attempt. They also managed to tarnish his image. "His reputation, like that of Richard III of England, is sadly in need of rehabilitation".

REFERENCES AND NOTES

CHAPTER I : EARLY SETTLERS

1. Vijaya is said to be the son of Sinhabahu, king of Sinhapura kingdom in North India. Vijaya was banished from his homeland by his father for misconduct and he came to Sri Lanka with his companions and settled down there. See K. M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka*, p. 31. For details about colonisation of the Island by Indo-Aryan tribes from North India, see A. L. Basham, 'Prince Vijaya and the Aryanisation of Ceylon', *Ceylon Historical Journal* (3), 1952, pp. 172–191.

2. H. W. Cordington, *A Short History of Ceylon*, p. 7.

3. The coming of Buddhism was the cardinal fact in Sri Lanka's culture and civilisation. Many are the miracles told of it. The island's national chronicle, the *Mahavamsa*, treats of it at length. See Wilhelm Geiger's translation of *Mahavamsa* from the original Pali, pp. 88–141.

4. K. K. Pillay, *South India and Ceylon*, pp. 44–49.

5. K. M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka*, p. 43.

6. H. W. Cordington, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

7. K. M. De Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

8. Manavamma, also referred to as Manavarma, assisted Pallava Narasimhavarman I Mahamalla (630–668) in his battles against Pulakesin, the Badami Chalukyan king. Later, Narasimhavarman helped Manavarmma to gain the throne. See K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *A History of South India,* p. 150.

9. The Kasakkudi plates of Nandivarman II state that Narasimhavarman I Mahamalla, the Pallava king, "surpassed the glory of the valour of Rama by his conquest of Lanka". See, *South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. II pp. 349 and 359.

10. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Pandian Kingdom*, p. 62.

11. Mudaliyar C. Rasanayagam, *Ancient Jaffna*, pp. 253–244.

12. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Pandyan Kingdom*, p. 62.

13. The *Culavamsa*, the continuation of the *Mahavamsa*, translated by Wilhelm Geiger and Mabel Rickmars, Vol. I, p. 169. Also, the "Tiruvalangadu plates of Rajendra Chola I", *South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. III, part III.

14. The *Culavamsa*, p. 176.

15. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *A History of South India*, p. 180.

16. S. Paranavitana, "The Capital of Ceylon during the ninth and tenth centuries", *Ceylon Journal of Science*, II (1928–33), pp. 141–47.

17. K.Indrapala, *Ilangaiyil Dravida Kattadakkalai* (Tamil), passim.

18. K.A. Nilakanta Sastri, *A History of South India,* p. 182.

19. *Ibid.*

20. It is said that Vijayabahu, successor of Vikramabahu I married Lilavati, daughter of Jagartipala whose queen had escaped from captivity in the Chola country, and also, Tilakasundari of the Kalinga royal race. See H.W.Cordington, *op.cit.*, pp. 55–57.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

22. These dates are from K.K. Pillay, *op.cit.*, p. 78. For a detailed study of the Chola conquest of Sri Lanka, see George W. Spencer, *The Politics of Expansion : The Chola Conquest of Sri Lanka and Sri Vijaya*, pp. 45–65.

23. K.A.Nilakanta Sastri, *The Pandyan Kingdom*, pp. 113–121.

24. When Chandrabanu, the ruler of Jaffna and a tributary of the Pandyas invaded the Sinhalese kingdom of Parakramabahu II (1236–1270), the latter appealed to the Pandyas for help. To maintain the balance of political power in the island, the Pandyas sent an expeditionary force. The combined forces of the Pandyas and Parakramabahu II defeated Chandrabanu and killed him. Instead of handing over control of Jaffna kingdom to the Sinhalese ruler, Parakramabahu II, the Pandyas installed Aryachakravarti, the leader of the Pandyan army, as the ruler of Jaffna kingdom under their overlordship. When the Pandyan empire collapsed after the Muslim conquest of South India, Jaffna became an independent kingdom under the Aryachakravartis. See K.M. De Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

25. S. Pathmanathan, *The Kingdom of Jaffna*, Vol. I, pp. 91–111. See also K. K. Pillay, *op. cit.*, pp. 116–133.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 110.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

29. H. W. Cordington, *op. cit.* p. 94.

30. For detailed account of Kotte Kingdom, see G.P.V.Somaratne, *Political History of the Kingdoms of Kotte c. 1400–1521*, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1969, pp. 372–392.

31. The Kandyan kingdom known among the Sinhalese as *Kanda Uda Pas Rata*, or the five countries on the hill, was called by Portuguese as 'Candea'. They used the name both for the Kingdom and its Capital Senkadagala Nuvara. The Dutch and the British also adopted the same practice.

32. On the founding of the Jaffna kingdom, see K. Indrapala, *Early Dravidian Settlements and the Beginnings of the Kingdom of Jaffna*, Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1965, pp. 399–541.

33. See C. R. De Silva, 'The first Portuguese Revenue Register of the Kingdom of Kotte – 1599', *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, New series, (III) (2), 1973, 14–27.

34. The etymology of the word Vanniya is not clear. Some scholars say it is derived from Sanskrit or Pali *Vana* or forest *(History of Ceylon*, Vol. I, pt. II, p. 736). W. Geiger has equated the term with forest folk or forest settlers. William Taylor mentions in his work, *A Catalogue Raisonee of Oriental Manuscripts in the Library of the (late) College, Fort St. George*, (Vol. III, p. 90) the word may be derived from Sanskrit *Vahni* or fire and *Vahni Kula* became Vanniya. The History of Vanni region may be gleaned from K. Indrapala, 'The origin of Tamil chieftaincies of Ceylon', The *Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, 1 (2), July, 1970, pp. 111–140; S. Pathmanathan, 'Federal Polity in Medieval Ceylon : An examination of the chieftancies of the Vanni', *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December, 1966, pp. 101–112 ; Thomas Nagel, 'Account of the Vanni', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch*, Vol. XXXVIII, pt. 2, no. 106, 1948, pp. 69–74. Nagal was appointed regent in the Vanni Principality by the Dutch in August, 1795.

35. For a detailed account of the Portuguese rule in Sri Lanka, see T. B. H. Abeyasinghe, *Portuguese Rule in Ceylon ;* C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire ;* P. E. Pieris, *The Portuguese Era*, Vols. I and II ; C. R. De Silva, *The Portuguese in Ceylon*, 1617–1638.

36. K. M. De Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 100. See also I. Mac Gregor, 'Europe and the East', in *New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. III.

37. H. W. Cordington, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–97.

38. K. M. De Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

39. C. R. De Silva, 'The Rise and Fall of the Kingdom of Sitavaka', *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, New series, VII (1), pp. 1--43.

40. See Fernao de Queyroz, *Conquista Temporal Espiritual de Ceilao.* Queyroz's lengthy history is considered the basis of the history of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century in Sri Lanka. Queyroz's work was translated by S. G. Perera, into English, and published as *The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon.*

41. Unless otherwise stated specifically, the sources consulted for narrating the Portuguese rule in the Maritime Provinces are from K.M.De Silva. *Op.cit.*, pp. 103–122 and H.W.Cordington, *op.cit.*, pp. 101–124.

42. For a detailed study of the Sitavaka Kingdom, see C.R. De Silva, *op.cit.*, n. 39.

43. T.B.H. Abeyasinghe, *op.cit.*, pp. 12–28.

44. S. Arasaratnam, *Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1598–1687*, p. 120.

45. C.R.De Silva, *The Portuguese in Ceylon, 1617–1638*, p. 251.

46. "The Portuguese arms and pillars placed in Africa and in countless isles beyond the bounds of these continents, are material things, and time may destroy them. But time will not destroy the religion, customs and language which the Portuguese have implanted in these lands". C. R. Boxer, 'The Portuguese in the East, 1500–1800', in H. V. Livermore (ed.), *Portugal and Brazil*, p. 244.

47. The details given in this section of the chapter are based largely on S. Arasaratnam's work mentioned in note No. 44.

48. P. Geyl, 'The Dutch in India', H.H. Dodwell (ed.) *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, pp. 28–60.

49. *Ibid.*

50. A few Dutch letters provide evidence about the role of the Dutch in such matters. See for example, Court Chiefs to Governor Simons, 1706, *Ceylon National Archives* : 1/3259.

51. See P.E.E. Fernando, 'An account of the Kandyan Mission sent to Siam in 1750 A.D., *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, 11, 1959, pp. 37-83; D.B. Jayatilaka, 'Sinhalese Embassies to Arakan', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society; Ceylon Branch*, XXXV, 1940, pp. 1-6; and P. E. Pieris, 'Kirti Sri's Embassy to Siam', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch*, SVIII, 1903, pp. 17-41.

52. On cinnamon trade see C. R. De Silva, 'Trade in Ceylon cinnamon in the sixteenth century', *Ceylon Journal of History and Social Studies*, New Series, III (2), 1973, pp. 14-27.

CHAPTER 2 : THE NAYAK DYNASTY

1. When the British occupied Kandy on 14th February, 1815, they found that the king had left the city with his family. However, he was captured by the British and transported to Vellore. See chapter 8 for details.

2. *Mahavamsa*, translated by Wilhelm Geiger, pp. 59-60. Mahatittha is now called Mantota, opposite to the islet of Mannar.

3. The Sinhalese king could have more than one *Mahesi* (queen) and the first of them was called *aggamahesi* (chief queen) and she alone was entitled to play a role in the *abhisheka* or consecration of the king. A king could not only have two *mahesis* but also two *aggamahesis*. In the Potgul Vihara inscription, the queen Candavati is described as the second *aggamahesi* of Parakramabahu I (1153-1186), the first being Lilavati. See *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, II, p. 241. During this period the king's *mahesis* (secondary wives) were known as *vakanda doli* or iron palanquin, to which they were entitled and the *aggamahesis* (chief queen) were known as *randoli* or golden palanquin.

4. *Manadarampura Puvato*, verses 433–436. A Sinhalese poem of historical nature, it deviates from conventional theme, and deals with military, social and economic matters. It was probably written during the later years of the Nayak king Kirti Sri Rajasinha's reign.

5. *Culavamsa*, the continuation of *Mahavamsa*, translated by Wilhelm Geiger, part II, p. 238.

6. *Ibid*., p. 235.

7. Court Chiefs to Governor Simons, 1705, Ceylon National Archives. 1/3229.

8. *Mahottiya* was on official who kept the official records, and *Muhandiram* was an officer of varying rank. It was also a title of honour given to persons of the highest caste, the Govikula, or in Indian terms, the Vellala.

9. Regarding the mission, a detailed report to the Chief *Adigar* (chief minister) is available. It is reproduced by P. M. P. Abhayasingha (ed.) in *Udarata Vitti*, pp. 122–129.

10. The Dutch Governor of Sri Lanka, Cornelies Joan Simons (1703–1707) refers to this embassy of five people which was sent to Madurai in 1706 to fetch a bride. *Memoir of Cornelies Joan Simons for his successor, 1707* (hereafter *Memoir of Governor Simons*) p. 7.

11. P.M.P. Abhayasingha, *op. cit*., p. 127.

12. This Raja must have been a member of the Pudukkottai ruling house.

13. His real name was probably something like Muttu Iyer or Muttu Iyen.

14. P. M. P. Abhayasingha, *op. cit*., p. 128.

15. *Memoir of Governor Simons*, p. 7.

16. Court chiefs to Governor Simons, 1706, Ceylon National Archives, 1/3259.

17. Narendrasinha, soon after his accession, married a Kandyan lady, the daughter of Monaravila, *Dissawa* (provincial Governor) of Matale. She is said to have borne a son to the king. It is very likely that the boy died young, for we hear no more about him. See Hugh Nevill, *Collection of Ballads*, British Museum, No. 857.

18. *Culavamsa*, p. 242.

19. E. Reimers (translater) *Memoir of John Schreuder for his Successor, 1762*, (hereafter *Memoir of John Schreuder*), p. 30.

20. Included in William Taylor, (editor and translator) *Oriental Historical Manuscripts in Tamil Language*, Vol. II, Appendix G, pp. 42-49. See also, 'The kings of Candia and their connections with Madura', *Collin Mackenzie Collection*, India Office Library, Vol. IV, p. 107.

21. *Sasanas of the Central Province*, Manuscript in Land Settlement Department, Colombo Secretariat, Vol. I, p. 87.

22. In January 1710 another bride was brought to Sri Lanka, from South India, with her family and retinue. Lorna Srimathie Dewaraja, *The Kandyan Kingdom, 1707–1760*, p. 35.

23. William Taylor, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-47.

24. It was written between 1798 and 1803 and its author is anonymous.

25. Contra, Lorna Srimathie Dewaraja, *op.cit.*, p. 34. She says "The brides did come from Madura, but it is doubtful whether they belonged to the royal family".

26. *Culavamsa*, 98.1. Narendrasinha had no children by either of the *aggamahesis*.

27. Verse, 510.

28. *Culavamsa*, Vol. II, p. 246.

29. Referred to as a concubine of the king. See E. Reimers *op.cit.*, p. 30.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

31. *Culavamsa*, 38.80. Even in the 5th century, Kassapa I was considered a usurper because his mother was not of royal rank. The designation *bandara* given to the off–spring of Sinhalese kings by a secondary wife of the Govikula was not accorded to the offspring of the king by women of a lower caste.

32. When Chokkanatha Nayaka of Madurai Nayak dynasty died without a male issue it was his wife Minakshi (1732–1738), who succeeded him and not his brother–in–law, Venkata Perumal Nayaka. See R. Satyanatha Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 232 ; See also Geiger's introduction to his translation of *Culavamsa*, 'Kingship and law of succession in Medieval Ceylon', Vol. I, p. XXII ; For more details on the law of succession see 'Mother right and succession to the throne in Malabar and Ceylon' in *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, Vol. II, Jan–June, 1963, No. 1, pp. 25–39 ; Also, M. B. Ariyapala "Succssion to the throne in Ancient Ceylon", *University of Ceylon Review*, Vol. XII, No. 4, Oct. 1954, pp. 195–216. Ariyapala, supports the view that succession depended upon Primogeniture.

33. *Culavamsa*, Vol. I.

34. Lorna Srimathie Dewaraja (*op. cit.*, p. 37) is tempted to say that it was the *Marumakkathayam* principle, which means succession by nephews, that influenced the accession of Sri Vijaya Rajasinha to the throne of Kandy.

35. It is said that Sri Vijaya Rajasinha sent an embassy to Madurai for a bride in 1739. The Kandy envoys met the Nayak representatives, Ramakrishna Nayaka and Narenappa (Narayanappa ?) Nayaka in Ramanathapuram town. The Kandyan envoys saught for their king the hand of a daughter of Narenappa Nayaka. The father agreed. Subsequently Narenappa Nayaka settled down in Kandy along with his family. Sri Vijaya Rajasinha married another Madurai lady seven years later on April 21, 1747. William Taylor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, App. G. p. 47.

36. Narenappa Nayaka's paternal grandfather, Periya Tirumala Nayaka, was married to a sister of a prince of Madurai. *Memoir of Joan Gideon Lotan to his Successor*, p. 3. Loten was the Dutch Governor of Maritime Provinces between 1752–1757.

37. E. Reimers, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

38. William Taylor, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Appendix C. p. 49. The existence of the marriage alliance between the Nayak dynasty of Kandy and the descendent of Vijaya Raghava Nayaka of Tanjavur is confirmed by a Telugu manuscript, *Tanjavuruvari Carita*. See T. Venkataswamy Rao, *A Mannual of the Tanjore District in the Madras Presidency*, p. 758.

39 *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 254, XXII, 359 ff. de Meurn to Harris, 1700 August, 1793.

40. J. Davy, *Account of the Interior of Ceylon*, 312.

41. S. G. Perara, *History of Ceylon*, II, p. 31.

42. J. Davy, *op. cit.*

43. North to Secret Committee, 26th November 1798 ; Colonial Office Records, 54.1 ; and North to Secret Committee, 30th January, 1800, Colonial Office Records, 54.1.

44. K. M. De Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

45. There was a street in Kandy, named Malabar Street, where only the Nayaks lived. "Malabar" was a term frequently applied to the Tamils and Telugus of South Tamil Nadu. It arose from a misconception on the part of the Arabs who gave the name of "Ma' bar" to the South Coromandal Coast. This name frequently occurs in the records of the time.

46. Nobles and *Sangha* (order of the monks) were sources of threat to the Kings of Sri Lanka. During the reign of the Nayak king, Kirti Sri Rajasinha (1747-1760) the Second *Adigar* Samanakkodi and some of the most venerated monks of the land plotted to kill the king by inviting him to a religious festival. They dug a pit, placed sharp spikes in it and covered it with some draperies and placed the throne on it. The idea was that the moment the king took his seat the draperies would give way and he would fall impaled upon the spikes. However, it failed to materialise since the king had prior information about the plot. *Culavamsa*, 100.23.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Though the Nayak dynasty figures in the general histories of Sri Lanka, for example in K. M. de Silva's *A History of Sri Lanka*, only one book, by itself, has been devoted to it so far. This is *The Kandyan Kingdom, 1707–1760*, by Lorna Srimathie Dewaraja. It is not primarily a history of the Nayaks, for it begins before they came to power and ends before they lost it. There are standard histories of the Nayaks of Madurai, Tanjavur, Gingee and Ikkeri, by R. Sathinatha Aiyer, V. Vriddhagirisan, C. S. Srinivasachari and K.D. Swaminathan respectively.

CHAPTER 3 : CONTACT WITH THE BRITISH IN SOUTH INDIA

1. A merchant by profession, Fitch was commissioned by the "Turkey Company" to travel to India and ascertain what openings there were for English trade. For more details about his travel to India and other places, see Richard Halklyut, *The Principal Navigations Voyages Traffiques & Traffiques of the English Nation made by Sea or Overland to the Remote & Forthest Distant Quarters of the Eartyh at any time within the compasse of these 1600 yeares*, III, p. 280.

2. Robert Knox. *An Historical Relation of Ceylon*, p. 21. Knox's book was published in 1681 in London and became one of the most popular travel books of the times in English.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 347–376.

7. K.M. De Silva, *A History of Sri Lanka*, pp. 135–136.

8. *Secret Minutes of the Dutch Political Council, 1762* (hereafter *Secret Minutes*) p. 3. These documents were edited by J. H. Paulusz in 1954.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

11. For these developments, see V.M.B. Mendis, *The Advent of the British to Ceylon*, pp. 24–25.

12. There were also the Setupathi of Ramanathapuram and the Zamindar of Sivaganga, in the far south. But they were tributary States. Both the Nawab of the Carnatic and The Raja of Tanjavur claimed their fealty. In fact, the Nawab also asserted that the Raja of Tanjavur himself was a tributary of his.

13. V.L.B. Mendis, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

14. *Ibid.*

15. K.M. de Silva, *op.cit.*

16. *Ibid.*. p. 139.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. Pigot to Pybus 6.4.1762, *Letters from Madras* IA, India Office Library.

20. *Secret Minutes*, p. 119.

21. *Ibid.*

22. He came to Madras as Writer on June 28, 1743. He was over carried in his ship to Machilipatnam, and he had to find his way to Madras by land. Eight years later he exchanged the pen for the sword when Robert Clive set out from Fort St. George on his famous march to Arcot where, after capturing the fort without resistance, he defended it heroically in a great military feat of the British empire. Clive had originally left Fort St. David in Cuddalore which, with the French capture of Fort St. George in 1746, had become the principal British settlement on the Coromandal coast, and sailed to Fort St. George which, though already restored to the British now, was still placed under the other fort. Richard Prince was the Deputy Governor. All but fifty of the European soldiers in Fort St. George accompanied Clive in the campaign against Arcot. Clive's force consisted of two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys. There were eight young officers, Lieutenants Pybus, Bulkley, Revel, Trenwith, Ensigns Glass, Morrice, Dawson and Turner. Pybus had volunteered for military service.

    The next available reference to Pybus in the Madras records is dated 1754. He had then become Senior Merchant. He was "Supra Vizor" in Fort Marlborough, in Indonesia.

Returning to Madras, he became "Assaymaster" at the mint in Fort St. George in 1758. His appointment was not without controversy. His predecessor in the office, Edward Edwards, refers in a private letter to "one Pybus, who now has care of it" (the mint) and says "he can make an Assay as well as Mr. Edwards ; however, the beauty of it is, no person will trust him with their Gold or Silver."

As a civilian this time, Pybus played his part in the repulse of the French siege of Fort St. George, from December, 1758, to February, 1759. After the siege he left for England on leave. On his return in the same year he became a member of the Governor's Council. See H.D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras* II, p. 428, 491, 550 562 and 589.

23. He was the Governor for two terms. 1755–1763 and 1775–1776. After his first term, he returned to England quite rich and was made a baron and was appointed Governor again. The scandals relating to the enormous debts of the Nawab of the Carnatic, Mohammad Ali, were then raging, and Pigot was caught up in them ; in fact, he was a leading figure in that complicated imbroglio. In August, 1776, he was arrested by some members of his own Council and removed to a suburb of Madras. In May, 1777, he died in confinement. See C. S. Srinivasachari, *Histor of the City of Madras*, pp. 184–187.

24. *National Museums of Ceylon Historical Series*, Vol. I, p. 83.

25. Pigot to Pybus, 6.4.1972. *Letters from Madras*, IA, India Office Library, London.

26. The manuscript in Tamil Nadu Archives, Madras, *Military Sundries*, Vol. XVII, (hereafter *Military Sundries)* consists of Pybus's Report to the President at Fort St. George. The remainder includes the diary he maintained on his trip (hereafter *Pybus Diary*). Most of the details furnished in this chapter are from these two sources.

27. *Pybus Diary*, 5th May, 1762.
28. *Ibid.*, 24th May, 1762.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, 4th June, 1762.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Military Sundries*, p. 9.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Military Sundries*, p. 12.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Pybus Diary*, 7th May, 1762.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Military Sundries*, p. 13.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 14–18.

58. L.A. Mills, *Ceylon under British Rule, 1795–1942*, p. 2.

59. *Military Sundries*, pp. 9–31.

60. *Ibid.*

61. There was a ferry here over the Mahaveli Ganga which runs on three sides of Kandy on the road to Trincomallee. There were other ferries on the road to Colombo and Galle.

62. *Secret Minutes*, p. 102.

63. *Military Sundries*, pp. 13–15.

64. For details of the letters from Madras to court, see *Letters from Madras* IA and from court to Madras see *Letters to Madras*, India Office Library, London.

65. Court to Madras, 9.3.1763, *Letters to Madraş* IA, India Office Library, London.

66. V. L. B. Mendis, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

67. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 4 : THE DUTCH REACTION

1. *Secret Minutes*, p. 88.

2. du Pre was at this time a member of the Madras Council. He was Governor of Madras from 1770 to 1773. When Hyder Ali was at the gates of Madras dictating peace, he himself chose du Pre as the British negotiator with him. See N. S. Ramaswami, *Political History of the Carnatic Under the Nawabs*, p. 208.

3. These were the Siyane, Hewagam, Haptigam and Aluthkuru Korales and the Province of Matara.

4. Big boats ; in Tamil, *thonis*.

5. *Codex 2298*, Nuwara Eliya Archives.

6. The Mahaveli Ganga ; that is, the envoy was in Ganncruwa.

7. A rank between *Muhandiram* and *Mudaliyar* ; perhaps a commander of hundred men.

8. *Dissawa*, a Provincial Governor.

9. *Secret Minutes*, p. 95.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

15. *Ibid.*

16. For further details see S. Arasaratnam, "Dutch Sovereignty in in Ceylon : A Historical Analysis of its Problems", *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies*, (1) 1958, pp. 105–31.

17. V.L.B. Mendis, *The Advent of the British to Ceylon*, 1762–1803, pp. 61–62.

CHAPTER 5 : BRITISH INTEREST RENEWED

1. Sir Charles Lawson, *Memories of Madras*, p. 69; See also N.S. Ramaswami, *Political History of the Carnatic under the Nawabs*, p. 240.

2. N.S. Ramaswami, *op.cit.*, p. 208.

3. J.F. Ramsey, *Anglo–French Relations, 1765–1770*, Chapter–III.

4. R. R. Palmer, *Age of the Democratic Revolution*, Vol. I, Chapter–VII.

5. V.L.B. Mendis, *The Advent of the British to Ceylon, 1762–1803*, p. 56.

6. At the end of the Carnatic wars after 1759, when a second French siege of Fort St. George failed, the British seemed undisputed in their power in the south. But the French did not by any means give up hopes of recovery. They found able supporters in Hyder Ali and Tippu Sultan, the rulers of Mysore. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Napoleon Bonaparte had plans to invade India from Egypt, which he had seized. The French revolutionaries were active in Mauritius. By the end of the century, Napoleon turned his attentions westwards to Europe. When Tipu Sultan attacked the Raja of Travancore, an ally of the Company and freed the British in India from the strict policy of neutrality laid down by Pitts India Act of 1784, they "manufactured a respectable *Casus belli* and defeated the Mysore hero with the collaboration of the Peshwa and the Nizam". Only then could the British feel secure. Till then, they had always to contend with the French schemes of recovery. See S. P. Sen, *The French in India, 1763–1816*, Chs. V–VIII. Also, Sailendra Nath Sen, *Anglo–Maratha Relations, 1785–96*, p. XIII. 16 and 45.

7. The sailing ships of the time faced two main difficulties. They had to keep off the east coast at the time the monsoons were changing, leading to cyclones, often fierce. This was in April and in October. Another difficulty was that ships still had to circumnavigate Sri Lanka in passing from one of India's coasts to another. After Indian independence there has been a scheme to cut a ship canal through Ramasvaram island to obviate the circumnavigation. But the canal has not yet been dug.

8. H. C. Wylley, *A Life of Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote*, K.B., pp. 200–201.

9. For a detailed account about his career and achievements, see L.D. Campbell (ed.), *Miscellaneous Works of Hugh Boyd*, 2 Vols.

10. H.D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. III, p. 237. See also A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch, (eds.), *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1815*, Vol. I, p. 173.

11. Now called Chaturangapatnam, some ten miles south of Mamallapuram and some forty miles south of Madras on the coast. The fort, a large one in extent, survives in parts. The best preserved are some tomb stones.

12. *Madras Consultations*, Vol. LXXV, for June 29, 1781.

13. This was the end of Castle Geldria, a fortress highly thought of in its time. As in Sadras, the survivals there today are a few tomb stones. One of thess carries a drawing of the fort. See N.S. Ramaswami, *The Founding of Madras*. This book contains a photograph of the tomb stone.

14. Later Medows became Governor of Bombay and then of Madras, from 1790 to 1792 in the latter.

15. *Home Miscellaneous*, Vol. 161, Folio – 313.

16. Wylly, *op. cit.*, pp. 222–223.

17. Proceedings of the Select Committee of Fort St. George, 1781–1785 (hereafter *Select Committee*), August 20, 1781, Letters from Madras, Vol. X, India Office Library, London.

18. L. D. Compbell, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 247.

19. Letter to Hornby, dated November 24, 1781, *Select Committee*, 22471.

20. Hughes to Macartney, First January, 1782, *Ibid.*, 22418.

21. V.L.B. Mendis, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

23. Letters from Madras, Oct. 16, 1761, India Office Library, London.

24. L. D. Campbell, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 182.

25. V. L. B. Mendis, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

26. L. B. Campbell, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 218.

27. Madras to Court. Letters from Madras II, India Office, Library, London.

28. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (eds.), *op.cit.*

29. V. L. B. Mendis, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

30. Madras to Court, September 9, 1782. Letters from Madras, II, India Office Library, London.

CHAPTER 6 : THE DUTCH EXPELLED

1. V. L. B. Mendis, *The Advent of the British to Ceylon*, p. 79.

2. *Ibid.*, 84.

3. For details about this port, see H.A. Colgate, *Trincomalle and the East Indies Squardon, 1746–1844*, M. A. thesis, University of London, 1959.

4. S. P. Sen, *French in India : First Establishment and Struggle,* pp. 115–149.

5. V. T. Harlow, *Founding of the Second British Empire* (1763–1793), Vol. I, p. 143.

6. These developments may be followed in V. T. Harlow, *op. cit.*

7. See *Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris,* Vol. 2, p. 38.

8. Holland Rose, *William Pitt and the Great War,* p. 250.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Letter of 1st February, 1795 from Grenville to the Duke of York, *Ceylon Library Register* (370 series) I, iii, 110 ff. Since Grenville believed Sri Lanka to be far more important than the Cape of Good Hope for the defence of India (A. W. Ward and G.P.Gooch,eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919,* p. 306) his assurance to the Stadtholder is to be taken with a pinch of salt.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Colvin R. De Silva, *Ceylon Under the British Occupation,* p. 17.

13. Rainbow, *English Expedition to the Dutch East Indies,* pp. 166–237.

14. H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras,* Vol. III, pp. 457–459.

15. *Secret Despatch to Bengal and Circular Despatches,* India Office Library (Board Records) 31, London.

16. Hobart to Angelbeek, Madras, *Military and Political Proceedings,* Vol. 45, Section, 1920 India Office Library. It was Hobart's ultimatum that caused a controversy with the Governor General, Sir John Shore. Shore argued that Hobart should have used conciliatory methods before threatening force.

17. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon Branch X,* 392 ff.

18. N. S. Ramaswami, *Political History of Carnatic Under the Nawabs*, pp, 267 ff.

19. W.J. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army;* Vibart, *Military History of the Madras Engineers and Pioneers.*

20. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, Vol. 45, Sec. 1848.

21. *Ibid.*, 253, XLVI, 2333 ff.

22. Colvin R. De Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

23. Resolutions of the Council of Ceylon, 12th July, 1795, *Ceylon Antiquary*, III, ii, 99 ff.

24. *Ibid.*

25. Colombo, now the capital of the independent Republic of Sri Lanka, was a harbour in the middle ages. But it was not until, in the nineteenth century, the British expanded its facilities that it became the island's leading port. Previous to that, under the Portuguese, the first foreign occupants, the Dutch who succeeded them, and also the British, Galle, then called point de Galle, on the south coast, was the leading port for trade and for passengers. There is an interesting fort in Galle today, overlooking the sea.

26. Colvin, R. De Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Council Proceedings of the 25th and 26th July, 1795. *Ceylon Antiquary*, 103 ff.

29. *Ceylon Antiquary,* 111, ii. 103 ff. Council Proceedings.

30. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 253. XLVI of 2700 ff.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*, 2709 ff·

33. Fornbauer was a Major in the Fusiliers and an engineer by profession. He remained in Sri Lanka after the British capture of the Maritime Provinces and died in 1798.

34. *Ceylon Antiquary*, III, E.I. 109. Council Proceedings.

35. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings, op.cit.*, 2682 ff.

36. *Ibid.*, 2685,

37. *Ibid.*, 2688 ff.

38. *Ibid.*, 2333 ff.

39. *Ibid.*, 2693 ff.

40. *War Office Records at the Public Record Office*, 1, 362 Stuart to Dundas, 31st August and 10th October, 1795 and enclosures.

41. Rev. William Neil (ed.), *The Cleghorn Papers, A Foot note to History Being the Diary, 1795–1796 of Hugh Cleghorn of Stravithie* (hereafter *Cleghorn papers)* 3ff and 15 ff.

42. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 3230 ff.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch*, X, 355 ff.

45. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings, op.cit.*, XLVIII, 3, 960, ff. Agnew to Hobert, 19th October, 1705.

46. *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch, op.cit.*, 405 ff. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings, op.cit.*, 3694 ff.

47. *Ibid*

48. *Cleghorn Papers*, pp 203–204.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

50. *Ibid.*

51. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

52. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 3960 ff. Agnew to Hobert, 19th October, 1795.

53. For the account of the operations, see *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 253, LVIII, 1898 ff.

54. *Ceylon Antiquary*, III, II, 115 ff.

55. *Ibid.*

56. According to V.L.B. Mendis, this was on Feb. 15, 1796, *op.cit.*, p. 165; According to Colvin R. De Silva, it was on the morning of February 16, *op.cit.*, p. 41.

57. *Cleghorn Papers*, 232.

58. See Regulations of Government 1796–1833; also *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 253, LVIII, 902 ff.

59. *Ibid.*, 967 ff.

60. Colvin R. De Silva, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

CHAPTER 7 : THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Andrews came to Madras in 1778 as a writer. In 1790 he was a senior merchant and a member of the Council in Cuddalore in 1791. After the British capture of the Maritime Provinces in 1796, he was appointed Superintendent of the revenues of Jaffna and its dependencies. The first British Governor of the Maritime Provinces, Frederick North, accused him of mishandling the situation, and a revolt broke out, as will be related below. On returning to India he was the Collector of Tiruchirapalli district from 1804 to 1808. In 1810 he became a Judge of the provincial court of appeal. He died in 1821.

2. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings,* 253, XLV, 2117 ff.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. 45, Sec. 221, Hobert to Andrews, 21.7. 1795.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, Sec. 2117.

8. *Ibid.*, 2120.

9. J. P. Lewis, 'Andrews Embassy to Kandy', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch*, No. 70, editors foot note, p. 68.

10. 21.9.1975, Andrews' Account, *Factory Records* (Ceylon) Vol. I.

11. J. P. Lewis, *op. cit.*, foot note to p.89.

12. 1.10.1795, Andrews' Accounts, *Factory Records* (Ceylon), Vol.I.

13. *Ibid.*, 10.10.1795.

14. *Ibid.*, 4.10.1795.

15. Shore to Dundas, 26.8.1795. Furber, *Private Record of an Indian Governor General*, p. 77.

16. Bengal Council to Madras, 4.12.1795, *Madras Political and Military Proceedings*, Sec. 4678.

17. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, LVII, 31ff, Council to Andrews, 1.1.1796.

18. 4.12 1795, Minutes of the Madras Council, *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, Vol. 50, Sec. 4695 ; James Stuart is said to be a cantankerous solider. He had taken a leading part in the arrest by some members of the Madras Council of their own Governor, Lord Pigot, in 1776. Later in 1783, he fell out with Lord Macartney when the latter was the Governor and was dismissed. When Macartney returned to Britain, Stuart fought a duel with him. He was reinstated in service in 1791 and returned to India. He later became Major–General. See N. S. Ramaswami, *Political History of Carnatic Under the Nawabs*, pp. 267 ff.

19. *Ibid.*

20. 31.12.1795. Andrews' Account, *Factory Records* (Ceylon) Vol. I.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*, 18.1.1796.

23. *Ibid.*, 13.1.1796.

24. *Ibid.*, 20.1.1796.

25. 23.1.1796, *Ibid.*

26. Colonial Office Records at the Public Records Office (hereafter *Colonial Office Records*) 55 : 1, Jackson to Stuart, 1.3.1796.

27. *Ibid.*, 28.9.1796 and Stuart to Hobert, 7.6.1796.

28. *Ibid.*, Stuart to Hobert, 24 8.1796 and Christian David to Stuart, 17.10.1796.

29. Douglas S. G. Perera (ed.) *Papers*, Colombo, 1933. These papers were those of Sylvester Douglas, later Lord Glenbervie. He was a brother-in-law of Lord North.

30. Andrews' salary was 150 star pagodas a month and one and a half per cent of collections. His assistants each received 100 pagodas and one per cent.

31. The company purchased for £ 180,000 the 732,885 pounds of prize cinnamon it found in the Colombo warehouses and in the Dutch ships captured in 1795. Though its hopes of a high profit were not realised, it did sell its stocks for 4sh. 7d. to 4sh. 10d. per pound, which was much higher than the five pence with production cost and the about nineteen pence with freight, insurance, customs duty etc. cost. The Dutch had made the high price of 11sh 6d. on an average by manipulation of the market. See C. R. De Silva, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 414

32. *Colonial Office Records*, 55.1. Jackson to Stuart, 1.3.1796.

33. *Ibid.*, Stuart to Hobert, 7.6.1796.

34. *Ibid.*, Jackson to Stuart, 28.4.1796.

35. *Ibid.*, Stuart to Fraser, 26.1.1796.

36 *Jaffna Diary*, 2.5.1796.

37. Colonial Office Records at the Public Records Office, 55.2, Proceedings of 15.3.1798. Hoberts Minute of 16.2.1798.

38. This was done despite a percipient warning from Stuart; "The Moodeliars and headmen are likely a lose many advantages and to suffer in their consequence by the change; they may therefore be expected to make some struggle to oppose arrangements which will operate so powerfully against their

individual interests, and they will most probably have sufficient influence to excite the inhabitants to revolt, while the later remain ignorant that their advantage will be promoted by the new system, although the Moodeliars suffer. The aversion which the Cingalese must naturally feel to have the power transfered from the heads of their own cast to Malabars, who are entire strangers, and for whom they can, as yet, entertain no respect, will greatly assist the Moodeliars in raising discontents, the bad effects of which may render the interference of Military force absolutely necessary, in which events the troops now here are not more than would be required to act with any degree of energy. I am the more induced to give this opinion from frequent communications I have had with Mr. Van Angelbeek on the subject". *Colonial Office Records*, 55.1. Stuart to Hobert, 7th June, 1796.

39. *Jaffna Diary*, 2.9.1796.

40. The following gives the strength of the revenue establishment in Colombo in June, 1798; One "Aumilder", one "Cinhalese Roysom", one "Head Peon", one "Assistant", one "Malabar Roysom", one "Cingalese Roysom", one "Head Peon", one "Assistant Peon", ten "Peons", twelve "Badge peons", three "Hirravahs", one "Translator", one "Intrepreter", one "Cash Keeper", two "Cash Assistants", five "Shroffs", one "Cutwall", one "Cutwall Conicoply" and six peons. The *Amildar* was paid a hundred pagodas. There were also sea customs servants under a *Maniakar* and office servants in Colombo. See *Colonial Office Records*, 55. 2. Proceedings, 20th June 1798.

41. *Wellesly MSS*, 13, 866. North to Mornington, 27.10.1798 and Cleghorn to Dundas, 28.9.1798.

42. G. Valentina, *Voyages and Travels to India*, Ceylon...1802–06.

43. U. Wickremeratne, *The British Administration of the Maritime Provinces of Ceylon*, 1796–1802, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1964.

44. See Jacob Burnand, Fragmens Sur'I Elat...de I'Isle de Ceylon. Burnand was a Dutch official and, therefore, not altogether disinterested in the matter.

45. *Colonial Office Records*, 55.2, proceedings, 15.3.1798, Hoberts Minutes of 1612, 1798.

46. Colvin R. De Silva, *Ceylon Under the British Occupation*, Vol. II, pp. 331–332.

47. A *fanam* was worth about two pence.

48. *Madras Revenue Proceedings*, 275, XIII, 3, 364 and 3, 367.

49. This word may be translated as curtomary service.

50. *Colonial Office Records*, Proceedings, 16.8.1797 and 14.3.1798; de Meuron's Report.

51. *Jaffna Diary*.

52. *Madras Revenue Proceedings*, 275, XV, 88 ff.

53. Colonial Office Records at the Public Records Office, 55–1. Hobert to Stuart, 26.11.1796.

54. *Wellesley MSS*, 13, 867. North to Mornington, 30.10.1799.

55. *Madras Revenue Proceedings*, 275, XVII, 1456 ff.

56. *Ibid.*, 275, XIX, 2343 ff.

57. *Colonial Office Records*, 55.1. Proceedings of 4.8.1707, Hobert Minute of 9.6.1707.

58. *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 253, LXXXIV, 4229.

59. *Ibid.*, 4288.

60. For these developments, see *Madras Military and Political Proceedings*, 254, 11, 4921 ff.

61. V.L.B. Mendis, *The Advent of the British to Ceylon, 1762–1803*, pp. 169–176.

62. *Wellesley MSS*, 13, 866, North to Mornington, 5.6.1798.

63. *Ibid.*, 22.10.1798.

64. *Ibid.*, 5.6.1798.

65. Colvin R. De Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

66. He was a Professor of Civil Law for 20 years at St. Andrews University Rev. W. Neil (ed.), *Cleghorn Papers*, p. 2.

67. *Madras Revenue Proceedings*, 275, XXIV, 837 ff.

68. *Wellesley MSS*, 13, 867, North to Mornington, 30.10.1799.

69. *Ibid.*, 13, 866, North to Mornington 31.9.1799.

70. An "Outcry" was an Auction.

71. *Wellesley MSS*, 13, 867, North to Mornington, 30.11.1799.

72. *Madras Despatches*, XXVI.

73. L.J.B. Turner, *Collected Papers on the History of the Maritime Provinces of Ceylon*, 1795–1835, 1923.

74. *Ibid.*

75. North had a difficult time with General Wemyss, the Commander-in-chief. There was a dispute between the military and the Supreme Court. Without any warning, Wemyss locked the gates of the Colombo fort, alleging that Kandyan spies were trying to enter. North ordered the gates

opened. Thereupon Wemyss said that his authority in Colombo had been flouted and that he would withdraw to a place where it was not challenged. Meanwhile, a judge of the Supreme Court, Lushington, was locked out of the fort on the day its gates were closed. Wemyss was hauled up before the court and bound over to keep the peace. Wemyss wrote an intemperate letter against the judges to the Governor. This letter was made public, and they resolved to bring an action against him in a London Court. Following the letter, the Attorney-General, Alexander Johnston, challenged Wemyss to a duel. North attempted to settle the quarrel by sending Rose, the Registrar of the Supreme Court to Wemyss. But the General called Rose a "demend scoundrel" and challenged him to a duel in England. But Wemyss deposed before a magistrate that it was Rose who had challenged him. The Supreme Court, after a hearing that lasted two whole days, held that no challenge had been intended and reprimanded Johnston. Wemyss apolcgised. Yet, despite all this, it was Johnston who shortly after became Chief Justice. *Colonial Office Records,* 55.15. North to Canden, 26th December, 1804.

76. *Ibid.*, 55.62, Canden to Maitlam, 12.1.1805.

77. *Ibid.*, 54.1.

78. *Douglas MSS*, 113 ff.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Colvin R. De Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

CHAPTER 8 : THE END OF THE NAYAK RULE IN SRI LANKA

1. James Cordiner, *A Description of Ceylon,* Vol. II, p. 160.

2. North to Secret Committee, 21.2.1799, Colonial Office Records, 54.

3. *Ibid.*

4. 'Macdowall's Embassy to Kandy', *Ceylon Literary Register*, 3rd series, Vol. III, 1933–4, p. 263.

5. Karunartna Wijetunga, 'A letter from Governor North to the king of Kandy', *Vidjodoya Journal of Arts, Science and Letters*, i, (1), January 1968, pp. 79–83.

6. Arbuthnot to Davie, 25.6.1803. Colonial Office Records.

7. Ajax Anderson, *The Wanderer in Ceylon*, pp. 188–9.

8. *Ibid.*

9. P. E. Pieris, *Sinhala and Patriots*, p. 682.

10. *Ibid.*, Appendix W, 'The Fate of Muddu Svami', pp. 674–83.

11. North to Hobart, 8.7.1803, Colonial Office Records, 54, 11. The details of the massacre are available in Major Arthur Johnston, *Narrative of an Expedition to Candy in the year 1804*, Appendix B and James Cordiner, *A Description of Ceylon*, Vol. II, pp. 207–20.

12. Mayor Davie's decision was not relished by Governor North. In his report to Lord Hobert he questioned the necessity to surrender. With a Corps of forty Europeans and two hundred Malay troops, he argued, Davie and his men "might cut their way through any army of Candians to any part of the island" (North of Hobert, 8.7.1803, Colonial Office Records, 54.11). This "official obloquy" was not completely shared by the subordinates of Davie who survived the massacre. It is possible that Davie knowing Pilima Talauva's disloyalty to his king trusted him completely. Still some, like Valentina, feel that it is hard to justify Davie's surrender of Muttusamy and his troops on the banks of Mahaweli Ganga. See George Valentina, *Voyages and Travels*..., Vol. I, p. 253.

13. The king Vikrama Rajasinha spared Davie's life. Davie managed to live at Kandy for ten long years. In the beginning he was half starved and neglected. The king was lenient

later. He provided him money, presents and servants. He was even appointed as *Madige Dissawa* (head of the bullock transport department) of the kingdom. See H.W. Codrington, 'Diary of Mr. John D'Oyly', *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society Ceylon Branch,* Vol. XXV, No. 69, p. 11. Davie also took a native wife and had a son, who survived him.

14. In contrast to what Governor North did, Maintland his successor, sent a spy to Kandy with a message concealed in a quill with the following questions : "How many of you ? Your name ? Their name ? Circumstances?" (Maintland to Camden, 22.9.1805, Colonial Office Records, 54. 18). Davie was located by the spy and he came back to Colombo in November 1805 with Davie's reply which read in part : "I have done my duty to my country but it has not done so to me. After tamely allowing for two and half years such cruel murders to pass unavenged, I can scarcely expect that my countrymen will ever come" (*Ibid*). In subsequent years also the British at Colombo, short of provoking a war with Kandy, did everything possible to secure Davie's release. They managed to send letters, concealed in quills and lumps of jaggery, to Davie. They made his release a precondition for any settlement with the Kandyans. But the king Vikrama Rajasinha was adamant. His strength and will power completely shattered by long illness, Major Davie died of a dropsy at Kandy around 1813.

15. P. E. Pieris (*op. cit.*, p. 73) refers to "shocking atrocities, perhaps unrivalled since the days of Jeronyme de Azavedo".

16. Gordon to Cooke, 15.11.1804, Colonial Office Records.

17. Johnston, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-9.

18. Maintland sincerely believed in peaceful co-existance with Kandy. This is reflected in one of his official despatches. He wrote : 'I shall not enter into any foolish expeditions ; I will not throw away the lives of His Majesty's subjects by Disease in burning and destroying the defenceless Huts of the innocent Natives". Maintland to Camden, 19.10.1806, Colonial Office Records, 64, 18.

19. Military History of Ceylon, Colonial Office Records, 59 56.

20. L. B. J. Turner, 'Some Aspects of the Economics of Ceylon, 1797–1808', *Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register*, Vol. IV (4), 1919, pp. 187–8 ; V (2), 1919, p. 68.

21. John Davy, *An Account of the Interior of Ceylon*, pp. 317–9.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 319.

23. The political intrigues of this colourful personality may be followed in L.B.J. Turner, 'Pilima Talawuwe : Maha Adigar, His Political Intrigues, 1798–1805', *Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register*, Vol. III (3), pp 219–25.

24. H. W. Codrington, *op.cit.*, p. 156.

25. Colvin R. De Silva, *Ceylon under the British Occupation*, 1795-1833, p. 126.

26. H.W. Codrington, *op.cit.*, p. 104.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 86, 136.

28. Maintland to Wyndham, 28.2.1807, Colonial Office Records, 54, 25.

29. Maintland to Peel, 26.1.1812, Colonial Office Records, 54, 55.

30. John Davy, *op.cit.*, p. 319.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30.11.1813, Colonial Office Records, 54, 48.

33. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 10.2.1814, Colonial Office Records, 51, 54.

34. John Davy, *op.cit.*, p. 321–3.

35. P.E. Pieris feels that this story was fabricated by Governor Brownrigg to discredit the king. P. E Pieris, *op. cit.*, Appendix H.

36. John Davy, *op.cit.*, p 325.

37. Brownrigg to Bathurst, 30.10.1814, Colonial Office Records, 54, 53.

38. *Ibid.*, Also 31–12.1814.

39. T. K. William (Tr), 'Capture of Sri Wikkrama Rajasinha by the British : an account alleged to be from an eye witness', *Monthly Literary Register and Notes and Queries for Ceylon*, Vol. IV (1), January 1896, pp. 20–2.

40. P. E. Pieris, *op. cit.*, Appendix 7, pp. 230–36.

41. These royal heirlooms comprised of king Vikrama Rajasinha's ceremonial throne and foot stool, crown, the sward of state and the golden staff. The ceremonial throne, a superb piece of workmanship is covered in gold sheeting and encrusted with jewels. Its arms are a pair of lions of Sinhala, and a large sun, symbolizing the origin of the Kandyan monorch, surmounted its back. It was a present from the Dutch, in 1792, to the Kandyan king. They were presented to the Prince Regent by Governor North and adored the Windsor Castle. They are now displayed in the Colombo Museum.

42. Based on William Tolfrey, probable author of *Gentlemen on the spot*, p. 31. Tolfrey, succeeded D'Oyly as the Chief Translator.

43. The details may be gleaned from William Granville, *Deportation of Sri Vikrama Rajasinha*, originally published at Colombo in 1830 and later reproduced in *Ceylon Literary Register* Vol. II, No. 11, 1934, pp. 487–504 and Vol. III, No. 12, 1934, pp. 543–50. About king Vikrama Rajasinha Granville observes : His person and manners possessed something peculiarly striking and distinguished ; and no one could

be five minuits in his presence without discovering a grandeur and superiority about him which is almost impossible to define. He was about six feet in height ; his limbs were of Herculean size, but beautifully formed ; his head small ; his features regular and handsome ; his eyes large and intensely black and piercing ; his hands and feet small but elegantly turned. He was unaccustomed to speak in a low tone of voice. His superiority in the presence of others was more or less manifested by the power and elevation of his voice. He thought none but the mean and humble whispered, and because he was the most despotic kings, his voice ought therefore to be raised to the highest pitch in addressing his inferiors (*Ibid.*, p. 544). This tallies with Captain Percival's description of the king. He likened him to Henry VIII (Captain Robert Percival, *An Account of the Island of Ceylon*, p. 404).

44. The king Vikram Rajasinha observed to Major Hook who escorted him to Colombo after his capture by the British : "The English Governors have one advantage over us kings of Kandy ; they have counsellors about them, who never allow them to do anything in a passion, and that is the reason you have so few punishments, but unfortunately for us the offender is dead before resentment has subsided". William Tolfrey, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

45. *The Ceylon Journal* , Vol. XIII, 18 Feb. 1832.

46. Henry Marshall, *Ceylon*, pp. 137-9. Dr. Marshall was the medical officer attached to the troops in the island. He has also written another useful book—*Notes on the Medical Topography of the Interior of Ceylon.* It was published in England in 1821.

47. The convention was signed by John D'Oyly and James Sutherland, the Governor's private Secretary, on behalf of the British and Ehelepola and nine other chiefs on behalf of the Kandyan people. The convention "abolished and

extinguished" all claim and title of the Nayaks ("Malabar race") to the dominion of the Kandyan provinces; The dominion of the Kandyan provinces was "vested in the sovereign of the British empire"; "the royal dues and revenues of the Kandyan provinces" were "to be managed and collected for His Majesty's use".

About the attitude of the Kandyans to being party to the convention, Marshall observes : "It being generally believed that in seeming to do so, they submitted with reluctance, but with admirable grace, to the force of circumstances, and did as they were desired leaving to time the development of result" (H. Marshall, Ceylon, pp. 164-5).

48. A dedicated man, D'Oyly was fluent in Sinhala and was sympathetic towards Sinhalese. Neither he married nor visited England during his service. After fourteen years of stay he worked himself to death in Sri Lanka on 25,, May, 1824. A broken fluted masonary column in the old Garrison cementery at Kandy marks D'Oyly's grave.

49. Ehelepola's frame of mind may be understood from an incident after the capture of the king. An official of the Palace brought to him some treasures entrusted to him by the king while he was fleeing Kandy. Ehelepola received them and donned the golden hat and coat of royalty. When the official objected to his behaviour, Ehelepola said that he would be the king in a few days and thus justified his action. (P. Pieris, *op. cit.*, p. 233). Ehelepola was arrested in 1818 by Governor Brownrigg for his suspected role in the rebellion against the British that rocked the Kandyan Provinces. He was held in custody at Colombo till 1825 and later banished in the same year, with his relations and servants to Mauritius where he died in April, 1829.

50. Molligoda served the British for nearly eight years and died on 26 October, 1823.

APPENDIX I

ARTICLES OF THE TREATY PROPOSED TO THE NAYAK KING BY THE BRITISH IN 1762 : TEXT*

"Ist—That the English East India Company shall have permission to establish a Settlement or Settlements in the Bay of Cottiarum in the River of Mattu Cullapay, or Batacal, or in the River Chilaun in the Districts of Annawolandane, or at any other place on the sea coast of the island of Ceylon, as they shall hereafter find most convenient for carrying on their trade, which now, is or shall hereafter be in the possession of the king, giving notice to the king of their intentions of establishing such settlement, before they erect any buildings there.

"2nd. — That the English East India Company shall have liberty to Provide, and His Majesty shall issue out orders to his subjects to furnish them with Cinnamon on the same conditions they provided it to the Dutch, and with such quantity as they shall have occasion for, to be at such Settlements as shall be hereafter agreed upon ; and His Majesty is requested to issue out his orders for collecting, with as much dispatch as possible, a quantity of Cinnamon at Matucullapay in readiness for a ship which may be sent fit it in September or October.

"3rd. — That no pepper, or Beetle nut shall be sold by any of His Majesty's subjects to any other but the English East India Company, to whom they shall be obliged to deliver those articles on the same terms as they were deliver'd by them to the Dutch.

**Military Sundries*, Vol. XVII, Tamil Nadu Archives.

"4th. — That his Majesty's subjects shall have free liberty to bring their goods, from any port of His Majesty's dominions to the English settlements, without receiving any Molestation or Interuption from any person or persons whatsoever.

"5th. — That His Majesty's subject shall be prohibited from carrying on any trade, or carrying any of their commodities, to any other settlements or places but those of the English East India Company.

"6th — That His Majesty, on Application being made to him, shall issue out his orders to the subjects, to furnish, on being paid for them at reasonable rates, such Timber, stone or other materials, as may be wanted for erecting forts, warehouses, or any other buildings, at such places as the English may hereafter find it convenient, and have the king's permission to settle at, and to supply likewise such a number of workmen as may be necessary, who shall be paid for their labour.

"7th. — That in case the English should find it necessary at any place or places, where they shall have his Majesty's permission to settle, to pull down or remove any House or Buildings that may be near or upon the Spot which they shall think most convenient for erecting their Fortification, Warehouses, or Buildings on, the Inhabitants or Proprietors of such Houses or Buildings shall be obliged, on proper notice being given them, to pull them down and remove the materials at their own expence (sic) having first the grant of another spot of ground of equal dimensions with that they shall have removed from, to erect such houses or buildings on, if they see proper.

"8th. — That any European belonging to any English settlement, Ship or Vessel (sic) any person that shall have been guilty of any Crime or Offence; any servant or slave belonging to the English or inhabitants living under their protection and government, that shall have deserted or run away from any of their settlements into the king's territories, shall, on application made to His Majesty by the Govr. of the settlements from which they shall have deserted or run away, be deliver'd up as soon as possible after such application has been made ; and in the like manner any of the Majesty's subjects, who have been guilty of any crime or offence, and have made their escape to an English Settlement for Protection, shall, on proper application being made, be deliver'd up.

"9th. — That the English, at all places where they may have settlements, shall have the priviledge of trying and punishing by the Laws of their own country (of whatever kind the nature of the offence shall be) all persons of what Nations soever who shall have within their limits and under their jurisdiction.

"10th. — That at any time when it shall be found necessary for the English to assi(s)t His Majesty with Troops, His Majesty shall oblige himself to furnish the necessary draft and carriage Bullocks for transporting the artillery, stores, and baggage of the army, and to provide the troops with provisions at his own charge, so long as they shall be employed in the field upon his service.

"11th. — That such officers as shall be employed with the Troops in the Field upon His Majesty's Service, shall have the liberty of travelling either in Pallankeens or on Horseback to or in any part of his Territories when they shall be employed upon such Service.

"12th. — That the same Allowance of Batta shall be paid by His Majesty to the Officers of the Troops while in the field as are allowed them on the coast of Coromandel.

"13th. — That all sorts of Military or other stores which shall be expended, broken or lost on the king's service shall be paid for by his Majesty.

"14th. — That in consideration of the great expense (sic) which will attend erecting Fortifications, Warehouses and other Buildings at such Places as the English may settle at, and for maintaining a Military Force for taking the field whenever the king shall have occasion for their service, His Majesty shall make over to the English East India Company for their sole use and Benefit, and as their property for ever, certain countries or Districts from whence they may be enabled to reimburse themselves for such heavy charges".

APPENDIX II

BRITISH ORDER ON THE LEVY OF COCONUT TAX : TEXT*

"Notice is hereby given that from a wish to relieve the lower order of people from the many personal taxes they now labour under and from a conviction that the Revenue is more justly collected by taxing the produce of the soil, the following arrangements will take place from the Ist of September next in part of the Revenue for the ensuing year. The Poll Tax or Body Tax to be abolished ; nor shall any class or order of the free inhabitants of the Island under the protection of the English be obliged to work without receiving an adequate compensation for their labour. But in order to provide for the necessary expenses in protecting the Island and its inhabitants, a tax is intended to be levied on the different coconut plantations where such plantations exceeds fifty trees in number, the rate of taxation to be one silver fanam a year for every tree bearing fruit or yielding Toddy. Any plantations of fifty trees or less to be exempt from duty which is meant as a relief to the poor".

(Signed) ROBERT ANDREWS,
Resident and Superintendent of the Revenue

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* *Jaffna Diary*, 15th July, 1796.

APPENDIX III

PROCLAMATION AT THE "CONVENTION" OF 1815 : TEXT*

At a Convention, held on 2nd day of March, in the year of Christ 1815, and the Singalese year 1736, at the Palace in the City of Kandy, between His Excellency Lieutenant-General Robert Brownrigg, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the British Settlements and Territories in the Island of Ceylon, acting in the name and on behalf of His Majesty George the Third, King, and His Royal Highness George Prince of Wales, Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on the one part, and the Adikars, Dissaves, and other principal chiefs of the Kandyan provinces, on behalf of the inhabitants, and in presence of the Mohottales, Coraals, Vidaans, and other subordinate head men from the several provinces, and of the people then and there assembled, on the other part, it is agreed and established as follows :

1st. That the cruelties and oppressions of the Malabar ruler, in the arbitrary and unjust infliction of bodily tortures, and the pains of death, without trial and sometimes without an accusation or the possibility of a crime, and in the general contempt and contravention of all civil rights, have become flagrant, enormous, and intolerable ; the acts and maxims of His Government being equally and entirely devoid of that justice which should secure the safety of his subjects, and of that good faith which might obtain a beneficial intercourse with the neighbouring settlements.

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* Henry Marshall, *Ceylon*, Colombo, Reprint, 1969.

2nd. That the Rajah Sri Wickreme Rajah Sinha, by the habitual violation of the chief and most sacred duties of a sovereign, has forfeited all claims to the title, or the powers annexed to the same, and is declared fallen and deposed from the office of king ; his family and relatives, whether in the ascending, descending, or collateral line, and whether by affinity or blood, are also for ever excluded from the throne ; and all claim and title of the Malabar race to the dominion of the Kandyan provinces is abolished and extinguished.

3rd. That all male persons being, or pretending to be, relations of the late Rajah Sri Wickreme Rajah Sinha, either by affinity or blood, and whether in the ascending, descending or collateral line, are hereby declared enemies to the government of the Kandan provinces, and excluded and prohibited from entering those provinces, on any pretence whatever, without a written permission for the purpose, by the authority of the British government, under the pains and penalties of martial law, which is hereby declared to be in force for that purpose; and all male persons of the Malabar caste, now expelled from the said provinces, are, under the same penalties, prohibited from returning, except with the premission before mentioned.

4th. The dominion of the Kandyan provinces is vested in the sovereign of the British empire, and to be excercised through the Governors or Lieutenant–Governors of Ceylon for the time being, and their accredited agents, saving to the Adikars, Dissaves, Mohottales, Coralls, Vidaans, and all other chief and subordinate native head men, lawfully appointed by authority of the British government; the rights, privileges, and powers of their respective offices, and to all classes of the people the safety of their persons and property, with their civil rights and immunities, according to the laws, institutions, and customs established and in force amongst them.

5th. The religion of Boodhoo, professed by the chiefs and inhabitants of these provinces, is declared inviolable; and its rights, ministers, and places of worship, are to be maintained and protected.

6th. Every species of bodily torture, and all mutilation of limb, member, or organ, are prohibited and abolished.

7th. No sentence of death can be carried into execution against any inhabitant, except by the written warrant of the British Governor or Lieutenant-Governor for the time being, founded on a report of the case made to him through the accedited agent or agents of the government resident in the interior, in whose presence all trials for capital offences are to take place.

8th. Subject to these conditions, the administration of civil and criminal justice and police, over the Kandyan inhabitants of the said provinces, is to be exercised according to established forms, and by the ordinary authorities, saving always the inherent right of government to redress grievances and reform abuses, in all instances whatever, particular or general, where such interposition shall become necessary.

9th. Over all other persons, civil or military, residing in or resorting to these provinces, not being Kandyans, civil and criminal justice, together with police, shall, until the pleasure or His Majesty's government in England may be otherwise declared, be administered in the manner following:

First, All persons, not being commissioned or non-commissioned military officers, soldiers, or followers of the army, usually held liable to military discipline, shall be subject to the magistracy of the accredited agent or the agents of the British government, in all cases except of murder, which shall be tried by special commissions, to be issued from time to time by the governor for that purpose. Provided always, as to such charges of murder wherein any British subject may be defendant, who might be tried for the same by the laws of United Kindom of Great Britain and Ireland, in force for the trial of offences committed by British subjects in foreign parts no such British subject shall be tried on any charge of murder, alleged to have been perpetrated in the Kandyan provinces, otherwise than by virtue of such laws of the United Kingdom.

Second, Commissioned or non-commissioned military officers, soldiers, or followers of the army, usually held amenable to military discipline, shall, in all civil and criminal cases, wherein they may be defendants, be liable to the laws, regulations, and customs of war, reserving to the governor and commander-in-chief, in all cases falling under this ninth article, an unlimited right of review over every proceeding, civil or military, had by virtue thereof, and

reserving also full power to make such particular provisions, conformable to the general spirit of the said article, as may be found necessary to carry its principle into full effect.

10th. Provided always, that the operation of the several preceding clauses shall not be contravened by the provisions of temporary or partial proclamation published during the advance of the army ; which provisions, in so far as incompatible with the said preceding articles, are hereby repealed.

11th. The royal dues and revenues of the Kandyan provinces are to be managed and collected for His Majesty's use, and the support of the provincial establishment, according to lawful custom, and under the direction and superintendence of the accredited agent or agents of the British government.

12th. His Excellency the Governor will adopt provisionally and recommend to the confirmation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on behalf of His Majesty, such dispositions in favour of the trade of these provinces, as may facilitate the export of their products, and improve the returns, whether in money, or in salt, cloths, or other commodities, useful and desirable to the inhabitants of the Kandyan country.

God save the King!
By His Excellency's command,
JAMES SUTHERLAND,
Dep. Secretary.

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